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ABSTRACT

The introductory essay of this book states that the value of formal and generic analysis must be tested heuristically, in application. With that value as the keynote to the essay collection, the theoretical perspectives of form and genre in rhetorical criticism are discussed, and five critical essays give evidence of the constraints and creative options that a focus on form and genre can present. The final essay comments on the five critical essays in the context of the theoretical perspectives that were initially discussed. (RL)

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Form and Genre

Shaping Rhetorical Action

Edited and with an introductory essay by

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell
Kathleen Hall Jamieson

Contributors:

Edwin Black * * * Ernest G. Bormann * * * Ronald Carpenter * * * Bruce Gronbeck * * * Stephen Michael Halloran * * * James Scott Measell * * * Herbert Simons

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This volume exists because the Research Board of the Speech Communication Association encouraged the study of form and genre in rhetorical criticism and allocated funds for a conference to stimulate thinking and research in this area. With additional support from the University of Kansas, a conference was held in June, 1976, at Lawrence, Kansas, on " 'Significant Form' in Rhetorical Criticism." The call for papers stated: "The phrase 'significant form' is intended to refer to recurring patterns in discourse or action including, among others, the repeated use of images, metaphors, arguments, structural arrangements, configurations of language or a combination of such elements into what critics have termed 'genres' or 'rhetorics'." The essays by Carpenter, Gronbeck, Halloran, Measell, and Simons were competitively selected to be presented at the conference. The essays by Bormann and Campbell and Jamieson are responses to the conference deliberations. We thank all of the authors for their cooperation and promptness in preparing the essays for publication. We particularly appreciate the contribution made by Ernest Bormann.

We and all the conference participants owe a special debt to Edwin Black who set the 'key note' with his paper and improved the quality of the deliberations through his comments as the conference critic.

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Karlyn Kohrs Campbell

Kathleen Hall Jamieson

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FORM AND GENRE IN RHETORICAL CRITICISM: AN INTRODUCTION

KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL

KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON

On the night of July 12, 1976, Representative Barbara Jordan of Texas electrified the Democratic convention with a keynote address that began with these words:

> It was one hundred and forty-four years ago that members of the Democratic Party first met in convention to select a presidential candidate. Since that time, Democrats have continued to convene once every four years and draft a party platform and nominate a presidential candidate. And our meeting this week is a continuation of that tradition
>
> But there is something different about tonight; there is something special about tonight. What is different? What is special ? I, Barbara Jordan, am a keynote speaker.[1]

At that moment, for hundreds of black and female delegates and for millions of other listeners, she embodied the idea she expressed in the next paragraph: "And I feel that, notwithstanding the past, my presence here is one additional piece of evidence that the American dream need not forever be deferred." She herself *was* the proof of the argument she was making.

Many critics who watched and heard her speak will have recognized a recurrent rhetorical form, a reflexive form, a form called "enactment" in which the speaker incarnates the argument, *is* the proof of the truth of what is said. And if one recognized the form, one understood the force of her speech; one knew why her words were greeted with sustained applause.

Critics who have studied keynote addresses at national nominating conventions also recognized that this was a typical example of that kind of speech.[2] She set the "key note", established a basic theme intended to

rejuvenate the faithful and attract all Americans. She contended that the Democratic party was the best available means through which the American dream could be realized. With the exception of the reflexive form used at the beginning and the end, and the self-conscious awareness of the rhetorical options available to a keynoter ("I could easily spend this time praising the accomplishments of this Party and attacking the record of the Republicans. I do not choose to do that. I could list the many problems which cause people to feel cynical, frustrated, and angry. . . . Having described these and other problems, I could sit down without offering any solutions. I do not choose to do that either."), this was a rather ordinary keynote that, like many others, returned to basic principles; in Jordan's case, the emphasis was on constitutional principles, a subtle echo of her opening speech in the House Judiciary Committee debate on articles of impeachment. In fact, the student of keynote addresses will be able to predict, we think accurately, that this speech will not be memorable except as a speech *given by* Barbara Jordan.

Why was Jordan's speech somewhat disappointing to those who were deeply moved by the opening statements? The explanation is most easily made if one compares her keynote address to a rhetorical act that fulfills the promise of the reflexive form more fully.[3]

Like Barbara Jordan, the narrative *persona* of Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* embodies the position she is arguing. More specifically, the author creates an imaginary woman, Shakespeare's sister Judith, who embodies all the dead women poets whose talents have been destroyed. Like Shakespeare, we are told, she was greatly gifted. To avoid early marriage to a neighboring wool-stapler, she ran away to London to seek her fortune in the theatre. Unlike Shakespeare, she could find no outlet for her talents ("a woman acting is like a dog dancing. . ."). Finally, the actor-manager Nick Green pities her and takes her in; she finds herself with child, kills herself, and is buried at an obscure crossroads. At the end of the book, the reflexive forms of the narrator and of Shakespeare's sister Judith come together.

> Now my belief is that this poet who never wrote a word and was buried at the crossroads still lives. She lives in you and in me, and in many other women who are not here tonight, for they are washing up the dishes and putting the children to bed. But she lives; for great poets do not die; they are continuing presences; they need only the opportunity to walk among us in the flesh. . . . For my belief is that if we live another century or so. . . and have five hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think. . . then. . . the dead poet who was Shakespeare's sister will put on the body she has so often laid down.[4]

Barbara Jordan said, "A lot of years (have) passed since 1832, and during

that time it would have been most unusual for any national political party to ask a Barbara Jordan to deliver a keynote address. But tonight, here I am." Imagine Congresswoman Jordan saying these words next:

> They did not make keynote addresses, nor indeed addresses of any sort, the Barbara Jordans of those days. They were not welcomed into this, or any other, political party. Surely some of them, some of those blacks, some of those women, were as able as I, and some undoubtedly were far more gifted. But they lived out their lives in obscurity, their talents unused and their abilities unexercised. And they died without knowing the joy of participation in the democratic system. They died, often in poverty and pain, and always without the fulfillment that America promised them.
>
> They were many in number, these women and blacks and minorities. They were scattered across this great nation. Yet on occasion, I somehow think of them as a single person, a single Barbara Jordan, alone, defeated in her fight to enter the arena of political life.
>
> And so tonight I ask your support for our Democratic Party and our democratic cause, not because of the principles I could enunciate, but simply because of Barbara Jordan. Simply because of Barbara Jordan. Not because of me; not for myself do I ask your aid. Such a plea is the beginning of tyranny and must always be rejected. No. it is not for *this* Barbara Jordan that I ask your help, but for *that other* Barbara Jordan that I have pictured struggling through the years, pleading to be allowed to contribute as I now do.
>
> Because you see, I do not think she died, that other Barbara Jordan. I hear her voice calling out tonight; I see her arms stretched out demanding access to the political life that I enjoy. And I lift my voice, and hold out my arms, and call, "Welcome."
>
> It is for that other Barbara Jordan, for all the blacks and women and minorities and poor people of yesterday and tomorrow, that I ask your support.

The form is now completed, fully realized. The imaginary speech (reflecting, we hope, the style of the real Barbara Jordan) enables the critic to compare the actual keynote with the model we have created in order to explain the limitations of the actual address. Critics may also compare Jordan's keynote with other keynote addresses to determine the essential characteristics of keynotes and to explain why, unlike the keynote delivered by John Glenn the same evening, Jordan's address evoked such intense response among the delegates.

This brief critique contains, in microcosm, the concepts and concerns of this volume. It discerns a recurrent form and uses the form to compare one rhetorical act to two other groups of rhetorical acts—keynote addresses (speeches given on similar occasions) and discourses based on the form of "enactment." It implies that the analysis of forms and the comparison of

rhetorical acts are essential elements in critical interpretation and evaluation.

In this opening essay we shall 1) trace, briefly, the beginnings of formal and generic concerns in the modern history of rhetorical criticism; 2) discuss some selected criticisms that make generic claims; 3) examine the relationship between the concepts of "form" and "genre"; 4) suggest the role of a generic perspective in the total enterprise of criticism; 5) introduce this volume of essays.

Rhetorical Criticism Revisited

A survey of modern scholarship treating the nature of rhetorical criticism[5] reveals that an interest in formal analysis and in discovering affinities among discourses and traditions evident in the history of rhetoric is not a contemporary fad. From the inception of rhetorical criticism as a distinct scholarly enterprise, critics have attempted to specify what forms are of particular interest to rhetoricians. They have also recognized the need for a history of rhetoric that would highlight the relationships among rhetorical acts.

In 1925, Herbert Wichelns distinguished the criticism of rhetoric from the criticism of literature. The "felt difficulty" he expressed was an absence of serious criticism of oratory ("a permanent and important human activity") and a failure to take note of distinctively rhetorical dimensions of style, invention, organization, and adaptation to the experiences and expectations of an audience.[6] Although he emphasized that rhetorical criticism was concerned with immediate effects on a specific audience in a given situation, he criticized histories of oratory because they did not consider its evolution.[7] He recognized the relationships among rhetoric, politics, and literature, even literary forms: "Rhetorical criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) and literature; its atmosphere is that of the public life, its tools are those of literature; its concern is with the ideas of the people as influenced by their leaders."[8] It is noteworthy that although scholars have used Wichelns to legitimate critical emphasis on the immediate effects of single speeches, he also called for an approach to oratory that recognized its evolution through history. Similarly, although he denied that the "permanence" and "beauty" of a discourse were of interest to rhetorical critics, he recognized the importance of literary tools in rhetorical criticism.

In 1948, building on the foundations laid by Wichelns and others, Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird produced, in *Speech Criticism*, a detailed statement of the methods, functions, and standards of judgment appropriate to rhetorical criticism. Their work surveyed the history of rhetorical theory to determine critical principles and presented a system for examining speeches and speakers that came to be called neo-Aristotelian[9]—analysis in terms of the canons and modes of proof, an emphasis on ef-

fects, and classification of speeches into deliberative, epideictic, and forensic genres. Because of the emphasis on individual speeches and speakers there is little room for a comparative or evolutionary approach. In one sense, however, this work recognizes the influence of prior rhetoric on subsequent rhetoric as it is based on a concept that criticism determines what is best in rhetorical practice and thus is the mechanism through which both theory and practice can be modified and improved.[10] The critical perspective of Thonssen and Baird is best illustrated by the criticisms found in the three volumes of *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*.[11]

Contemporaneously, Barnet Baskerville and Ernest Wrage recognized the need for a systematic approach to criticism[12] and for an historical approach to rhetoric.[13] Their collaboration produced two volumes of speeches with historical and biographical notes surveying American speechmaking from 1788 to the 1960's. The editors described the first volume in these terms: "This volume is not a garland of rhetorical flowers, a mere miscellany of eloquent passages. . . . Nor is its purpose that of catering to an antiquarian sentimental attachment to great speeches of the past. . . . Rather, we have selected and juxtaposed speeches in order to provide the substance and framework of an American forum as a venture in intellectual history through public address."[14] The preface to the second volume is more explicitly generic: "This issue-centered approach recommends itself because it establishes secure linkages between the function of speech in a free society and the historical processes which speech shapes and by which it is shaped."[15] The anthologies were arranged to compare and contrast statements of prevailing viewpoints on major issues and suggested a critical perspective that would chart conflicting attitudes toward central themes in American society. However, the volumes did not provide a developmental analysis to show how issues evolved through time or how earlier articulations influenced subsequent expressions of similar concepts.

In 1952, Leland Griffin wrote "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements." In his opening remarks he explained that the impulse toward the criticism of historical and social movements arose out of methodological constraints: "The recommendation has been made, for example, that we pay somewhat less attention to the single speaker and more to speakers—that we turn our attention from the individual 'great orator' and undertake research into such selected acts and atmospheres of public address as would permit the study of a multiplicity of speakers, speeches, audiences, and occasions."[16] Griffin's response was to propose the study of movements and to suggest methods by which this might be accomplished. Since that time, a plethora of movement studies, too numerous to cite, has examined political campaigns, the New Left, the Radical Right, old and new feminism, black protest, child labor reform, and many others.[17] The interest in movements and campaigns encouraged other critics to suggest ways to refine the study of movement rhetoric.[18] In our view, this activity attests to an intense interest in studying bodies of rhetoric that illustrate

the development, fruition, and degeneration of rhetorical forms and strategies.

In 1965, a generic approach to rhetorical criticism received its first explicit sanction with the appearance of Edwin Black's *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*. Like Griffin and others, Black recognized a serious limitation in the dominant critical paradigm: "The neo-Aristotelians ignore the impact of the discourse on rhetorical conventions, its capacity for disposing an audience to expect certain kinds of justification in later discourses that they encounter, even on different subjects."[19] The traditional mode of criticism did not, and perhaps could not, trace traditions or recognize affinities and recurrent forms, the elements of a developmental rhetorical history. Black proposed an alternative, generic frame of reference. For him, a generic perspective presumed that 1) "there is a limited number of situations in which a rhetor can find himself"; 2) "there is a limited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond rhetorically to any given situational type"; 3) "the recurrence of a given situational type through history will provide the critic with information on the rhetorical responses available in that situation"; and 4) "although we can expect congregations of rhetorical discourses to form at distinct points along the scale, these points will be more or less arbitrary."[20] Although the clusters described by Black were somewhat taxonomic, i.e., classifications based on the relative pre-eminence of rational or emotive elements in a discourse, the argumentative and exhortative genres he described were not discrete or sharply delineated. Rather, they represented modes of discourse characterized by certain strategies that seemed more likely to occur in certain kinds of situations. The scale of transactions he developed (a scale he argued would reflect situations, strategies, and effects to a relatively equal degree) serves to suggest affinities between discourses of different kinds as well as to suggest generic clusterings. However, the alternative frame of reference was only a beginning. It did not suggest how a generic approach to criticism might be used to write a developmental history of rhetoric nor did it provide a detailed introduction to a generic perspective. Whatever the limits of this beginning, Black's work was noteworthy on several counts: it argued for an organic critical method, one which emphasized form but was not formulary; it located clusters of discourses based on recurrent strategies, situations, and effects; and it revealed the weaknesses of the neo-Aristotelian perspective as a basis for writing a developmental history of rhetoric. For these reasons, among others, Black's book was a precursor of the explosion of unconventional critical essays that appeared in the late 1960's and 1970's.

In 1968, Lloyd Bitzer made a detailed analysis of the situational or scenic component of rhetorical action.[21] He argued that it was the situation which called the discourse into existence and provided a vocabulary through which to describe the variables in "rhetorical situations." The terminology permits critics to compare and contrast rhetorical situations and the discourses they engender. In addition to the provocative notions

that both rhetorical acts and rhetorical criticism are grounded in rhetorical situations, the essay suggests the important influence of prior rhetorical action on subsequent discourse. According to Bitzer, comparable situations prompt comparable responses, "hence rhetorical forms are born and a special vocabulary, grammar and style are established. . . . because we experience situations and the rhetorical response to them, a form of discourse is not only established but comes to have a power of its own—the tradition itself tends to function as a constraint upon any new response in the form."[22]

Some of the controversies raised by Bitzer's positions have been examined elsewhere.[23] Other questions, more relevant to form and genre in criticism, remain. What, for example, would constitute a case disproving this theory of the relationship between the situation and the discourse? For instance, if Bitzer can claim that a presidential inaugural or a Fourth of July address, clearly inappropriate to the occasion on which it was given, was not a "fitting" response to the situation, then "appropriate" discourse confirms the theory but "inappropriate" rhetorical acts cannot disconfirm it. If so, how can the concept of the rhetorical situation be used as a basis for recognizing and defining recurrent forms? In addition, one may ask, do comparable situations ever exist? It is possible to accept Bitzer's formulation of the rhetorical situation while arguing that all situations are idiosyncratic and hence do not and cannot produce recurring forms. Finally, could an alternative theoretical model, a theory of commonplaces, for example, account for recurring forms more parsimoniously? While Bitzer's essay has made a significant contribution to a generic perspective, some questions persist.

In 1968, Lawrence Rosenfield published a critical essay based on a generic perspective in which he compared apologic speeches by Harry Truman and Richard Nixon.[24] In 1969, a second comparative criticism revealed the similarities between the rhetorical postures of Patrick Henry and George Wallace.[25] Neither essay seeks to discover a genre; each presumes a recognized genre already exists (the mass media apologia and the anti-aggressor rhetorician, respectively). Rosenfield's "analogs" serve to enumerate the factors of generic similarity and dissimilarity. The possibilities and limitations of comparative criticism that presumes a pre-existing genre are illustrated in essays by Chesebro and Hamsher,[26] Butler,[27] and by the essay on the historical jeremiad found in this volume.

In the late 1960's these critical interests and concerns culminated in an explosion of articles describing "genres", "rhetorics", or the salient formal attributes of certain groups of rhetorical acts. Retrospectively, it appears that, in most cases, the use of "genre" or "rhetoric of" was a matter of convenience rather than an assertion of the existence of a discrete type of symbolic act. For example, the phrase "the rhetoric of . . ." was used to describe bodies of discourse defined by purpose, as "the rhetoric of desecration"[28] or "the rhetoric of confrontation"[29] meaning, respectively, rhetorical acts intended to desecrate or confront. The phrase was also used

to identify the source of the discourse, as for instance, "the rhetoric of the New Left"[30] or "the rhetoric of black power"[31] meaning, respectively, rhetorical acts emanating from groups identified as part of the New Left or from groups identifying themselves with the demands represented by the phrase "black power." While these phrases do touch on the strategic and substantive elements that ordinarily serve to define genres, they seem to have been used somewhat casually, in many cases, as the most succinct way in which to entitle the body of rhetorical acts the author wished to discuss without necessarily entailing a fully developed claim to generic particularity.

Generic Criticisms

However, in this same period, a small number of essays began to appear which made explicit claims that genres existed, genres as varied as the diatribe, the papal encyclical, doctrinal rhetoric, and contemporary women's rights rhetoric. Once these appeared, theoretical questions were inevitable: Just what is a genre? How does one justify a generic claim? Why do generic criticism? How does generic criticism differ from other kinds of rhetorical criticism? In Sections III and IV, we shall address these questions directly; here, we shall examine the answers given by critics in selected generic criticisms.

In 1950, Harold Zyskind, a scholar in the field of English, published a generic analysis of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.[32] He presented his analysis as an example of generic criticism that would enable others to see its value as a method for treating texts in undergraduate courses. His approach to genres was deductive: the measurement of the text against a preexisting model. After justifying his view of the Address as rhetoric (rather than as history or political philosophy), Zyskind attempted to determine whether the address was best viewed as epideictic or deliberative rhetoric. He justified this classical, even traditional, approach to genre on the grounds that it requires the student to scrutinize the text in a systematic manner. The value of generic classification should be tested by asking, "Are the meaning and purpose of the Address—in its uniqueness—in any way illuminated by an analysis of it as belonging to that genre?"[33] The bulk of his critique develops a case for concluding that the epideictic elements in the Address are subordinate to its deliberative purpose. This is done through an analysis of structure, imagery, diction, the role of the listener, and the relationship between the audience and the "we" of the Address. The criticism produces not only a generic placement but a statement of the unique qualities of this particular act:

> Thus the deliberative aim of the Address is not to persuade the listeners of the truth of the idea that the Union must be reborn. In a

logical sense the truth of the general idea that future action is needed is largely taken for granted. The aim rather is to take this accepted general idea and sink it deeply into the feelings of the audience, fix it as an emotional experience so powerful that each listener will, at any crucial time, do what he can specifically for the future of the nation to which he is here dedicated.[34]

If Zyskind's essay is taken as the model he intends it to be, generic criticism is an orderly means of close textual analysis. It unifies the questions the critic asks about various formal and substantive elements. Generic analysis is justified if and only if the meaning and the purpose of the work are illuminated by struggling with the evidence to determine the work's best classification. Finally, Zyskind reminds us that each of the classical genres was an amalgam of elements drawn from the situation, the issue, the lines of argument, the audience, and the appropriate diction. As he notes in this case, an address may have some elements of one genre (epideictic) and still be an exemplar of another (deliberative).

Like Zyskind, Windt's method is deductive, at least in part.[35] He develops a model of the diatribe from the practices of the ancient Cynics, a model which is then applied to the practices of contemporary Yippies to establish a recurrent mode of symbolic action. Like Zyskind, Windt develops a genre which synthesizes situational, substantive, and stylistic elements, and he justifies his classification in terms of the illumination it provides of the behaviors of apparently self-defeating persuaders of both ancient and contemporary times.

Unlike Zyskind and Windt, Hart proceeds inductively to survey a variety of discourses to see if there are clusters of similar symbolic acts.[36] Out of these tests, he cautiously posits a genre of doctrinal rhetoric. Like Zyskind, this cluster of acts reflects not only substantive and stylistic features but the relationship between the speaker and the audience. Since this is the most systematically developed inductive genre, the points of similarity to Zyskind are of particular interest.

Jamieson also proceeds inductively but within a more limited body of discourses, papal encyclicals.[37] However, she does not presume a genre; she examines these discourses to determine if one exists. Like Zyskind, her motive is illumination—she wishes to understand the forces which constrain *Humanae Vitae* so that it cannot adapt to its times and its audience. Her work adds an additional insight for the generic critic: the power of conventions, traditions, prior rhetoric to mold and constrain subsequent rhetorical action. She reminds us most strongly that rhetorical acts are born into a symbolic/rhetorical context as well as into an historical/ political milieu. Once again, the genre which emerges is a complex of elements—a constellation of substantive, stylistic and situational characteristics.

Like Hart, Campbell's approach to contemporary women's rights rhetoric is inductive.[38] No prior model is assumed; a genre must emerge from

or be discerned in the discourses themselves. Yet the concept of genre remains constant—it is formed out of substantive and stylistic elements and out of the unique situation of a female audience in 20th century America. And, like all the others, the justification for a generic claim is the understanding it produces rather than the ordered universe it creates.

These are only a few of the available generic criticisms. Since these first essays appeared, many have followed. But as a sample, they will do. Despite their variety, there are certain noteworthy constants: 1) Classification is justified only by the critical illumination it produces not by the neatness of a classificatory schema; 2) Generic criticism is taken as a means toward systematic, close textual analysis; 3) A genre is a complex, an amalgam, a constellation of substantive, situational, and stylistic elements; 4) Generic analysis reveals both the conventions and affinities that a work shares with others; it uncovers the unique elements in the rhetorical act, the particular means by which a genre is individuated in a given case.

Ideally, theory develops out of and is tested by criticism. Whether or not that is true of generic concepts, these and other criticisms have raised the questions which have become so exigent in contemporary rhetorical criticism.

Form and Genre

Northrop Frye, the most eminent critic to comment on generic criticism, wrote in his *Anatomy* that "The study of genres is based on analogies in form."[39] He called these forms "typical recurring images", "associative clusters", and "complex variables"; he compared them to the *topoi* or rhetorical commonplaces; and he described them as "communicable units", i.e., the forms through which experience and feeling can be made intelligible to others. In other words, formal similarities establish genres, and the forms relevant to genres are complex forms present in all discourse. If the forms from which genres are constituted have the characteristics indicated by Frye, they will be the kinds of forms that rhetoricians ordinarily call "strategies"—substantive and stylistic forms chosen to respond to situational requirements. For example, refutation may be described as a strategy in which one states an opposing position and responds to it by offering an alternative conclusion or by demonstrating the inadequacy of evidence or premises. As a strategy, refutation implies a situation in which there are competing positions and persuaders that must be taken into account. The power of such rhetorical forms is evident in this paragraph from John F. Kennedy's speech, *"Ich bin ein Berliner"*:

> There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the great issue between the free world and the

> Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make economic progress. *Lass'sie nach Berlin kommen.* Let them come to Berlin.[40]

The most evident form is *repetition*, a strategy implying a situation in which a key idea must be established and emphasized. In this case, the refrain not only repeats the theme, it also functions as *refutation*. The repeated sentence is a condensed, even *enthymematic*, answer to the four opposing positions. Sheer repetition produces yet another form. When the passage is read aloud, it is nearly impossible to repeat the refrain, "let them come to Berlin", with identical emphasis. Rather, each repetition tends to become more emphatic and intense, creating a *crescendo*. The situation is perceived and described by the speaker as a conflict, and the refrain becomes a climactic sequence dramatizing the conflict. There is still another form of critical interest. John Kennedy delivered this speech in the city of Berlin. The refrain is reflexive, a dramatic *enactment* which says, in effect, "do as I did—come to Berlin." This form is of particular importance because it is reinforced by the title and by the rest of the speech in which Kennedy says that not only is he, symbolically, a citizen of Berlin, but all of "us" (as opposed to "them") should become symbolic citizens of this beleagured city which stands for the struggle between the "free" and the "Communist" worlds.

As this analysis illustrates, rhetorical forms do not occur in isolation. In addition, it should be apparent that these forms are phenomena—syntheses of material that exists objectively in the rhetorical act and of perceptions in the mind of a critic, a member of the audience, or a future rhetor. The phenomenal character of forms is reflected in Kenneth Burke's reference to the "psychology of forms" and in his remark that "form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite."[41] That forms are phenomena has persuasive and critical significance because, as a result, forms can induce participation by others. This is never more evident than in the quintessentially rhetorical form, the enthymeme, whose force is explained by the fact that auditors participate in the construction of the arguments by which they are persuaded.[42]

It should now be apparent that the rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and substantive responses to perceived situational demands. In addition, forms are central to all types of criticism because they define the unique qualities of any rhetorical act, and because they are the means through which we come to understand how an act works to achieve its ends.[43]

From earliest antiquity, rhetoricians have been interested in forms. Analyses of recurrent lines of argument, such as those done by Measell and Carpenter in this volume, resemble the ancient study of the *topoi* or commonplaces.[44] The concept of *stasis* (or *status*) expressed a judgment that there were only a limited number of issues (being, quantity, quality, procedure) over which clash could occur.[45] Halloran's analysis of the issues in the public proceeding in this volume falls in this tradition. To Aristotle, the most important rhetorical form was the enthymeme, the form of deductive argument found in rhetoric. In this volume, Carpenter's interest in the interpretations of readers who filled in premises or drew inferences from relatively factual material reflects this tradition. As noted earlier, the canons and modes of proof can be used as a basis for formal analysis. Finally, from classical to contemporary times, the important role of literary forms has been acknowledged. As noted, Herbert Wichelns recognized the role of literary tools in rhetorical criticism; Hoyt Hudson refers to poetic expression as "*an indispensable means*" to instrumental ends;[46] and Northrop Frye assumes that "most of the features characteristic of literary form, such as rhyme, alliteration, metre, antithetical balance, the use of exempla, are also rhetorical schemata."[47]

If the recurrence of similar forms establishes a genre, then genres are groups of discourses which share substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics. Or, put differently, in the discourses that form a genre, similar substantive and stylistic strategies are used to encompass situations perceived as similar by the responding rhetors. A genre is a group of acts unified by a constellation of forms that recurs in each of its members. These forms, *in isolation*, appear in other discourses. What is distinctive about the acts in a genre is the recurrence of the forms *together* in constellation.

The eulogy is illustrative. The eulogy responds to a situation in which a community is ruptured by death. In this situation, persons must alter their relationship with the deceased and also confront their own mortality. The very act of eulogizing acknowledges the death. In so doing, it necessitates a juxtaposition of past and present tense which recasts the relationship to the deceased to one of memory. The assurance that the deceased, hence the audience, survives, at least in memory, eases confrontation with mortality. Thus the assertion of persistent life is intrinsic to the eulogy. That conviction is expressed in claims that the deceased survives in memory—in deeds, family or history. Metaphors of rebirth articulate this eulogistic claim.

The act of eulogizing is, in another important respect, performative. By uniting the bereaved in a rhetorical act, the eulogy affirms that the community will survive the death. Typically, eulogies reknit the sundered community through rhetorical devices which appeal to the audience to carry on the works, to embody the virtues, or to live as the deceased would have wished. These are the situational requirements, strategic responses, and stylistic choices that, taken together, form the eulogy. These characteristics do not co-exist by chance. They exist in a reciprocal, dynamic relationship.

External factors, including human needs and exposure to antecedent rhetorical forms, create expectations which constrain rhetorical responses. But the internal dynamic of fused elements also creates expectations which testify to its constraining force. Generic exemplars have an internal consistency. For example, the papal encyclical presupposes truths of natural law known by God's vicar on earth who interprets and explicates the law. This premise dictates a deductively structured document which employs a formal and authoritative tone that is consistent with dogmatic statement. It also entails the use of absolutistic, categorical vocabulary. Encyclicals assume print form because the sort of doctrinal matters addressed require a careful, prepared, precise form of communicating God's will. (Clarification of truth and of doctrine are serious and exacting matters. An oral form is transitory in a way a print form is not.) Each of these elements implies the others. The rhetoric of dogma, for example, cannot be structured inductively without undermining the dogmatic tone and the sense of authority pivotal to the document. One might even argue that the concept of papal authority on certain doctrinal matters entails the form of address which is the encyclical.

In other words, a genre does not consist merely of a series of acts in which certain rhetorical forms recur; for example, it is conceivable that parallelism and antithesis might recur jointly without establishing a generic similarity. Instead, a genre is composed of a constellation of recognizable forms bound together by an internal dynamic.

When a generic claim is made, the critical situation alters significantly because the critic is now arguing that a group of discourses has a synthetic core in which certain significant rhetorical elements, e.g., a system of belief, lines of argument, stylistic choices, and the perception of the situation, are fused into an indivisible whole. The significance of this fusion of forms for the critic is that it provides an angle of vision, a window, that reveals the tension among these elements, the dynamic within the rhetorical acts of human beings, in different times and places, responding in similar ways as they attempt to encompass certain rhetorical problems—the death of a member of the community, an accusation to which no forensic defense is adequate, and the like.

Because a genre is a constellation of elements, the appearance of the same forms in different genres poses no critical problem; a genre is given its character by a fusion of forms not by its individual elements. Thus the argument that Aristotle's genres are not useful because epideictic elements are found in deliberative and forensic addresses, deliberative elements in epideictic and forensic works, etc., is irrelevant; Aristotle's schema is weak generically only if the constellation of elements forming epideictic works does not permit the critic to distinguish the epideictic clustering from the constellations which form the other Aristotelian genres.

The concept of an internal dynamic fusing substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics permits the critic to determine the generic significance of recurring elements. For example, Rosenfield identifies the

clustering of facts in one section of the mass media apologia as a generic characteristic.[48] To test whether the characteristic has generic significance, one must ask: Why would such an element occur in the apology? What is its necessary relationship to other elements in the apology? What substantive, stylistic or situational constraints might require the inclusion of this element and its particular positioning in the structure?

Generic claims are difficult to sustain because constellations of elements rarely fuse into unique and indivisible wholes of the sort described. In addition, generic claims are difficult because of the nature of the processes by which genres may be established.

Some genres, probably most, are established deductively from a model or touchstone. For instance, Socrates' *Apology* is taken as a paradigm and acts which resemble it in essential ways are said to form a genre; similar procedures are followed with the rhetoric of Jeremiah or the rhetoric of the Old Testament prophets, and so on. There are at least two major pitfalls in this method: 1) the critic may fail to delineate the essential characteristics of the model so that the basis for comparison is faulty, or 2) a generic "fit" is asserted although certain essential characteristics are absent or significant dissimilarities exist. The first problem can be eliminated if the critic analyzes the original and refuses to accept "received wisdom" about classic works. The second can be eliminated only if the critic makes the goal in analogic or comparative criticism that of delineating similarities *and differences* and proffers a generic claim only when the evidence *requires* such a claim.

Some genres are established inductively. One can look at a vast number of discourses delivered in response to the death of a member of the community and discover that, at least in Western cultures, they seem to evince essential similarities.[49] One can examine the papal encyclicals and establish a generic resemblance. One can examine all available samples of contemporary rhetoric demanding women's rights in the U.S. and make a case that they form a coherent whole which can be distinguished from the acts of other protest groups. Each of these is an enormous project and each claim is difficult to justify. In most cases, the results of inductive efforts will be disappointing, and a generic claim will not be warranted by the evidence. The problems with this approach are those inherent in any procedure that draws inductive generalizations. Until now, conscientious rhetorical critics have tested their claims about inductively derived genres by selecting specimens from dissimilar eras and/or rhetors to minimize the possibility that the characteristics of an age or a class of persons would be mistaken for generic qualities. Thus a student who generalized from a sample of 19th century eulogies to the conclusion that eulogies are stylistically florid would be told that a characteristic of 19th century rhetoric had been mistaken for a generic characteristic and would be urged to sample eulogies from different periods. This approach was based on the scientific notion that random sampling would minimize critical error. A deeper understanding of the nature of genres provides other rhetorical-

critical tests: Why should a eulogy be characterized by a florid style? What is the necessary relationship between such a style and the substantive and situational elements which comprise the eulogy?

The confusion of deductive and inductive approaches to genres can also create difficulties. In a number of cases, critics have assumed, *a priori*, that a genre already exists and is known and defined—e.g., the sermon, [50] the presidential inaugural,[51] the apology,[52] among others—and an inductive procedure, content analysis in some cases, is applied to parse its elements. Such studies are suspect because the *a priori* definition of a genre and identification of its members generates a circular argument: an essential and preliminary procedure defining the generic characteristics has been omitted. Generic critics need to recognize explicitly the assumptions they are making and the procedures required to establish their claims.

An understanding of the genre as a fusion of elements, formed from a constellation of forms, permits one to distinguish between classification and generic analysis. There are some troublesome pieces of rhetoric, such as presidential inaugurals, in which a series of rhetorical elements recur. For example, the inaugurals establish the philosophy and tone of new administrations. Because they follow the divisive rhetoric of a campaign, they employ unifying appeals and articulate superordinate goals. In an attempt to overcome the fear that the incoming president is an incipient despot, each places the country in the hands of a higher power and acknowledges humility in the face of future tasks. The tone is dignified. Yet Lincoln's second inaugural and Washington's first are basically dissimilar. There are several possible explanations: 1) What have been isolated as inaugural elements are, in fact, elements inherent in a broader genre, rehearsal rhetoric; a hierarchical error, as Simons would call it, has been made; 2) A genre, the inaugural, does exist, but critics have failed to isolate the generic elements and the dynamic which binds them. Hence we cannot see the fundamental similarity between Lincoln's and Washington's addresses; 3) The evidence at hand would suggest that although it is possible that a genre properly termed "inaugural" does exist, it is not necessarily evoked in the situation created by the swearing-in of a President, as the inability to locate dynamic interrelationships among the elements of the inaugural and the inability to distinguish it from other rehearsal rhetoric testify.

The concept of a genre as a constellation of fused elements refines the notion that, in a genre, the significant rhetorical similarities outweigh the significant rhetorical differences. In its earlier form, generic "significance" resided in the mind of the critic, and any generic claim seemed vulnerable to a charge of subjectivism. Testing a generic claim on the grounds that "significant similarities will permit prediction of the form of an address not yet conceived or delivered" was problematic. The test does not assure that the critic is dealing with genre. For example, it is possible to predict certain characteristics of an inaugural address although there is general scholarly agreement that the claim that inaugurals form a genre

has yet to be established. Unless the elements cohere in a necessary and significant relationship, in a dynamic fusion, the ability to predict that certain characteristics will appear in an act on a certain occasion does not assure that a genre has been located. If an element is generically significant, it is so fused to the other elements that its absence would alter the character of the address.

Critics have assumed that genres are bodies of discourses that, as distinctive symbolic acts, recur in different times and places. Conversely, Black has argued that a genre may have a single identifiable member and illustrated his view with Chapman's Coatesville Address, a piece of rhetoric that functions as a morality play.[53] The view of genre described here, as a dynamic constellation of forms, focuses not only on what has recurred but on what may recur. In this sense, a constellation of elements bound together dynamically need only exist in a single instance to establish a genre or a generic potential. Clearly, the dynamic of the constellation and the fusion of its forms are more easily recognized when their recurrence is observed, but it is now possible both to isolate the constellation and its dynamic without comparing multiple specimens of the genre.

Similarly, this definition helps to explain the perseveration of rhetorical forms which the critic judges to be inappropriate to the demands of the situation. Jamieson has argued that the papal encyclical, at least as a form illustrated by *Humanae Vitae*, is a perseverative rhetorical form. An internal dynamic combines the elements in an encyclical, and the internal dynamic accounts, at least in part, for its perseveration as a genre. One cannot abandon elements of a genre which are dynamically fused without undermining the genre itself. For example, classical Latin with its rigorous controlling verbs complements the deductive structure of the papal encyclical, and that structure itself is dictated by and consonant with the concept of papal authority on matters of dogma.

The definition emphasizes the interrelationships among generic elements. Genres often exist in dynamic responsiveness to situational demands—e.g., an encyclical appears in order to affirm papal authority. Those instances in which a dynamic is sustaining a genre in the absence of, or counter to, situational demands invite the label "degenerative." The critic labelling a form "degenerative" risks the charge that ideological bias has colored the critical act. In the context developed here, the "degenerative" nature of the diagnosed genre can be subjected to a test of evidence. Does an internal dynamic exist? Is it consonant with perceived demands of the situation? If not, the genre is rhetorically degenerate because the audience and other germane situational variables are being ignored—and also degenerative in a literal sense; that is, a genre which fails to achieve its purpose—e.g., reknit a community ruptured by death or affirm papal authority—is more likely to "degenerate" and ultimately to disappear than is a genre consonant with perceived situational demands.

The concept of genre may be illustrated by analogy. Biologists speak of the genetic code inherent in the germ plasm of each species. Although

there will be variations, that code is the internal dynamic which determines the biological form of the individual member of the species. The internal dynamic of a genre is similar. It is the determinant of the generic form of the rhetorical utterance although like individual members of species, individual rhetorical acts—although part of a common genre—will show some individual variation. What is significant about the concept of genre is the fusion of elements and the critical insight the fusion provides.

The term "constellation" suggests another metaphorical insight. The stars forming a constellation are individuals but they are influenced by each other and by external elements; consequently they move together and remain in a similar relation to each other despite their varying positions over time. Like genres, constellations are perceived patterns with significance and usefulness—they enable us to see the movements of a group of individual stars and they enable us to understand the interrelated forces in celestial space.

Both metaphors and the very concept of the internal dynamic suggest the difference between classification or creating a taxonomy on the one hand, and critical analysis on the other. A "genre" is a classification based on the fusion and interrelation of elements in such a way that a unique kind of rhetorical act is created. Approaching such acts generically gives the critic an unusual opportunity to penetrate their internal workings and to appreciate the interacting forces that create them.

Genre and Criticism

"Genre" is not the key term in a philosophy of rhetoric; it is an important concept in one kind of criticism. The theory underlying the concept of genre is critical theory, theory about the enterprise of criticism. It is no accident that Frye is a major source for material on genre as his *Anatomy* is a study of criticism as an autonomous enterprise. Frye argues strongly for a pluralistic approach to criticism, and he justifies his view by showing that all discourse is polysemous, i.e., that it has many levels of meaning or means in different ways. These different levels or kinds of meaning require different critical perspectives. Because all works are not only unique but also resemble other works, generic criticism is essential. Frye notes that part of the meaning of a work is derived from the tradition of which it is a part, from the conventions it observes. The conventions found in a discourse indicate the tradition to which it belongs and the works to which it has close affinities. Consequently, he says that

> When he [Milton] uses the convention of invocation, thus bringing the poem [*Paradise Lost*] into the genre of the spoken word, the significance of the convention is to indicate what tradition his work primarily belongs to and what its closest affinities are with. The purpose

> of criticism by genres is not so much to classify as to clarify such traditions and affinities, thereby bringing out a large number of literary relationships that would not be noticed as long as there were no context established for them.[54]

What Frye is describing is a *generic perspective* toward criticism not a crusading search to find genres. The generic perspective recognizes that while there may be few clearly distinguishable genres, all rhetoric is influenced by prior rhetoric, all rhetorical acts resemble other rhetorical acts. Such a critical perspective emphasizes the symbolic and rhetorical contexts in which rhetorical acts are created.

Some elements of a generic perspective are intrinsic in all criticism because classification and comparision are integral parts of the critical process. As a critic, one is perpetually classifying and labelling—e.g., this is an introduction, this is an example, this is high style, this is satirical, this is a eulogy. Inherent in each classification are two comparative standards—the comparison of like to like, the comparison of like to unlike. The first comparison arises out of definition. To label some part of a discourse as an introduction is to have a definition that contains essential attributes and, implicitly, suggests an ideal or model. Such classifications are the basis for evaluative comparisons—this is better, this is more fully realized, and the like. The second, comparison or contrast, differentiates introductions and conclusions, one form of support from another, distinguishes styles, tones, and ultimately, between classifications by type or genre. These contrasts compel re-definitions and form the basis for strategic evaluations—e.g., this style was chosen, but an alternative style would have been preferable because of its ability to accomplish "x" objective. No one who recognizes the role of comparison and contrast in interpreting and evaluating rhetorical discourse is likely to ignore the traditions which have generated or shaped discourse and the relationships among discourses which extend the critic's capacity to make comparative judgments.

Because rhetoric is of the public life, because rhetorical acts are concerned with ideas and processes rooted in the here and now of social and political life, rhetoric develops in time and through time. Ironically, the traditional emphasis on individual speeches and speakers as rooted historically in a particular time and place is, in an important sense, anti-historical, because it fails to recognize the impact of rhetorical acts on other rhetorical acts, and it fails to recognize the powerful human forces which fuse recurrent forms into genres which, in an important sense, transcend a specific time and place. The critic who classifies a rhetorical artifact as generically akin to a class of similar artifacts has identified an undercurrent of history rather than comprehended an act isolated in time. Recurrence of a combination of forms into a generically identifiable form over time suggests that certain constants in human action are manifest rhetorically. One may argue that recurrence arises out of comparable rhetorical situations, out of the influence of conventions on the responses of

rhetors, out of universal and cultural archetypes ingrained in human consciousness, out of fundamental human needs, or out of a finite number of rhetorical options or commonplaces. Whatever the explanation, the existence of the recurrent provides insight into the human condition.

A generic approach to rhetorical criticism would culminate in a developmental history of rhetoric that would permit the critic to generalize beyond the individual event which is constrained by time and place to affinities and traditions across time. It would move from the study of rhetors and acts in isolation to the study of recurrent rhetorical action. It would produce a critical history exploring the ways in which rhetorical acts influence each other. Such a "genealogy" would trace the imprint of form on form, style on style, genre on genre. It would, for example, trace imperial forms of address from the Roman emperor's decree to the papal encyclical in order to discern imperial tendencies in papal address, trace the form of the State of the Union address from the form of the King's speech to Parliament in order to account for monarchical qualities in early State of the Union speeches. It would trace the Congressional speeches in reply to State of the Union addresses back to the echoing speeches of Parliament in order to account for the curiously subservient tone of early Congressional responses. It would root the Presidential Inaugural in the theocratic addresses of Puritan leaders in order to explain the supplicative elements in early inaugurals.

It is now manifest that a concern with form and genre does not prescribe a critical methodology. Mohrmann and Leff have argued for a synthesis of neo-Aristotelian and generic perspectives.[55] Bitzer suggests a situational basis for generic study; Hart proceeds inductively using content analysis and other quantitative and non-quantitative methods; Campbell relies on dramatistic concepts.[56] In short, generic analysis is an available critical option regardless of the critical perspective that one cherishes.

However, a generic perspective does make some demands on the critic. It is a critical approach that requires careful textual analysis, for instance. It also heightens an awareness of the interrelationship between substantive and stylistic elements in discourse.

A generic perspective is intensely historical, but in a sense somewhat different from most prior efforts. It does not seek detailed recreation of the original encounter between author and audience; rather it seeks to recreate the symbolic context in which the act emerged so that criticism can teach us about the nature of human communicative response and about the ways in which rhetoric is shaped by prior rhetoric, by verbal conventions in a culture, and by past formulations of ideas and issues.

It can be argued that generic placement and comparison to an ideal type—touchstone criticism—are both familiar forms of rhetorical criticism. We have noted their classical origins and we note a contemporary, Walter Fisher, who writes that rhetorical criticism "says how and in what ways a rhetorical transaction fits, falls short of, or transcends other examples of its kind."[57] This essay amends that statement to emphasize the role of formal analysis in the process of generic placement. One's ca-

pacity to clarify and reveal a rhetorical act is based on one's ability to see it clearly, to understand its nature, to select the most apt characterization of it. It matters greatly, as Zyskind indicates, whether one calls Lincoln's Gettysburg Address an epideictic eulogy or labels it a deliberative act designed to urge the audience toward the actions it should follow if the Union is to be preserved. Similarly, Barnet Baskerville's critique of Nixon's "Checkers Speech" treats the address as forensic and demonstrates persuasively that it did not serve to answer the charges that had been made.[58] But if the speech is more properly classified as an apologia, such a "failure" is inevitable—the apologia is a speech in which one responds to forensic charges in a non-forensic way—by transcending them to present one's life and character to one's judges.

Introduction to Critiques

The value of formal and generic analysis, indeed the value of all criticism, must be tested heuristically, in application. We have referred to many previously published criticisms; we now refer you to the essays in this volume. In addition to this essay, the opening section includes two other essays which examine the nature of generic criticism. The first by Herbert Simons takes a perspective slightly different from our own. Simons emphasizes the inductive approach to generic analysis that critics with inclinations toward the social sciences may find most hospitable to their methods and interests. It is followed by a demurrer in which Ernest Bormann attempts to distinguish the procedures of the social scientist from those of the critic.

Simons and Bormann share the assumption that humanists and scientists must examine their underlying assumptions and must define their points of juncture and disjuncture. Simons projects "a science of rhetorical genres, one that might give theoretical coherence to the speculative generalizations of individual critics, help verify (or disprove) their claims by subjecting them to controlled tests, and ultimately guide the interpretation and evaluation of particular rhetorical artifacts." But, argues Bormann, Simons uses as a touchstone a scientific model which ought to be abandoned in our attempts to generate theory and research concerning the factors influencing rhetorical choice.

Simons' essay, " 'Genre-alizing' about Rhetoric: A Scientific Approach," evaluates the papers in this volume from a "scientific" perspective. Bormann's essay frames the issues raised in the volume from a "humanistic" viewpoint. Both examine the questions: What is a genre? What evidence is required to make a generic claim? What is the role of generic analysis in the total enterprise of criticism? They also raise the most fundamental questions critics can ask: What are the functions of criticism? By what standards or criteria should critical acts be judged? Together the essays provide a number of concepts and critical alternatives with which to approach the five essays in part two—criticisms which proceed from a generic perspective.

NOTES

[1]All cited material from the speech is transcribed from a tape of the address as delivered. Excerpts from the prepared text may be found in *The New York Times*, 15 July 1976, p. 26.

[2]An historical perspective on keynote addresses is provided by Edwin A. Miles, "The Keynote Speech at National Nominating Conventions," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 46 (February 1960), 26-31.

[3]Another example of reflexive form is found on pp. 18-19 below.

[4]Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (Harbinger: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1929; rpt. 1957), 117-118. The earlier description of Judith is found on pp. 48-50.

[5]A detailed history of modern rhetorical criticism is found in Charles J. Stewart, "Historical Survey: Rhetorical Criticism in Twentieth Century America," in *Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism*, ed. Charles J. Stewart, Donovan J. Ochs, and Gerald Mohrmann (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1973), 1-31.

[6]Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in *Speech Criticism: Methods and Materials*, ed. William A. Linsley (Dubuque, Ia.: Wm. C. Brown, 1968), 11-12. For another perceptive, early statement on the nature of rhetorical criticism, see Loren D. Reid, "The Perils of Rhetorical Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 30 (December 1944), 416-422.

[7]Wichelns, p. 28.

[8]Wichelns, p. 37.

[9]Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 27-35.

[10]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards of Rhetorical Appraisal* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), 16. See also Marie Hochmuth Nichols *Rhetoric and Criticism*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963) for a later rationale for traditional rhetorical criticism with a strong emphasis on history. This work also serves as a bridge between traditional and modern perspectives as it includes critical perspectives drawn from Kenneth Burke and I. A. Richards.

[11]William Norwood Brigance, ed., vols. I & II (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943); and Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, ed., vol. III, *A History and Criticism of American Public Address* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955).

[12]Barnet Baskerville, "A Study of American Criticism of Public Address, 1850-1900 (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1948).

[13]Ernest Wrage, "Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 33 (December 1947), 451-457. See also Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 42 (October 1956), 283-291.

[14]Ernest J. Wrage and Barnet Baskerville, eds. *American Forum: Speeches on Historic Issues*, 1788-1900 (New York: Harper, 1960), viii.

[15]Ernest J. Wrage and Barnet Baskerville, eds. *Contemporary Forum: American Speeches on Twentieth Century Issues (New York: Harper, 1962)*, v.

[16]Leland Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 38 (April 1952), 184. For an earlier illustration of movement analysis see J. Franklin Jameson's excellent work, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (Princeton University Press, 1926).

[17]Griffin applied his critical approach in "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement: Part I," *Quarterly Journal Of Speech*, 50 (April 1964), 113-135. See also "The Rhetorical Structure of the Antimasonic Movement" in *The Rhetorical Idiom*, ed. Donald Bryant (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), 145-149.

[18]See Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," *Western Speech*, 36 (Spring 1972), 82-88; Herbert Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (February 1970), 1-11; Leland Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in *Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke* ed. William H. Rueckert (Mpls.: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 456-478, among others.

[19]Black, p. 35.

[20]Black, pp. 133-134.

[21]An earlier analysis of the situational element in symbolic action is found in Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York: World, 1945, 1950; rpt. 1962), 727-736.

[22]Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 1 (January 1968), 13.

[23]See Richard E. Vatz, "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 6 (Summer 1973), 154-161, and Scott Consigny, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 7 (Summer 1974), 175-184.

[24]Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," *Speech Monographs*, 35 (November 1968), 435-450. An earlier essay, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," *Speech Monographs*, 25 (March 1968), 50-69, is an insightful statement on the nature of rhetorical criticism.

[25]Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "George Wallace Plays Rosemary's Baby," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55 (February 1969), 36-44

[26]James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, "The Concession Speech: The MacArthur-Agnew Analog," *Speaker and Gavel*, 11 (January 1974), 39-51.

[27]Sherry Devereaux Butler, "The Apologia, 1971 Genre," *Southern Speech Communication Journal*, 37 (Spring 1972), 281-289.

[28]Richard J. Goodman and William I. Gordon, "The Rhetoric of Desecration," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (February 1971), 23-31.

[29]Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55 (February 1969), 1-8.

[30]Griffin, "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement"; James W. Chesebro, "Rhetorical Strategies of Radicals," *Today's Speech*, 21 (Winter 1972), 37-48.

[31]Parke Burgess, "The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 54 (April 1968), 122-133.

[32]Harold Zyskind, "A Rhetorical Analysis of the Gettysburg Address," *Journal of General Education*, 4 (April 1950), 202-212.

[33]Zyskind, p. 202.

[34]Zyskind, p. 212.

[35]Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., "The Diatribe: Last Resort for Protest," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (February 1972), 1-14.

[36]Roderick P. Hart, "The Rhetoric of the True Believer," *Speech Monographs*, 38 (November 1971), 249.

[37]Kathleen M. Hall Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 6 (Summer 1973), 162-170. See also "Interpretation of Natural Law in the Conflict over *Humanae Vitae*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 60 (April 1974), 201-211.

[38]Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59 (February 1973), 74-86.

[39]Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton University Press, 1957), 99. See also pp. 95-115.

[40]*American Short Speeches*, eds. Bower Aly and Lucile Folse Aly (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1968), 132-133.

[41]Kenneth Burke, *Counter-Statement* (University of Chicago Press, 1931; rpt. 1957), 31.

[42]Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 45 (December 1959), 408.

[43]Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 581-582.

[44]John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, *Public Speaking as a Liberal Art*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1973).

[45]Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," *Speech Monographs*, 17 (November 1950), 345-369.

[46]Hoyt H. Hudson, "Rhetoric and Poetry," *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, 10 (April 1924), 146.

[47]Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism, 245.*

[48]Rosenfield, "A Case Study. . ," 441-442.

[49]See James O. Payne, "The American Eulogy: A Study in Generic Criticism," (M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1975). We are indebted to Charley Conrad, a graduate student at the University of Kansas, for the concept of inductive and deductive approaches to the formation of genres.

[50]Thomas Clark, "An Analysis of Generic Aspects of Contemporary American Sermons." Paper presented at the Central States Speech Association Convention (April 1976).

[51]Donald Wolfarth, "John F. Kennedy in the Tradition of Inaugural Speeches," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 47 (April 1961), 124-132.

[52]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59 (October 1973), 273-283.

[53]Black, 79-91.

[54]Frye, 247-248.

[55]G. P. Mohrmann and Michael C. Leff "Lincoln at Cooper Union: A Rationale for Neo-Classical Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 60 (December 1974), 459-467.

[56]Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Rhetoric of Radical Black Nationalism: A Case Study in Self-Conscious Criticism," *Central States Speech Journal*, 22 (Fall 1971), 151-160; "An Exercise in the Rhetoric of Poetic Injustice" in *Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric*, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1972), pp. 142-151; "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation: An Oxymoron."

[57]Barnet Baskerville, "The Illusion of Proof," *Western Speech*, 25 (Fall 1961), 236-242.

[58]Walter R. Fisher, "Rhetorical Criticism as Criticism," *Western Speech*, 38 (Spring 1974), 76.

"GENRE-ALIZING" ABOUT RHETORIC: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

HERBERT W. SIMONS

Through their efforts at identifying and distinguishing among rhetorical genres, rhetorical scholars have greatly ameliorated the problems occasioned by what political scientist Stephen L. Wasby referred to as our field's traditional preoccupation with the "particularistic or idiosyncratic" in discourse.[1] Whereas traditional rhetorical criticism has produced studies which are "difficult for anyone to integrate in order to develop general explanations or theories,"[2] the new scholarship bids fair to producing a social science of rhetorical choice, one that delimits strategic and stylistic options in the face of situational and purposive constraints.

Unfortunately, the very term "genre,"—"unpronounceable and alien thing that it is"[3]—has impeded scholarly progress. Stripped of its aura of mystery, the term vaguely denotes some type of categorization but is nonspecific about nature of categorization or level of abstraction. One wag defined a category as "a set of differences which for a particular purpose doesn't seem to make a difference." Not surprisingly, rhetoricians have operated, if not at cross-purposes, at least with varying purposes, and they have fought pseudobattles over what constitutes a "true" rhetorical genre.[4] Because the word "genre" originated in the humanities, rhetoricians have also been loath to recast their conceptual and methodological tasks in scientific terms, lest they pollute the original meaning of the word, perhaps, or in some way betray their own humanistic origins. Thus, for example, Ware and Linkugel, in their essay on the apologia, found it necessary when introducing a scientific term to provide an apologia of sorts themselves:

> The use of the term *factor* as a means for classifying conglomerates of like strategies that are relatively invariant across apologia is not an attempt on our part to introduce scientific rigor into the critical act; it is likewise not intended to confuse, frighten, or threaten the speech critic of a traditional bent.[5]

At the risk of discomfiting the critic of a traditional bent, I should like here to point the way toward a science of rhetorical genres, one that might give theoretical coherence to the speculative generalizations of individual critics, help verify (or disprove) their claims by subjecting them to controlled tests, and ultimately guide the interpretation and evaluation of particular rhetorical artifacts. Significantly, it was humanist Northrop Frye who saw in generic scholarship the potential for an explanatory "science" of human creations, one that would tentatively accept "the first postulate . . . of any science: the assumption of total coherence."[6] Drawing on past scholarship, I shall offer a series of scientifically based propositions designed to clarify the research questions and theoretical problems we confront and suggest potentially fruitful methods of inquiry. At the Editors' suggestion, I shall also offer occasional comments (via footnotes) on other papers contributed to this volume. These, together with brief references to other studies, should help to illustrate the propositions I advance.

A Perspective on Science

At the outset, let me make clear that I mean nothing terribly mysterious or esoteric by "science," "scientific objectivity," "scientific knowledge," etc. In aspiring to objectivity, for example, the scientist is no different from historians and philosophers: all make claims in a rational spirit. Nor is the quest for scientific knowledge any less personal or impassioned a process than that of other intellectual disciplines. Like their counterparts in other fields, scientists do not simply "collect" knowledge; they attain it by active intellective processes of searching, selecting, comparing, unifying, and generalizing. And like other disciplines, science is very much a communal enterprise, requiring critical checks by the scientific community as a whole against the foibles and passions of individual scientists.[7]

Yet there are norms which distinguish the scientific quest from other intellectual activities, and these, I would maintain, have direct application to the study of rhetorical genres. Although they are closely intertwined, one may distinguish the methodological norms that regulate processes of research conception and execution from the norms that govern theory construction and evaluation.

Research Norms

To begin with, there is the concern with linguistic rigor. Scientists, says Karl Popper, "try to avoid talking at cross-purposes. They try very seriously to speak one another's language, even if they use different mother tongues."[8] At the conceptual level, this entails the consistent use of theoretically embedded technical terms as well as constitutive definitions that stipulate rules of correspondence to the real world. At the level of execution, it involves the derivation from constitutive definitions of opera-

tional definitions, specifications of the manipulations or other procedures by which a phenomenon can be observed in a given research context.

Related to linguistic rigor is the matter of observational rigor. Other disciplines recognize experience as "the impartial arbiter of experience," but, says Popper, the scientist insists upon "experience of a 'public' character, like observations and experiments, as opposed to experience in the sense of more 'private' aesthetic or religious experience; and an experience is 'public' if everybody who takes the trouble can repeat it."[9] Hence the concerns for mechanical safeguards against human error, for verification through replication, and for clearcut applications of specified rules of measurement. The scientist need not use numbers, for example; mere labels will do, but the labels must refer to properties of objects that can be classified reliably and validly.

Finally, there are the attempts at inferential rigor. Humanists are often mystified by sophisticated research designs and sampling statistics, but they are simply means for reducing errors of inference. Thus, experimental designs provide controls over contemporaneous events, maturation, history, reactivity of instruments, etc., as potential sources of error. Similarly, sampling statistics are essentially means of ruling out (or ruling in) chance as an explanation of results.

Theoretical Norms

A theory is like a funnel. Into the funnel come generalized findings about phenomena which the theory attempts to organize, summarize, and explain. Out of the funnel come ideas for research which, when tested, add new grist for the theoretical mill. The heart of the theory—the narrow part of the funnel—is a set of assumptions, basic concepts, constitutive definitions of those concepts, and explanatory statements or theorems which relate the concepts to each other.

Scientists generally concur on the standards that should guide the construction and evaluation of theories (although they do not all agree on how the criteria should be weighted):

1. *Logical rigor.* Are the terms of the theory clear and unambiguous? Is the internal logic of the theory free of material or deductive fallacies?

2. *Predictiveness.* Are predictions from the theory confirmed when tested in the real world? Do deductions from the theory permit control over phenomena?

3. *Provocativeness.* Does the theory adequately guide the search for facts? Does it generate new research? Does it yield nonobvious hypotheses? Does it "explain" in a subjective sense?

4. *Manageability.* Is the theory "elegant" in the sense that verifiable pre-

dictions can be derived from a few general principles? Are its key terms and theorems consistent with well-accepted theories in related areas?

5. *Comprehensiveness.* Does the theory account for a broad range of phenomena? Can it explain seemingly disparate or unrelated findings?[10]

Implications for the Study of Rhetorical Genres

Although the foregoing discussion does not provide a detailed blueprint for the study of rhetorical genres, it should call to mind problems associated with the present status of research and theory. Rather than dwelling on these problems, however, I should like in this section to emphasize implications of scientific norms and procedures for future study. These are presented in propositional form.

Research Tasks

A clearcut definition of "rhetorical genre" would help to delineate the general area of research. In the interests of linguistic rigor it would be desirable to cull such a definition from past usage of the term by scholars. Unfortunately, past usage has been anything but consistent. A search of the literature reveals rhetorical genres classified by occasion (e.g., inaugurals), race (e.g., black rhetoric), ideology (e.g., women's liberation), strategy (e.g., polarization), historical period (e.g., eighteenth century), geographical location (e.g., British), intended effect (e.g., to stimulate), and various combinations thereof. Any definition of "rhetorical genre" that would subsume these various uses of the term must necessarily be vague. Reluctantly, therefore, and as a tentative first step, I would propose the following constitutive definition:

I.1: *The term "rhetorical genre" refers to any distinctive and recurring pattern of rhetorical practice.* "Rhetorical practice" is defined as any discourse or symbolic act designed to influence others (i.e., secure preferred outcomes) by modifying their beliefs, values, or attitudes. Consistent with guidelines proposed for the "Conference on 'Significant Form' in Rhetorical Criticism," one might stipulate further that "recurring pattern of rhetorical practice" includes, among others, "the repeated use of images, metaphors, arguments, structural arrangements, configurations of language, or a combination of such elements . . ."[11] Note that while the definition of "rhetorical genre" helps to distinguish the term from "literary genre," "dialectics,"[12] and other generic types, it does not restrict rhetorical genres to speeches, persuasive campaigns, or other such paradigmatic efforts. Thus, in keeping with trends in contemporary rhetorical theory, militant confrontational acts, nonverbal rhetorics, and "specialized" rhetorics such as those used within scientific communities might all be counted as rhetorical genres.[13]

Impossibly broad as my definition of "rhetorical genre" is, it neverthe-

less suggests several principles that have not always been adhered to. These may be illustrated with reference to what is undoubtedly the best known of rhetorical genres, the apologia.

I.2: *To demonstrate that a given set of rhetorical practices is unique, it must be shown that other rhetors do—or at least may—use dissimilar practices.* It makes little sense, for example, to speak of the "mass-media apologia"[14] as a distinctive genre unless there are other patterns of possible or actual discourse with which the mass-media apologia can be compared and contrasted. The scientific notion of a control or comparision group becomes directly applicable here.

I.3 *If one genre is to be distinguished meaningfully from another, it follows that there must be a larger class of rhetorical practices into which both genres can be put, and that this class itself might constitute a genre distinguishable from another at its own higher level of abstraction.* Rather than haggling over the level at which something becomes a genre as opposed to a family or species, one might better recognize that genres "exist" at various levels of abstraction, from the very broad to the very specific. Conceivably, for example, one might speak of the apologia (i.e., insistence on complete innocence) and the limited concession (i.e., minimizing of wrong-doing) as two among several "self-defense" genres, and one might refer at a higher level of abstraction to discourse in defense of self as a genre distinctive from accusatory discourse.[15] Surprisingly, there have been only fledgling attempts thus far at evolving hierarchical schemas of rhetorical genres.

I.4: *The distinguishing features of a genre must not only be namable but operationalizeable: i..e., there must be clear rules by which two or more independent observers can concur in identifying predesignated characteristics of rhetorical practice when confronted with samples of rhetorical practice.*

Using the language of Abelson's balance theory, for example, one might hypothesize that apologias will employ strategies of *denial* while limited concessions will employ *transcendence* strategies.[16] The first question which arises is whether these supposedly distinct strategies are actually distinguishable in practice. For example, is a plea of "no contest" a form of denial, as Agnew maintained in his resignation speech, or is it an admission of guilt, as his prosecutors insisted?

I.5: *Independent observers must not only have clear rules or criteria for distinguishing characteristics of a genre, but must also be able consistently to assign items of rhetorical practice (e.g., whole speeches) to generic categories according to those rules.*

The logic of this proposition varies only slightly from the previous one. Assuming one's rules are clear, the question arises whether, taken

together, they adequately classify *paradigmatic* cases of each genre, i. e., clearcut instances which virtually all experienced observers would consistently place into one or the other generic category. A group of judges, for example, might concur in classifying Nixon's "Checkers Speech" as an apologia and his first major speech on Watergate (April 15, 1973) as a limited concession. One may then ask whether these two speeches were dominated, respectively, by the use of denial and transcendence stratagems.

I.6: *If items of rhetorical practice are to be consistently identified as fitting within one genre or another, it follows that these items should be internally homogenous across salient characteristics and clearly distinguishable from items comprising an alternative genre.*

Abstracting from the above propositions, one might, as in the following idealized model, conceive of rhetorical genres as subsets (X, Y) of a larger generic set (Z), each subset containing items of rhetorical practice (X_1, X_2, X_3, X_n; Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, Y_n) and both distinguishing characteristics (X_a, X_b, X_c, X_n, Y_a, Y_b, Y_c, Y_n) and common characteristics (Z_a, Z_b Z_c, Z_n). Each subset is, in principle, divisible into subsets, and each set is, in principle, a subset of a still larger set.



Thus, to return to the example provided above, X might be the apologia, Y the limited concession, and Z self-defense discourse. X_1 might be Nixon's "Checkers Speech", Y_1 his first speech on Watergate, and X_a, Y_a, and Z_a might all be conceived of as strategies of self-defense. In the language of Abelson's balance theory, X_a might be denial, a strategy unique to the apologia; Y_a might be transcendence, a strategy unique to the limited concession; and Z_a might be bolstering, a strategy common to both genres. The task of the investigator would be to establish that the above configuration maps patterns of rhetorical practice in the real world.

Research Methods

The above diagram is neat, and perhaps too neat. In studying rhetorical genres, one is, as Edwin Black has put it, dealing with "complexes" rather than "simples."[17] If nature has its mongeese and its platypi, then surely the sum of rhetorical artifacts created by human beings will include a goodly share of items that defy easy classification. Nevertheless, it should be possible by means of content analysis, factor analysis, discriminant analysis, and other statistical techniques to sort out the more simple of the "complexes." And even where it is not possible to treat rhetorical data in quantitative or statistical terms, other techniques in the scientific arsenal such as random sampling and coding by independent observers may be used to advance the state of generic scholarship. Here I shall propose a sequence of steps in the methodological process as well as some examples.

II.1: *So as to reduce the chances of errors of inference, a rather large and varied sample of items of discourse should ordinarily be selected which the investigator has reason to believe is representative of a rhetorical genre.* Gamson and his associates approached the ideal when they took an equal probability sample of 53 protest groups from a carefully identified universe of over 500 such groups, operative in the United States between 1800 and 1945.[18] Among other studies referred to earlier in this paper, Ware and Linkugel examined some 30 apologias, Chesebro and Hamsher used 41 popular television series as their data base, Kidd selected a 10% random sample of "advice" articles appearing during specified periods in magazines with circulations over 1,000,000, and Platt and his associates studied all eight Riot Commission reports.

Unfortunately, the use of large and representative samples has by no means been the rule among rhetorical scholars. More commonly, investigators have focused on single cases or have used what Rosenfield has called the "analog" method in which just two or three cases were compared.[19] If striking similarities have been observed, independent of speaker, subject, audience, etc., the claim has been made that a genre and/or its distinguishing characteristics has been discovered. Although the two or three case comparison may have important heuristic value, it should by no means be the stopping point for research on rhetorical genres. The problem is that the method may uncover purely coincidental likenesses while ignoring salient similarities.[20]

II.2: *In addition to the main sample of items, it generally is advisable to have at least one "control" sample of items, closely comparable to the main sample, but nevertheless contrastable with it in terms of their respective particulars.* If the main sample consists, metaphorically, of rhetorical house flies, the control sample might consist of rhetorical fruit flies. Consistent with this admonition, Thomas Clark picked two "control"

samples against which to compare contemporary American sermons. As an additional refinement, he selected portions of each speech for purposes of content analysis that were matched in terms of word length and placement in the discourse.[21] Using a classification scheme suggested by Frye, Chesebro and Hamsher[22] were able to show the distinctiveness of any one television entertainment genre by contrasting its characteristics with those of other genres in their typology.[23]

II.3: *Needed in addition to samples of items is a list of characteristics of rhetorical practice.*

Well-formulated hypotheses may enable the investigator to focus on a limited number of variables. Consistent with their predictions, Rokeach and Morrison were able to distinguish sharply among political ideologies in terms of the relative frequency of appearance of two value terms in comparable samples of representative writings.[24] Of seventeen value words that were arrayed in terms of order of frequency, "freedom" and "equality" ranked first and second in the writings of socialists while ranking next to last and last in the writings of Hitler. Lenin mentioned equality most often and freedom least often while a nearly opposite pattern was exhibited by conservative Barry Goldwater.

On the other hand, by comparing rhetorical discourse against a computerized dictionary of classified terms, the investigator may work inductively with a virtually unlimited number of potentially discriminating characteristics. Thus, for example, the *General Inquirer* dictionary has been used to analyze a range of discourse, from suicide notes to a sample of twenty nomination speeches by presidential aspirants.[25]

II.4: *In addition to a list of characteristics of rhetorical practice, there should be clear rules and procedures for identifying which of these characteristics is distinctive to a particular genre.* Here, various content analytic and statistical procedures may be of use. While it is often the case that the more "interesting" the category, or category marker, the less amenable it is to clear operationalization,[26] the investigator may, at the least, secure the assistance of independent observers for purposes of classifying discursive elements (especially such ambiguous elements as metaphors, mythic forms, and multilevelled symbolic constructions).

As a check on the consistency of categorizations by independent observers, and indirectly, on the operationalizations of characteristics provided to the observers, the investigator may determine reliability coefficients for category placements and ferret out categories yielding low agreement. By means of factor analysis and discriminant analysis, it should also be possible to determine how characteristics cluster together and which clusters are distinctive to a rhetorical genre. Nonstatistical equivalents of these procedures tend to be adopted by humanistically oriented rhetorical critics. They are prone, however, to errors of observation and inference.

II.5: *Finally, the investigator needs to perform sample and subsample comparisions of items of rhetorical practice.* Subsample analyses may be performed to identify subclasses of a distinctive rhetorical genre—variants of protest rhetoric, for example, as in Gamson's study.[27] Subsample analyses may also be performed to distinguish paradigmatic cases of a genre—i.e., those exhibiting small within-group differences and large between-group differences—from borderline cases. If possible, the investigator should attempt to determine what it is about the borderline cases that makes them troublesome.

Theoretical Development

III.1: *The task of generic identification should take place within theoretical frameworks, should be guided by theoretically derived hypotheses, and should be focused on theoretically significant similarities.*

Rhetorical practices may be classified in myriad ways. Indeed, as Wayne Booth has argued, the potential list of genres is indeterminate in size.[28] Find any two rhetors who, for whatever reasons, manifest rhetorical practices distinguishable from two other rhetors, and *ipso facto*, you have discovered a rhetorical genre.

The problem is, of course, that such discoveries, while valid by definition, may not be very useful; in Frye's terms, they "classify" but do not "clarify."[29] Nor would adherence to methodological strictures, such as those outlined in the previous section, necessarily produce a coherent body of research findings. Needed is research conducted within a theoretical context as well as theory that can both guide the search for facts and account for those facts.

I suggested earlier that the standards which scientists use to evaluate their own theories are directly applicable to the tasks at hand. The test of logical rigor should, of itself, disqualify most current formulations; for example, researchers have been singularly unsuccessful at applying the generic "convince-persuade" distinction to samples of discourse. Similarly, we have reason to be suspicious of theoretical generalizations about the rhetoric of an entire century or race: such generalizations are likely to be trivial or inelegant or just plain wrong.

Although there are few generic conceptualizations that deserve the name "theory," let alone "useful theory," there is one approach—initiated by Black[30] and extended by Rosenfield,[31] Bitzer,[32] Hart,[33] Jamieson[34] and others—which bears great theoretical promise.[35] Because of its well deserved primacy in the field, I shall confine my comments to it in the remainder of the paper.

The basic point made by Black & Co. is that rhetorical practices do not cluster together into identifiable genres by accident; rhetoric, as a pragmatic, adaptive art, is highly constrained by purpose and situation—and these constraints are often quite similar for different rhetors facing different audiences at different times.[36] This very general formulation suggests a number of interesting propositions:

III.2: *The study of rhetorical genres is discontinuous with the study of artistic, literary or dialectical genres.* Not only is rhetoric, *qua* rhetoric, more constrained, it is also differently constrained; hence, we cannot expect very much help from our colleagues in aesthetics, literature or philosophy: their genres will be very different from ours.

III.3: *The study of rhetorical genres is concerned, not simply with classification, but with the relationship between generic similarities and the common constraints that give rise to them. Consistent with this statement of purpose, one may usefully limit the scope of definition: "rhetorical genre" is redefined to mean a distinctive and recurring pattern of similarly constrained rhetorical practices.* By implication, the definition compels a search not simply for similarities in rhetorical practice, nor even (following Black's suggestion[37]) for factors that vary concomitantly with similar rhetorical practices, but for the causal links between these factors and rhetorical practices.

III.4: *Rhetorical genres will emerge most clearly when rhetorical practices are most constrained by purpose and situation.* Put in statistical terms, purpose and situation account for the greatest common variance among rhetorical practices. Should purpose and situation be highly constraining, as when a group of persons is committed to a highly doctrinaire world view, or when persons are participating in a ceremony or ritual, we should be able to predict much of what rhetors will say before they say it. Not always, of course, for one rhetor may respond inappropriately to the constraints of purpose or situation and another may, with great artistry, transcend those constraints, but ordinarily we may expect considerable conformity.[38]

While the line of thinking initiated by Black shows great theoretical promise, it is not yet a theory by scientific standards. Having thus far sung its praises, let me now suggest measures to advance its development.

III.5: *Needed is a more enriched and refined vocabulary for characterizing rhetorical practices and the constraints that give rise to them.* As Becker has observed,[39] the current lexicon for describing messages is woefully inadequate. Still less is one able to characterize purposive and situational constraints. It will not do, for example, to label appeals as ethical, logical or pathetic; or to allow "style" to mean anything from the microcharacteristics of messages to the unique and idiosyncratic aspects of messages; or to speak vaguely and indiscriminately of ideological commitments as causes, worldviews, belief systems and philosophies; or to fail to differentiate further among goals of conversion, stimulation, and activation; or, when pressed to indicate what one means by "rhetorical situation," to use such equally ambiguous terms as "climate," "atmosphere," "occasion," or "set of exigences." Without a logically rigorous system of terms, it will be difficult to guide research efforts or to compare, sum-

marize, and explain research findings. As a first step, critics might simply list the terms they use most commonly and identify, from that list, ambiguities, overlaps, gaps, and so on. Ultimately, I believe, an officially sponsored dictionary or encyclopedia of commonplace and technical terms that stipulates preferred meanings and offers concrete examples will be needed.

III.6: *Needed are explanatory theorems which can help us to understand not only that a rhetorical situation or purpose is constraining but why it is constraining.* Assuming, as Jamieson does, that the rhetor's perceptions of traditions and audience expectations are highly controlling,[40] one should speculate on why this is so. Might an over-arching "need for legitimacy" be posited on the basis of Berger and Luckmann's treatise on the sociology of knowledge?[41] Might Meadian role theory be suggestive, given its emphasis on interactively derived role prescriptions?[42] Might structural-functional theory,[43] which I relied on so heavily to derive rhetorical requirements of social movements,[44] also be applied to other types of constraints? Or might Burke's theory of dramatism, with its emphasis on scenic determinants, be most applicable?[45] Whatever the theorems, they should be capable of generating unique, testable, and ultimately confirmed, hypotheses about the relationship between generic similarities and prior constraints.[46]

III.7: *Needed are theories-within-theories about particular phenomena, "mini-theories" about protest rhetoric, ceremonial rhetoric, the rhetoric of scientific discourse, etc., that follow from, and contribute to, the larger theory of rhetorical genres.* Here, perhaps, is a more useful starting point, for it gives theorists the opportunity to deal in concrete particulars. Once again, they are obligated to develop logically rigorous systems of terms and to formulate explanations for findings, not just descriptive generalizations. These terms and theorems should ideally be consistent with the larger theory, thus yielding, in each case, one deductive, hierarchically ordered theory with several subordinate branches.[47]

III.8: *Needed are theory-based hypotheses about generic similarities and their underlying constraints that link together seemingly disparate rhetors, audiences, periods, places, etc.* This is Jamieson's[48] suggestion, one consistent with the criterion of provocativeness or inobviousness in scientific theories. Utilizing Burke's "perspective by incongruity," one might, for example, hypothesize the existence of similar "courtship" rhetorics in the discourses of politicians, advertisers, lovers and the introductory chapters of survey texts.[49]

III.9: *Needed, finally, are empirical tests of theories.* Rather than assuming, for example, that similar rhetorics were inspired by similar purposes, it should be possible to determine whether that is so by checking au-

tobiographical and other sources. Similarly, rather than assuming that a given audience had a common set of expectations, it should be possible to survey auditors, preferably in advance of the rhetorical event. Along with James Chesebro and Karen Gelman, for example, I conducted a survey of expectations among a geographically diverse sample of respondents just prior to Nixon's first Watergate speech. Not only were expectations quite similar, respondents were also remarkably adept at predicting what Nixon would say.[50] It would be of theoretical interest to determine whether future audiences for speeches of the kind Nixon delivered will have similar expectations.

Conclusion

This paper has proposed a scientific approach to the study of rhetorical genres, one which, in Hart's words, would make of the student of genres "a sort of sociologist of persuasion."[51] The great promise of generic study lies not simply in classification but in the identification of common purposive and situational constraints that lead to generic similarities. While other students of persuasion are busy determining the differential effects of varied rhetorical choices, critics can be breaking new ground by developing theory and conducting research about the factors influencing those choices.

But that theory and research should be guided by scientific norms. In keeping with those norms, I have suggested no fewer than twenty propositions, ranging from recommendations about applications of scientific methods to ideas for theoretical development. Clearly, the task as I have outlined it, is not for one person but for a community of scholars. As a field which already blends scientists and humanists, ours is the right community. Given that a scientific approach may not be entirely appropriate in any given case, humanists should at the least be able to draw selectively from the arsenal of scientific methods and theories.

NOTES

[1]Stephen L. Wasby, "Rhetoricians and Political Scientists: Some Lines of Converging Interest," *Southern Speech Journal*, 36 (Spring, 1971), 237.

[2]Wasby, p. 237.

[3]Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 13.

[4]See for example, Robert D. Brooks, "An Alternative for Retention: Genre Studies and Speech Communication." Paper presented at Central States Speech Association Convention (April, 1974), 1-7. Also, James S. Measell, "Generic Criticism: Assumptions, Guidelines, and Implications." Paper presented at Speech Communication Association Convention (December, 1974), 1-10. We quibble, for example, over whether generic study should serve research or pedagogical purposes (see Brooks);

and over whether a given class of rhetorical practices is a genus or a species (see Measell, p. 2).

[5]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59 (October 1973), p. 274.

[6]Frye, p. 16.

[7]See for example, Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), Ch. 1.

[8]Karl Popper, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 654.

[9]Popper, p. 654

[10]For an example of how these criteria have been applied elsewhere, see my "Psychological Theories of Persuasion: an Auditor's Report," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (December 1971), 383-392.

[11]From the conference *Announcement*, 1975.

[12]Roderick Hart uses the term "dialectics" to refer to discourses distinguishable only in terms of topic and idea. See "Theory-Building and Rhetorical Criticism." Paper presented at Speech Communication Association Convention (December 1974), p. 5.

[13]I would, for example, count all of the following as studies of rhetorical genres, despite the fact that none deals with traditional objects of rhetorical scholarship: James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, "Communication, Values, and Popular Television Series," *Journal of Popular Culture*, 8 (Spring, 1975), 589-603; William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975); Virginia Kidd, "Happily Ever After and Other Relationship Styles: Advice on Interpersonal Relations in Popular Magazines, 1951-1973," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (February 1975), 31-39; Mark L. Knapp *et al.*, "The Rhetoric of Goodbye: Verbal and Nonverbal Correlates of Human Leave-Taking," *Speech Monographs*, 40 (1973), 188-190; Paul D. Krivonos and Mark L. Knapp, "Initiating Communication: What Do You Say When You Say Hello?," *Central States Speech Journal*, 26 (Summer 1975), 115-125; Anthony M. Platt, *The Politics of Riot Commissions, 1917-1970* (New York: Collier Books, 1971), esp. pp. 29-43; Andrew Weigert, "The Immoral Rhetoric of Scientific Sociology," *American Sociologist*, 5 (May 1970), 111-119. These studies illustrate the wide range of tasks associated with generic scholarship. Chesebro and Hamsher set out to demonstrate the critical value of a classification scheme. Gamson, dealing with historical materials, identified correlates of various strategies of protest. Kidd traced changes in a genre over a period of time. The "goodbye" and "hello" studies attempted to identify patterns of verbal and nonverbal behavior and their correlates. In an introductory section of his volume, Platt examined cross-cutting themes in commission reports. Weigert provided a critical analysis in the debunking tradition. With the exception of the Weigert paper, the studies placed scientific controls on observation and in-

ference, although, appropriately enough, they ranged widely from laboratory studies to historical studies, and from those making statistical comparisons to those relying only on qualitative content analysis as a basic inferential tool.

[14]Lawrence W. Rosenfield uses the term. See "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," *Speech Monographs*, 35 (November 1968), 435-450.

[15]I am indebted to James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher for their use of this distinction. See "The Concession Speech: The MacArthur-Agnew Analog," *Speaker and Gavel*, 11 (January 1974), 39-51.

[16]Robert P. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (1959), 343-352.

[17]Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 135.

[18]William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975). Gamson's book shows evidence of unusual rigor in the definition of protest groups, in the selection of a wide and representative range of such groups, and in the development, testing and use of protocols for securing comparable historical data about the rhetoric of each group and their aims and effects. See Ch. 2 and Appendices A-E.

[19]Rosenfield.

[20]Each of the studies reported in this volume draws on just a handful of cases for comparison. And, while the arguments in support of the judgments made about each case generally display considerable face validity, one wonders about their generalizability. Consider Black's provocative claim that what most marks the sentimental style "is the detail with which it shapes one's responses . . . a total control over the consciousness." True enough as applied to Webster's speech and, no doubt, many others, but one wonders whether the generalization can be extended to other rhetorics one would ordinarily label as sentimental. Consider, for example, the pop music slop of the 1940's and 50's which S.. I. Hayakawa has analyzed in "Popular Songs vs. The Facts of Life," *Etc.*, 12 (1955), 83-95. By contrast to Negro blues, the pop music of the period tended towards "wishful thinking, dreamy and ineffectual nostalgia, unrealistic fantasy, self-pity, and sentimental cliches masquerading as emotion" (p. 84). Like Webster's epideictic, then, it beckoned us to flee from reality. But did it seek to shape our consciousness any more than its Negro blues counterpart did? Hayakawa implies the opposite, and while he is by no means the final authority on the subject, his paper does underscore the need to examine a greater number and range of cases before a generalization of the kind Black offered can be established conclusively.

[21]Thomas Clark, "An Analysis of Generic Aspects of Contemporary American Sermons." Paper presented at Central States Speech Association Convention (April, 1976).

[22]Chesebro and Hamsher, "Communication, Values . . ."

[23]Rhetoricians often provide informal comparisons, as when, in this

volume, Black contrasts Webster's sentimental style with Lincoln's more implicative approach, and when Halloran contrasts the public proceeding with both the private proceeding and the public hearing. Gronbeck's more systematic approach to comparison enables him to identify several genres at once, a procedure I would generally recommend.

[24]See Milton Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1968), p. 172. The study by Morrison and Rokeach stands as an exemplar of the power of quantitative content analysis to verify inobvious hypotheses about the generic characteristics of discourse.

[25]See Philip J. Stone, *et al.*, eds., *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).

[26]As might be expected, the papers contributed to this volume vary considerably in terms of the clarity of categories and category markers used to identify genres and their distinguishing characteristics. Measell's six markers of repressive rhetoric seem relatively clear (whether they are valid or not is another question), as do Bormann's indices of "covenant" rhetoric. At some points in the defense of his classification scheme, Gronbeck is able to rely on relatively simple counting procedures, but for the most part, as he himself acknowledges, his categories and indices are rather vague. Carpenter's system poses special problems since it requires estimates of audience effect. Black, too, implies probable effects by casting his characterization of the sentimental style in functional terms. Halloran marks off the public proceeding in relatively straightforward ways but vacillates between normative and empirical criteria for characterizing the actions of participants.

[27]Gamson subclassified in terms of such variables as period, nature of challenge, type of challenging group, and nature of opposition.

[28]Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Irony* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 208-209.

[29]Frye, p. 247.

[30]Black, Ch. V.

[31]Rosenfield.

[32]Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (Winter 1968), 1-14.

[33]Hart.

[34]Kathleen M. Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 6 (Summer 1973), 162-169.

[35]After reading Bormann's analyses of fantasy themes (QJS, 1972, 1973, 1977), I would suggest that there is a second approach which bears great theoretical promise, one that nicely complements the line of thinking I have just referred to. Unfortunately, several key terms in Bormann's theory seem unclear (through highly provocative) and several theoretical claims are largely undocumented. One wonders whether independent observers could concur in identifying a group's "fantasies" or "visions," for example. One wonders, too, whether Bormann's account of cultural processes is hinged too strongly on his earlier small group re-

search. On what grounds, for example, does he maintain that a new rhetorical style "begins when small groups of people become disturbed by their here-and-now problems and meet together to discuss their difficulties? " Mightn't one person (a Hitler, for example) or one invention (radio, for example) or a new law (e.g., the Wagner act permitting collective bargaining) be responsible for a new rhetorical style? And given Bormann's own "fantasy" of rhetorical styles as emerging from democratic, face-to-face groups, one wonders why he would trace the emergence of rhetorical styles by looking at "speeches, representative critical commentary on speech practices, and works of rhetorical theory," rather than at records of the interactions of small problem-solving groups.

[36]Of the papers in this volume, Measell's offers the clearest expression of this position. To be sure, rhetoric also shapes purposes and situations, as Measell acknowledges and as Bormann emphasizes. Rather than haggling over whether situations and purposes create rhetoric or vice versa, perhaps we can develop cyclical or dialectical theories that account for both types of influence. Just as an emphasis on situational and purposive factors may cause selective inattention to rhetorical effects, so Bormann's bias toward a kind of rhetorical determinism may have prevented him from investigating those situational and purposive factors (e.g., opportunity for interaction, elite status, intractability of the opposition, group goals, etc.) which influence why, in some cases but not others, "dramatizations . . . catch on and chain out in small groups . . . and . . . spread out across larger publics."

[37]Black, pp. 133-137. The discovery of factors that vary concomitantly with rhetorical discourse would undoubtedly take generic studies a long way, but, as I suggested earlier in this paper, I do not believe that the traditional critical focus on one or a few cases is as appropriate even to this task as are the methods of the social sciences. This most fundamental of methodological issues is raised directly by Black, and his argument in this otherwise excellent section of his book provides yet another opportunity to compare methodological perspectives. Says Black:

> The logic of criticism is not always a logic of probabilities; the recurrence of a phenomenon does not necessarily strengthen a critical generalization. Criticism's rationality, rather, may sometimes resemble the logic of the chemist. Once the chemist has combined two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen to produce water, his formulary generalization is secure. For the chain of events to have occurred once is sufficient to establish it as a potentiality forever. Similarly, when the critic abstracts a formula from a single phenomenon of discourse, that single occurrence is enough to establish the formula (p. 137).

Were the critic to deal with "simples" like water rather than "complexes" such as apologias, then Black's argument might hold water, although the scientist would undoubtedly remind him that it is extremely dif-

ficult to isolate and combine pure hydrogen and pure oxygen even within the sterile confines of the chemical laboratory. Scientists recognize that they are prone to errors of observation and inference under the best of laboratory conditions, and thus they routinely require repeated and independent measures of laboratory events. The more appropriate analogy, of course, is between generic scholarship and social-scientific field studies in which manipulation of variables is impossible, the objects of research display great individual differences, and both measurement and data analysis are highly subject to researcher biases. Were Black truly interested in adapting the logic of science to the tasks of generic scholarship, he would be led, I believe, to the methods I have been proposing here.

[38]Specification of situational and purposive constraints thus provides a rough benchmark against which to evaluate the artistry of individual rhetors—i.e., the ways in which they deviate from what is expected. (For a similar statement, see Rosenfield, p. 435.)

[39]Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the Contemporary World," in Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (eds.), *The Prospect of Rhetoric* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 21-43.

[40]Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation." Also see her "Antecedent Genre as Rhetorical Constraint," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (December 1975), 406-415.

[41]Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1966).

[42]George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

[43]Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

[44]Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (1970), 1-11.

[45]Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (rpt: Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

[46]It is worth noting that rhetorical critics seem unable to avoid social scientific constructs and theorems. In this volume, for example, Gronbeck implied a theory about the relationship between beliefs and attitudes and about the effects on beliefs and attitudes of "differentiation" and "transference" techniques. Operating from a largely psychoanalytic framework, Black talked of repressed sensibilities and of consciousness as collectively shared. Halloran fused dramatistic theory with sociological assumptions about how the structure and functions of public proceedings combine to influence rhetorical practices.

Whether the best possible use has been made of social-scientific constructs and theorems is another question. I would suggest, for example (at the risk of seeming immodest), that Halloran's model of public proceedings would be more comprehensive and predictive were he to recast it in a manner similar to my "requirements—problems—strategies"

framework for social movements. Rather than assuming the preeminence of one or another goal for the proceeding (as he tends to do somewhat inconsistently), he might hypothesize that the rhetoric of proceedings arises from potentially incompatible rhetorical requirements and the rhetorical problems they occasion. In this way, he might better account for the seemingly disparate styles of individual participants and for the wide variations among proceedings.

[47]Albeit in rather informal ways, most of the papers in this volume operate at general and relatively concrete levels. Links between "maxi-theory" and "mini-theory" are most fully developed in Bormann's papers.

[48]Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation."

[49]In this volume, Black, especially, draws insightful comparisons between the rhetorics of quite different social systems. I am struck by the similarity between Black's account of Noyes' "master trope" ("thou shalt practice free love mechanically") with Bateson's account of the "rhetoric" of parents of schizophrenic children. The common denominator is what Gregory Bateson called the *double-bind*—a paradoxical injunction which requires someone subordinate to a power-holder to follow a seemingly self-contradictory command. Might the double-bind notion be used to account for other anomalous rhetorical transactions? Bateson gives reason to believe that the notion has widespread rhetorical possibilities. See, for example, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972).

[50]Herbert W. Simons, James W. Chesebro, and Karen Gelman, "Nixon on Watergate, April 30, 1973: A Rhetorical Analysis." Paper presented at Speech Communication Association Convention (December 1973).

[51]Hart, p. 7.

GENERALIZING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT FORM: SCIENCE AND HUMANISM COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

ERNEST G. BORMANN

The theme of this volume relates to significant form in rhetorical criticism. In this chapter and the last I discuss a humanistic approach to the study of significant form. What Simons has done from a scientific perspective I propose to do from a humanistic. Simons has posed some important questions, however, relating to the nature of rhetorical and communication theory and to scientific theory which need to be explored to place an analysis of a humanistic approach into perspective. Simons raised explicitly or implicitly questions such as the following: Can certain kinds of theory that are successful in the natural sciences serve as models for rhetorical critics to emulate? Should criticism aim to evolve theories which describe lawfulness? Can the methods associated with certain of the natural sciences be profitably adopted by the rhetorical critic? My basic thesis is that scientific studies and rhetorical criticism are different approaches to knowledge and that while they are not antagonistic and ought not be the basis for conflict and rancor they are incompatible in method and in the explanation and understanding that they provide.

Style-specific theory. Communication and rhetorical theory consists of the codified rules, models of ideal communication, advice on how to practice good communication according to the ideal, and so forth. Thus, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a handbook by one of the experts in a style of communication common to Greece in a certain historical period.[1] Much of the book consists of descriptions of the typical contexts for communication events and discussion of the ideal messages for such contexts. The contexts all require a relatively formal message delivered by one rhetor for an audience. Aristotle does not deal with other communication contexts probably because the style he was discussing was not appropriate to them. We know from Plato's dramatization of it that another important communication context saw a group of people in a relatively informal setting at a meal or under a plane tree in which one person questioned another ac-

cording to the conventions of quite a different style. Haggling in the marketplace might well have created a different communication style. Indeed, the ancient conflict over the Asian and Attic style illustrates the point quite nicely. Gorgias was a practitioner of quite a different style of speaking than were the speakers of Athens. When a new style is introduced into a rhetorical community and attracts converts the result is controversy between the two rhetorical communities about the proper rules of communication. The basic assumptions come under attack and find their way into the "sensibilities" of the contending communities to use Black's term.

For example, William Ellery Channing was a spokesman for a new style of preaching when he delivered his famous sermon "Unitarian Christianity", and he devoted roughly the first half of that sermon to the question of what is the proper way to prove a theological argument.[2] Particularly he discussed the proper way to view, interpret, and use the Bible as support for theological positions. The Puritan preachers never discussed such questions of proof because they shared a common set of assumptions about the nature of the Bible as proof and about the proper way to make a theological argument.

Contemporary rhetorical and communication theory form the rationale for important communication styles in the United States. Elsewhere I have made the argument that rhetorical theory is the rationale for public speaking communication style and communication theory is the rationale for message communication style.[3] Both rhetorical and communication theory consist of systematic and organized statements which set down the basic conventions and ideals and standards for their respective communication styles. Thus, both are similar in basic form, content, and function, although both differ as to such details as the ideal model of communication, the basic rationale for evaluating communication events, and so forth. Both sets of theories, communication and rhetorical, differ in crucial ways from scientific theories.

Few scholars have argued that rhetorical theory was like scientific theory. To be sure, few have tried to unravel exactly what a rhetorical theory consists of and how it functions as explanation and as knowledge.[4] The matter seems to have rested upon precedent. As a result scholars treated the writings of such classical figures as Aristotle and Cicero on rhetoric as similar to scientific theories such as Newton's. That is, scholars studied the classical writings on rhetoric as though they expressed, if not invariable relationships at least important principles which were applicable across time, geography, and culture. Thus, rhetorical theory presumably provides insights into rhetorical practice and is a way to understand communication. The analysis of communication styles reveals that rhetorical theory is not a coherent, homogeneous, body of principles discovered in classical times, and handed down through the centuries as principles which explain communication. Rather rhetorical theory is a collection of style-specific theoretical formulations to guide practice and criticism, which scholars have collated, codified, and commented upon.

While few scholars have argued that rhetorical theory was scientific a good many have argued that communication theory was analogous to scientific theory. The latter have often associated communication theory with research paradigms drawn from the behavioral sciences. They see the paradigm of attitude change studies, for example, growing out of and feeding back into communication theory much as the experiments of the physicists and chemists fed into their theories and were derived from them in the nineteenth century. Indeed, in the controversies between the devotees of communication theory and rhetorical theory one of the arguments in favor of communication theory was that it was more scientific, more descriptive and less prescriptive, than rhetorical theory.

I turn now to an analysis of communication theory to clear up the misconceptions about its nature and to indicate how it consists of the same sorts of linguistic statements as rhetorical theory.

The nature of contemporary communication theory. By the 1940's engineers and technologists were applying scientific methods to the study of communication and evolving a new way to practice it. They were particularly interested in sending messages by telephone, radio, and television. Out of their practice grew a new way of criticizing communication events and very quickly a new communication theory developed. By the time of the Second World War engineers working at such places as the Bell Telephone Laboratories, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pennsylvania State University, and Harvard University were also beginning to build communication systems which employed information processing systems. The engineers tended to blueprint their plans for electronic circuits for radios and television sets and computers. One of the first important descriptions of the communication event in the new style was presented in the form of an electronic blueprint by Shannon and Weaver.[5]

Schramm who was more interested in mass communication than in the technology of its transmission adapted the Shannon and Weaver blueprint for his purposes and Berlo who had studied with Schramm at Illinois made further modifications which resulted in a description of the ideal communication event which was abstract enough to include both human and machine communication.[6]

The basic ideal of the theory was that of human beings communicating with a machine. *Cybernetics* is the study of the way humans set goals and control behavior to achieve those goals and the way machines can come to serve the same function. The study of cybernetics is based upon the ability of organisms and machines to provide and use feedback. The term *feedback* refers to information about the output of a machine or the behavior of an organism which is continuously fed back to a control device and which changes the operation or behavior in order to correct errors and achieve predetermined goals. The principle of feedback has always been in operation in the goal-seeking of organisms but it had not become part of a communication theory in such an important way until the development of

computers and automation elevated it to a key position in the new communication theory.

The new theory included a set of critical standards to guide practice and enable the initiated to coach or teach neophytes how to practice the style. Good communication transmitted information with high fidelity. That is, the more information the system transmitted from source to receiver without distortion or loss the higher the fidelity of transmission and the better the communication event. *Noise* in a communication system cuts down on fidelity and is, thus, undesirable. To combat noise such as static the engineers discovered that repetition of message elements increased the receiver's ability to decipher the appropriate information. The theorists called the repetition of message elements ***redundancy***. However, redundancy was costly in terms of time and energy; since the new theory also valued the conservation of energy they judged that good communication should also be efficient in terms of energy output (costs). The ideal communication situation, therefore, was one where noise was minimized and the redundancy level adjusted to a rate which results in high fidelity transmission of information with no unnecessary repetitions.

Communication styles also have an associated rhetorical vision or view of social reality. Influential figures in the early development of communication theory saw the universe as winding down. They saw this winding-down process as a tendency towards disorganization. They used the word *entropy* to refer to the general tendency of things to grow disorganized. In their view information was the opposite of entropy or negative entropy and they saw the creation and transmission of information as requiring energy to combat the natural tendency towards disorganization. Left alone information would decay under the natural entropic forces. Energy was a value to be protected and the organization and transmission of information was a goal to be sought. Norbert Wiener reflected the general *ethos* of the communication style when he referred to speech as " a joint game by the talker and listener against the forces of confusion."[7] In the game against confusion the computer was always cooperative. Models of the communication style are prescriptive and not scientific because of the fact that people often fail to cooperate in the joint game against confusion. They bluff, lie, and try to mislead. If the model were scientific then all or an appreciable subset of communication events would fall into the pattern the model describes. The prescriptive nature of the communication theory is also apparent in the way criticism grows out of it. Using a scientific theory like Newton's does not yield criticism such as, "That is a bad free-fall by that cannon ball for it failed to travel the distance prescribed by the formula $S=1\frac{1}{2}gt^2$." Suppose, however, an instructor who understands communication theory observes a videotape of a two-person conference and that both he and the people observed share an understanding and appreciation of the communication style. If the instructor then comments "You are confused because you are not providing one another with adequate feedback" the evaluation is both sensible and helpful. The par-

ticipants can then work on their feedback skills according to the standards for good feedback spelled out in the theory.

A good many theorists were confused in the early years of the development of communication theory as to the nature of the models which were a major feature of the theory. Since they wished to be scientific and since some scientific theories did have models as part of their explanatory structure some communication scholars concluded that the models of their theory were different than the ideal descriptions of public speaking events that grew out of rhetorical theory. As late as 1966 Gerald Miller, a leading communication theorist, was of the opinion that, "It is useful to think of models as arbitrary constructs, as judgments made by the person who creates the model. By adopting this view, one avoids the pitfall of assuming that there is a *correct* model of speech communication; he discards one common meaning for the therm 'model,' i.e., 'something eminently worthy of imitation, an exemplar or ideal.' "[8] Miller argued that no current model of speech communication was worth such a laudatory evaluation, thereby implying that he saw an exemplar or ideal in the Platonic sense as an ideal for all time and all places. The models of communication theory are not ideals for all times and all places, rather they are exemplars or ideals for the community limited in time and space which practices communication in that style.

Communication theory also includes, typically, a survey of current research and thinking in a number of other disciplines as it relates to matters of attitude and behavior change, coercion, personality traits, roles in groups, institutions, and society, and so forth. Insofar as the explanations drawn from other disciplines are scientific to that extent communication theory is scientific. However, none of the social sciences from which communication theorists borrow has yet achieved a theory which is of the Newtonian kind. Thus, communication theory remains unscientific in the Newtonian sense.

Scientific Theory

In order to indicate how communication and rhetorical theories differ from scientific formulations I must turn briefly to the nature of science. The scientific method consists of observation, induction, and deduction. Science is, at its core, empirical in that the scientist depends upon observation for confirmation and negation of theoretical constructs. A scientific theory evolves from the practice of science when sufficient low-level laws exist to enable a theoretician to invent a general principle or a law of broader scope which covers and integrates the same observations covered by the low-level laws. A "good" scientific theory accounts for all the observables and is so logically consistent that some of the laws suffice for the deduction of all other laws by means of mathematical computation analogous to the way some axioms of geometry enable the deduction of all other theorems.

For students of communication theory the sciences which have been

most influential are those of nineteenth century physics and chemistry. The leaders of the new school of experimental psychology of the early years of the twentieth century took as their models the theories and experimental methods of physics and chemistry in their efforts to achieve a science of psychology. The methods of experimental psychology influenced, in turn, the investigators in communication.

The chemists and physicists of the turn of the twentieth century practiced their sciences by discovering invariable relationships among carefully quantified factors. The method was to discover the *relevant* variables (those discernable features of the phenomenon under study which were causally related), to control some of them, and to vary some, and to leave some alone. The experimenter then observed the effect of the manipulation of some variables upon those that remained. The investigator then attributed the changes in the variables which were not manipulated to the effect of the changes in the manipulated variables.

The rigorous control and manipulation of relevant variables required laboratory conditions which allowed the investigators to seal off the processes they were investigating. Chemists and physicists at the turn of the century were essentially creating closed systems for the phenomena they were studying and doing so with such care that laboratory conditions were a necessity.

Generally the experimenters measured the variables carefully during the course of an experiment so change in the manipulated variable was quantified. In the same way they calibrated numerically the effect of the manipulation upon the dependent variable. Because investigators measured changes numerically they could use the mathematics of functions for the deductive interpretation of such data.

One of the most impressive of the early theories of physics which exhibits the reciprocal relationships among observation, induction, and deduction was that of Newton. I shall use Newton's theory as a touchstone against which to examine communication theory.

Newton was not able to develop his theory until the natural sciences had evolved to the point where a number of low-level functional relationships were formulated. Galileo had done extensive work with the swing of the pendulum and with falling objects on the surface of the earth which established such functional relationships as the distance covered by a fall is equal to one half the square of the time of the fall multiplied by a constant rate of acceleration. The law covering the fall of bodies on the surface of the earth could be expressed in the algebraic function $S = 1/2kt^2$.

Meanwhile previous work by Copernicus and others had developed an account of the motion of the planets which assumed that the sun was the center of the system rather than the earth with the planets speeding in orbits around the sun. Ptolemy had provided an explanation of the heavenly bodies which assumed the earth as the center and which successfully predicted the position of the planets in the heavens. Copernicus'

explanation accounted for the position of the planets as well as but no better than Ptolemy's. Interestingly enough a number of scientists were drawn to Copernicus' explanation not because it was better able to predict but because it was simpler and more elegant. The aesthetic dimension of scientific and mathematical theories and theorems is an important part of their appeal.

Newton was working at a time, therefore, when the field of terrestrial mechanics was able to provide mathematically formulated laws relating to velocity, acceleration, force, mass, and distance. At the same time the field of celestial mechanics was developed to the point where the sun was posited as at the center of the solar system and the paths of the planets were well mapped.

Newton's theory was based upon a unifying analogy. Indeed, a fruitful unifying analogy is often the basis of scientific theories and provides another clue to the aesthetic dimension of such thinking. Newton's insight was to see an analogy between the fall of the apple towards the earth and the fall of the earth itself towards the sun. Newton's theory consisted essentially of the general law that the force pulling two bodies of any size together is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between their centers. Again the law can be expressed mathematically in terms of concepts which can be measured and assigned numbers. The mathematical expression of the function is $F = k \frac{M_1 M_2}{R^2}$. F in the formula stands for the force of attraction, M_1 and M_2 for the mass of the bodies, R for the distance between their centers and k for a constant force known as the constant of gravitation. A mathematician can apply the general law to the planets and chart their orbits so that he can derive mathematically all of the applications of the laws of Copernicus relating to the planets. For example, a mathematician could, by using the notion of the vector of forces on the earth when its direct fall into the sun is modified by the gravitational pull of the other planets, discover its orbit. In similar fashion a mathematician can apply the general law to the special case of objects falling on the surface of the earth and derive mathematically all of the laws of Galileo. For example, the fall of the apple is a special case of Newton's theory because the distance from the center of the earth to its surface is so much greater than the distance above the earth to the tree limb upon which the apple grows and because the earth has vastly more mass than the apple. Because of the great difference in distance and mass the acceleration of the object towards the earth is a constant and the acceleration of the earth towards the object is so slight that it can hardly be noticed. Thus, the function $S = 1/2gt^2$ follows from the application of Newton's general law.

Newton's theory integrated two bodies of theoretical knowledge which had previously been considered separate and was deductively consistent. Not only that but experiment after experiment and practical application

after practical application continued to produce results which squared with predictions that engineers and scientists had computed mathematically from Newton's general law.

Influence of Science on Communication Research

When investigators began to study communication scientifically they often applied the model of natural sciences sketched above to their efforts. They tried to isolate relevant variables, control some, manipulate others, and observe in some measurable way the effect of the treatment on the dependent variables. For example, Franklyn Haiman's 1949 study of ethos assumed at least three relevant variables (1) the *ethos* of the speaker, (2) the message, (3) the audience's attitude toward the topic. He held the message constant (controlled the variable) but changed the *ethos* of the speaker by attributing the message to a communist for some subjects, to a sophomore at Northwestern University, for others, and to the surgeon general of the United States for still others. He administered tests of the subjects' attitudes towards the topic in order to quantify the effect of manipulating *ethos* on listeners' attitudes.[9]

The influential work of Hovland and his associates at Yale University who replicated the Haiman study and then set out to solve further puzzles in terms of isolating relevant variables proved to be precedent setting.[10] A large number of scholars in social psychology and communication adopted the paradigm of the Haiman and Hovland investigations. They examined the interactions among message variables such as order of arguments, use of evidence, emotional materials and source credibility variables, and audience variables. They usually designed their efforts to discover functional relationships (lawfulness) which could be expressed quantitatively. When they discovered such relationships they hoped to integrate them mathematically and manipulate them deductively to yield prediction and control of communication events. Their general research program was aimed at the goal of a science of communication complete with theoretical formulations along the model of Newtonian mechanics.

The Failure of Communication Research to Emulate Newtonian Theory

As research accumulated the analogy between Newtonian mechanics and behavioristic psychology proved more figurative than literal. The experimentalists in communication research stretched the analogy even more since they were, of necessity, interested in symbolic matters for which the behavior of subjects was often a poor index.

The failure to find laws. The physicists were dealing with invariable relationships. The law of gravity seemed at work everywhere in the universe and to have operated throughout history. The operations of the whole magnificent system were exemplified in the fall of one apple. Physicists working within the Newtonian paradigm did not need to take a random sample and draw inferences on the basis of statistical assumptions

of chance. In a sense when you had computed the fall of one apple you had computed the fall of all.

The investigators employing their analogy of the Newtonian paradigm to the study of communication events were unable to quantify their variables as were the natural scientists. Communication scholars knew that quantification was the key to the success of the method. Historically the breakthrough in the development of functional laws came when investigators found ways to measure such variables as mass, time, and velocity. The researchers in communication used scaling devices, evaluators or judges who assigned numerical values to observations, and a number of paper-and-pencil testing procedures to quantify variables. But the resulting numbers did not fulfill the assumptions of such mathematics as arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and calculus. Communication theorists could not express functional relationships in mathematical terms using the numbers and have their observations confirm or negate the functional relationships.

Since the investigators could not use the mathematics of functions they turned to statistical mathematics for their deductive systems. Statistical mathematical systems were able to provide estimates as to the odds that a given variance between two factors was probably due to chance or to some lawfulness. The statistical treatments could not, however, indicate a functional relationship so precisely that a mathematician knowing the value of one or more variables could compute the numerical value of other variables.

The failure to develop theory . Investigators searching for a scientific theory of communication were also handicapped because they never had low-level laws which were the equivalent of the discoveries of Galileo such as $S=1/2gt^2$. Newtonian theory was dependent upon a number of prior mathematically expressed functional relationships in celestial and terrestrial mechanics. Without low-level laws expressed as functional relationships in algebra or calculus the search of theorists for a grand overarching Newtonian generalization was bound to fail. Thus, several of the most important features of the scientific paradigm of Newton were lacking from the research paradigm of early investigators of communication who saw as their central variable the concept of "attitude change."

Still the investigators continued to search for the touchstones of their Newtonian model, namely theoretical explanations, deductively integrated, which would yield further hypotheses for investigation and which would serve to provide the basis for practical applications to predict and control communication events. The result was that communication theory included, in addition to the models of ideal communication events and the other artistic elements, *ad hoc* explanatory accounts of research results.

A brief comparison between "cognitive dissonance theory" and Newtonian theory will indicate how the two formulations differ in crucial respects.[11]

Newton's theory can be supported or disconfirmed by observations which check predictions deduced mathematically by the application of the laws. Festinger's dissonance theory (and all balance notions) cannot be supported or disconfirmed by observations in the same way. An experimental subject who fails to change appreciably the way he marks an attitude change scale after listening to a message designed to create conflicting cognitions does not disconfirm the dissonance notion because we can assert that the message failed to create dissonance and thus no change resulted. When change does result we can assert that dissonance was created by the message and that accounts for the change. A body at rest to which an external force was applied and which did not react with an equal and opposite force would disconfirm Newton and throw the whole theory into disarray.

Likewise we can provide alternative explanations for attitude change in the form of the balance notions which are as plausible and which cover the same phenomenon and there is no scientific way to choose between them.

Impossibility of Newtonian Approach to Communication

While Simons' essay is on the one hand a creative call for new paradigms of research for the scientific study of communication, it exhibits, on the other hand, a number of vestiges of the tradition which culminated in the "attitude change" paradigm of research based upon the analogy of experimental science and Newton. Among the vestiges of the attitude change paradigm are his call for a "scientific approach to the study of rhetorical genres" in order to develop theories which are logically rigorous, which allow predictions which are "confirmed and tested in the real world" and which "permit control over phenomena." In addition the theories ought to be " 'elegant' in the sense that verifiable predictions can be derived from a few general principles" and they ought to be comprehensive to account for a "broad range of phenomena." Simons has the general touchstone of Newtonian theory as the basis for his evaluation of explanations.

Simons also suggests a method of investigation which grows out of the same research tradition. He urges the use of the "specific notion of a control or comparison group" and the operationalization of definitions so that "two or more independent observers can concur in identifying predesignated characteristics of rhetorical practice when confronted with samples of rhetorical practice." He urges a large sample of items to assure some comprehensiveness to investigations and the use of statistical procedures to identify "characteristics of rhetorical practice."

Finally Simons reflects the paradigm of Newtonian theory in which applications can be derived from the theory mathematically and in which new hypotheses for critical experiments can be derived in the same manner. He suggests that "The task of generic identification should take place within a theoretical framework; guided by theoretically derived hypotheses; and focused on theoretically significant similarities."

Insofar as Simons calls for the application of the research paradigm of the attitude-change studies to the study of rhetorical criticism with the hope of developing theories which have the qualities of Newtonian mechanics he is wrong and to follow his advice would be to generate another school of communication research as trivial and misguided as the one which practiced research within the paradigm of attitude change during the 1950's and 1960's. He is wrong because the past research demonstrates that closed systems analogous to the closed laboratory experiments of 19th century chemistry and physics are not logically possible and because past research demonstrates the impossibility of measuring variables and discovering mathematically expressed functional relationships among such variables.

Possibility of Scientific Study of Communication

However, Simons is creative in that his paper recognizes the bankrupt nature of the attitude change paradigm, and he calls for a good deal more than simply an application of the old paradigm to new questions and new material. Simons gives evidence of once having been a partisan of the attitude-change paradigm and thus his paper exhibits many of the assumptions of that approach. Indeed, he tends to generalize those assumptions to all science and call them "scientific norms." But Simons also gives evidence of being willing to go to rhetorical criticism for stimulation and help in the creative task of finding new avenues for a "science" of communication and that is one of the important contributions of his paper. For me, the most seminal statement in the paper is Simons' notion that "While other students of persuasion are busy determining the differential effects of varied rhetorical choices, we can be breaking new ground by developing theory and conducting research about the factors influencing those choices."

If we are to develop theory and conduct research about the factors influencing rhetorical choices on the part of both the designers and interpreters of messages then we had best abandon the Newtonian model and the influences of the old behaviorism. If communication is a rule-governed game, then we need to understand how the rules of the game come into being, to what extent players abide by the rules, what happens when they break the rules, why they choose to abide or fail to abide by the rules, the extent to which these games are played in given historical periods and places, and the tactical choices available to the communicators. We can certainly answer such questions on the basis of empirical data which investigators gather carefully, check for reliability, and test for validity.

The Scientific Study of Communication Styles

One perspective we might use for the scientific study of communication is to take the notion of a communication style as the practice of a rhetorical community with the communication theory and criticism which sustains the practice and then ask questions about how styles arise,

flourish, and decay. If we wish to describe the boundaries of the communication styles in both space and time we need to take broad based samples of communication events. Simons' call for careful sampling of large populations of events is a useful one for such research as this. Our theories, however, will not be like Newton's. They will not result in mathematical functions describing invariable relationships. Rather, they will be theories about communication styles which describe general features of such communication games, which account for the inception, rise, maturation, decline, and decay of such rule-based communication communities, and which explain the effects of the communication events which occur at the boundaries of styles when participants in one style try to communicate with those of another.

Style reveals artistic side of theory. How does the perspective of rhetorical style and communication theory relate to the development of a scientific research program aimed at development of a coherent body of principles which explain broad classes of communication events? First the theory related to a particular communication style always contains conventional and idiosyncratic models of ideal communication events. The conventional idiosyncratic (the rule-governed) features of a communication style can be considered artistic parts of the theory as opposed to scientific components which would cut across all (or at least a significantly large number) of styles. The classification system of phonemes such as vowels which is based on the conformation of the energy distribution in the sound wave is scientific in the sense I have in mind. Thus the energy distributed in the /ɔ/ sound remains invariant no matter the language or the style of communication.

The scientific method of investigation is appropriate to those features of communication styles which are common to many. If the investigator applies the scientific method to the artistic features (conventional, customary, rule-governed but style-specific) of a communication style the result will be information pertinent to that style but of no use in understanding communication in other styles. Significant forms, patterns, correlations, invariable relations all imply a regularity beyond the arbitrary choices of communicators. Thus, thunder follows lightning and can be said to be a sign of or to mean lightning. However, we cannot choose to change thunder from meaning lightning to meaning the coming of a rainbow. On the other hand, the artistic features of communication style are rule-governed. That is, the participants lay down rules for their communication games which are quite arbitrary. If they decide to refer to a certain meteorological phenomenon with the word *lightning* or the word *blitzen* they are dealing not with a lawfulness like that which characterizes the relationship between lightning and thunder but with a rule-established conventional relationship which is subject to their whims. Likewise if the community establishes a rhetorical transaction such that when lightning strikes a tree and causes it to burn they will form a circle of people around it while a predetermined spokesperson chants in rhyme and makes broad

jerking gestures and the members of the group interrupt at rule-governed customary places to make rhythmic shouts such transactions will be idiosyncratic, conventional, and arbitrary. The spokesperson may produce messages which take a recurring form from ritual to ritual so that an anthropologist might recognize the transcription as being one of the type but the form of the message would be style-specific.

That the Puritan preachers should speak for an hour-glass, that they should divide their sermons into two major parts, that they should stud their sermons with "firstly" and "secondly" and other devices to aid the audience's memory is part of the artistic side of the Puritan rhetorical (communication) theory. That computer programmers should write their messages to the machines on specially prepared forms with great care and precision in a carefully constructed grammar is part of the artistic side of the communication theory. That Halloran should discover that the public proceeding is comparable to a play where the audience is expected to sit quietly through the performance without taking substantive part is an artistic feature of the communication theory associated with such a transaction.

Past scientific investigation of styles proved trivial. Investigators have often employed the scientific paradigm to isolate variables and measure their interrelationships in order, in Miller's words, to "discover a regularity in events that will enable him to make explanatory and predictive statements concerning those phenomena that are of importance to speech communication."[12] Many of the investigators have selected as hypotheses for study rule-governed behavior which was style-specific. For example, Miller notes some of the typical investigations of the 1950's and early 1960's as:

> Can audiences distinguish between a sincere and insincere speaker? Is it most effective to put the strongest argument at the beginning or at the end of a message? Will intensely emotional language result in greater audience attitude change than language of moderate emotional intensify?[13]

The questions which raise style-bound rules to the level of hypotheses to be tested to discover scientific lawfulness or regularity are bound to fail. The proper way to communicate sincerity is generally taught in any communication style in which sincerity is an important value. In the relationship style which evolved in the 1960's authentic sincere communication was a positive value and facilitators of sensitivity groups taught people how to communicate sincerity by self-disclosing, by the nonverbal expression of positive relationships, and by striving for interpersonal trust. In manipulative styles which characterize some negotiating transactions in contemporary North American the use of the relationship style's techniques to communicate sincerity would be confusing and disruptive.

The point, however, is made clearly in the question of language

intensity. One of the early topics of investigation using the attitude-change paradigm was the question of the effectiveness of using varying levels of fear-arousal appeals in terms of changing the attitude of a listener. The basic question was, Can a speaker scare listeners into thinking or acting differently? Early communication researchers at Yale University first asked the question about fear arousal in the 1950's and discovered that their subjects, including some students at Yale at the time, were not likely to change their attitudes when subjected to highly fearful messages. Indeed, messages with lower levels of fear appeals proved more effective. Apparently the style of communication to which the Yale students in the sample were committed did not include high fear arousal as a feature which moved them or which they appreciated. Consider Yale two hundred years before the experiments. Had the researchers conducted their investigations in the 1740's when a powerful religious revival swept across the American colonies they probably would have gotten a different answer to their question. During the revival high-fear-arousal sermons designed to put the fear of God into the listeners and scare them into giving up their sinful ways proved very successful in changing not only attitudes but behaviors. Johathan Edwards, himself a graduate of Yale College, delivered a famous sermon called "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," which is one of the most artistic and powerful examples of high fear arousal in our history. A number of years earlier Edwards' grandfather, Solomon Stoddard had instituted the stylistic feature of hell-fire-and-damnation fear appeals in a series of revival sermons.[14]

Apparently the style of the revival of the 1740's would not have moved the students at Yale in the 1950's. Interestingly enough, other communication researchers attempted to repeat the same studies in the 1960's and discovered that the results contradicted the discoveries of the 1950's. They found higher levels of fear arousal were again more effective than lesser levels.[15] A rhetorical critic conversant with the history of persuasion in North American could have anticipated the waxing and waning of the power of high-fear-arousal messages on the basis of the past changes in communication styles. Indeed, the communication styles of the college students of the cool and conservative 1950's were different from the styles of those students caught up in the antiwar, civil rights rhetoric of the 1960's.

Style and appropriate scientific questions. Of course lawfulness and regularity may well operate in all human beings and in all communication styles. My argument is not that the scientific study of communication is fruitless, only that the application of the scientific paradigm of Newtonian physics in order to discover Newtonian theory has proved fruitless after investigators have given it a thorough run for the better part of three decades. The proper place for the application of scientific methods designed to discover lawfulness is in those areas which seem to transcend communication styles. Simons is right, I believe, to turn to the rhetorical critic of significant recurring forms to get aid in discovering features of

communication which transcend styles. The rhetorical critic and historian can provide a useful service for the scholar interested in developing a science of communication by revealing the scope and nature of communication styles and by sorting out those features of communication styles which seem to be artistic and idiosyncratic from those which seem to be common to a number of styles. Much as a philosopher of science might examine various questions in order to determine which are pseudo-questions, which are tautological or linguistic questions, and which are questions that can be answered by empirical investigation, so can the rhetorical critic examine a variety of questions and determine which are rule-governed, customary, and arbitrary and likely to be style-specific and which are more general and thus, at least potentially, a starting place for scientific investigation.

The dynamic developmental perspective for research. Fantasy theme analysis is only one perspective which sees communication as a dynamic developmental phenomenon.[16] A good many scholars are searching and groping for a viewpoint which sees the dynamic development of communication conventions which bind individuals into speech communities, which spread out and contract, which persevere through time and die out, and which are of varying scope and importance to their participants. A number of studies have been based upon a viewpoint which included a systems approach to communication. Insofar as scholars use the notion of an open system with the dynamic changing interrelationships among subsystems they are dealing with the dynamic developmental aspects of communication. Other scholars have tried to study rhetorical transactions and discover the rule-governed aspects of verbal and nonverbal communication associated with them.[17] The Sheflens have discovered such transactions to be widespread and some to exhibit a great deal of inertia.[18] The occasion which calls forth a eulogy for the death of an individual is probably such a transaction. Other studies of rules governing saying goodbye or beginning a two-person communication episode also reflect a growing tendency to find some viewpoint which deals more directly with the rule-governed and game-like features of communication.

The point is that Simons' call for a scientific approach to " 'Genre-alizing' About Rhetoric" makes good sense if the notion of variables, controls, and other vestiges of the Newtonian paradigm are dropped from the scholar's viewpoint. How might Simons' call for a scientific approach to generalizing about rhetoric be adapted to the dynamic developmental viewpoint of rhetorical styles? Again, because I am more familiar with it, I will apply the notion to the use of fantasy theme analysis, rhetorical visions, styles, and communities. Quite possibly the systems viewpoint would work as well.

A Conjecture About Communication Theory

The notion that communication theories like theories in physics and chemistry can be integrated, consistent sets of laws, expressed in terms of

mathematical functions, which yield theoretically derived hypotheses for investigation in critical experiments has been a barren one. We have no such communication theories. One of the main threads of my argument has been that such theories are impossible. It does not follow that other kinds of scientific theories (or at least theories resembling the explanatory accounts of other natural sciences) are also impossible for scholars of communication. I believe that theoretical structures which explain and allow for anticipation and a measure of control are possible and that, at any rate, scientifically inclined students of rhetoric and communication will continue to study symbolic events rigorously, systematically, and in order to replicate findings from one laboratory or field study to another.

If an investigator shifted the level of analysis from such essentially micro-units of communication as five minute messages played to fifty subjects to a much broader and general level such as monitoring the evolving rhetorical visions for large segments of the public in the United States then the law of large numbers so important to statistical inferences would come into play. We already have impressive evidence of how computer-aided polling techniques can anticipate the outcome of an election, for example, with only a few key returns from selected precincts around a state or even from the entire country. To be sure there is always a margin of error but such prophecy, when it reaches the stage of eighty or ninety percent accuracy, is the result of a plausible theoretical account of voting behavior.

I have no notion what form a communication theory will eventually take but to illustrate my point take a theory of the same form as the explanatory accounts which allow for the anticipation of weather changes. If large sampling techniques were used and various stations for reporting group fantasies were set up at special locations around the country then observers could take periodic readings of what shared fantasies were spreading around what sections of the country and in what publics. Just as the meteorologist charts cold fronts and warm fronts, the main tract of the jet stream, the possibility of thunder storms or severe weather, a properly programmed computer might well be able to take data from monitoring stations and chart the boundaries of various visions, estimate their essential saliency, their motivational force, emotional intensity, and the direction and speed of their movement.

One hypothesis growing out of the study of religious and reform visions is that the more romanticism there is in the vision the more zealous the participants and the more likely they are to be fanatics. Investigators using a computer programmed content analysis system such as the General Inquirer could conceivably code key terms which would index such features of romanticism as the celebration of deep emotional authentic feeling, the commitment to nature and to the natural person, the antipathy to technology, to rationalism, to intellectual matters, the emphasis upon knowledge and moral insights gained intuitively from moments of insight as opposed to man-made laws derived from precedent or observation. Such a monitoring system might have discovered the romantic reform vi-

sions forming and evolving in the 1960's and been able to chart their collisions with established visions. Given communication theories of a meteorological form scholars might have been able to accumulate data using content analysis, Q-sort techniques, and interviews and analyze emerging patterns so that they could have predicted a 60% chance of a strong new opinion front crystalizing around the slogan "the feminine mystique" and sweeping through the United States.

The meteorological analogy may not be the most apt but my point is simply that a new perspective on theorizing for a scientific approach to communication is in order. Further I would argue that scholars such as Simons searching for the new perspective can learn much from the work of rhetorical critics and historians in the areas of significant form. In turn, my position is that critics can learn from a "science" of communication and should such a useful body of generalizations develop, critics would be unwise to be either antagonistic to it or to ignore it. Finally, however, the general objectives, the general functions, and the general method of the two scholarly approaches are not compatible and we ought not try to force them together. Before either humanist or scientist can do sensible research both must think through the basic assumptions undergirding their work and both must understand how they relate to one another, where they are incompatible, where they can supplement the work of one another.

NOTES

[1]By *style* in this context I mean something similar to the way Black uses the term in his study of sentimental style. *Style* refers to the broad usage of a community of people engaged in significant discourse for which they understand the rules, customs and conventions. I define a *rhetorical community* as a group of people who participate in a rhetorical style (practice, criticize, and understand the theory associated with the style). Communication styles begin with practice but practice cannot continue without criticism. Criticism, in turn, fosters the development of theory in the sense of models of ideal communication events, standards of evaluation, and principles guiding the practice. For a more complete explication of the interrelationships among practice, criticism, and theory in a communication style see Ernest G. Bormann and Nancy C. Bormann, *Speech Communication: A Comprehensive Approach*, 2nd ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), Chapter 2, "Communication Theory."

[2]The sermon has been widely reprinted. It can be found in Wayland Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hochmuth, eds., *American Speeches*, (New York: Longmans, Green), 1954.

[3]Bormann and Bormann, pp. 29-47.

[4]For an early attempt see, Ernest G. Bormann, *Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), Chapter 6, "Theory and Explanation in Speech."

[5]*The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, (Urbana, Il.: University of Illinois Press, 1949).

[6]Schramm presented his model in "How Communication Works," in Wilbur L. Schramm, ed., *The Process and Effects of Communication*, (Urbana, Il.: University of Illinois Press, 19[illegible]; Berlo developed his model in David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

[7]Norbert Wiener, *The Human use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1954), p. 42.

[8]Gerald R. Miller, *Speech Communication: A Behavioral Approach*, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 53.

[9]Franklyn S. Haiman, "Experimental Study of the Effects of Ethos in Public Speaking," *Speech Monographs*, 16 (1949), 190-292.

[10]Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (1951), 635-650; Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly, *Communication and Persuasion*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).

[11]Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

[12]Miller, p. 26.

[13]Miller, p. 27

[14]Edwards' sermon has been widely reprinted. It can be found in Parrish and Hochmuth.

[15]For an early study revealing resistance to high fear arousal see Irving L. Janis and Seymour Feshback, "Effects of Fear-arousing communications," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 48 (1953), 78-92; for later studies which found higher levels of fear arousal effective see for example, Howard Leventhal, "Findings and Theory in the Study of Fear Communications," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 5, (New York: Academic Press, 1970), pp. 119-189; for a survey of the findings see Elliot Aronson, *The Social Animal*, (San Francisco: Freeman, 1972), pp. 66-69.

[16]Fantasy theme analysis is based upon a viewpoint which is dynamic and developmental and which sees rhetorical styles coming into being, flourishing, maturing, and declining. For a discussion of the method see Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (Dec. 1972), 396-407.

[17]Charles R. Berger and Richard J. Calabrese, "Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward A Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication," *Human Communication Research*, 1 (1975), 99-112: Vernon E. Cronen and Nancy Mihevec, "The Evaluation of Deductive Argument: A Process Analysis," *Speech Monographs*, 39 (1972), 124-132: Leonard Hawes, "The Effects of Interviewer Style on Patterns of Dyadic Communication," *Speech Monographs*, 39 (1972), 114-123; Robert F. Nofsinger, Jr., "The Demand Ticket: A Conversational Device for Getting the Floor," *Speech Monographs*, 42 (1975), 1-9. Thomas S. Frentz and Thomas B. Farrell, "Language-Action: A Para-

digm for Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62 (Dec. 1976), 333-349; Leonard C. Hawes, "How Writing is Used in Talk: A Study of Communicative Logic-In-Use," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62 (Dec. 1976), 350-360; Robert E. Nofsinger, "On Answering Questions Indirectly: Some Rules in the Grammar of Doing Conversation," *Human Communication Research*, 2 (1976), 172-181; Gerry Philipsen, "Speaking 'Like a Man' in Teamsterville: Culture Patterns of Role Enactment in an Urban Neighborhood," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (Feb. 1975), pp. 13-22; Jesse G. Delia, "Constructivism and the Study of Human Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 63 (Feb. 1977), 66-83. Robert W. Norton, "Conviviality: A Rhetorical Dimension," *Central States Speech Journal*, 26 (1975), 164-170.

[18]Albert E. Sheflen and Alice Sheflen, *Body Language and Social Order: Communication as Behavioral Control*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[19]Several studies have demonstrated the feasibility of using Q-methodology to discover and delineate rhetorical visions. See particularly David L. Rarick, Mary B. Duncan, David G. Lee, and Laurinda W. Porter, "The Carter Persona: An Empirical Analysis of the Rhetorical Visions of Campaign '76," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 63 (Oct. 1977), 258-273.

CRITIQUES

Section II, "Formal and Generic Criticism," presents critics grappling with form and genre. By testing in application the critical utility of a focus on form and genre, it exposes questions central to a formal or generic approach to criticism. These questions include: What constitutes evidence for the existence of a form or genre? Does formal or generic criticism end in classification? How do genres interact with other genres, forms with other forms? Where can forms and genres be located? How and why, if at all, do genres and forms change?

In the keynote essay, "The Sentimental Style as Escapism or the Devil with Dan'l Webster", Edwin Black illustrates a style he labels "sentimental" with a passage drawn from Webster's Bunker Hill Address. Black attempts to explain not merely the ceremonial style of Webster but *a* style which "flourished" in nineteenth century Britain and America and to account for the resonance and decline of that style.

Unlike the other criticisms in this section, this essay explores the rhetorical manifestation of a form of consciousness. The sentimental style, according to Black, manifests "a disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic values in order, essentially, to escape a burden of moral responsibility."

"The Sentimental Style as Escapism" focuses not on the symptoms of the style ("stately movement", adjective piled on adjective, a tendency to "tear passions to tatters"), but on the didactic function of these symptoms. This style, Black argues, instructs the auditor "in how he is to respond to the speech". The focus on function yields an explanation of the style's existence, persistence, and recurrence. In addition, it generates a characterization of the oratory of display: "a piece functions as display when, intentionally or not, it promotes a disparity between its actual audience and its implied audience." This focus also raises questions pivotal to any critical consideration of form and genre. What does the existence of a form or genre signify? What and how do forms and genres mean? Black's essay, which details the relationship between form and genre, contains the most encompassing conception of form in this volume.

In "A Comparative Study of Prime Minister William Pitt and President Abraham Lincoln on Suspension of Habeas Corpus", James Measell compares the rhetoric generated by Lincoln and Pitt in situations sharing similarities. To the extent that it is susceptible to testing, Bitzer's notion of the

rhetorical situation will be tested in this sort of analysis. Do comparable situations produce comparable rhetoric, hence comparable forms? The situations examined by Measell did not produce rhetorical acts whose salient similarities outweighed salient differences. Consequently Measell does not claim that he has isolated a genre. The question, do comparable situations occur, or are situations and rhetoric responsive to situations essentially idiosyncratic?, can be answered only by examination of seemingly comparable situations. By detailing both the similar and dissimilar strategies employed by Lincoln and Pitt, Measell illustrates the difficulty inherent in a situationally based search for genres.

Nonetheless, he does locate two similar forms of argument employed by Lincoln and Pitt, and he illustrates the potential of comparative criticism. In effect, Measell has employed the rhetoric of Pitt to understand the rhetoric of Lincoln, and vice versa, thus spelling out the rhetorical options available to each and accounting for their respective choices.

Although the imprint of Bitzer's "The Rhetorical Situation" is clear in both Measell's essay and Halloran's "Doing Public Business in Public", the primary critical moves in the two essays are radically different. Measell finds dissimilar strategies in what would initially have been presumed to be similar rhetorical acts, while Halloran finds rhetorical commonality in seemingly dissimilar public transactions.

Halloran's essay and Carpenter's "The Historical Jeremiad as Rhetorical Genre" do not use a succession of rhetorical instances to define a rhetorical genre but rather define a genre and explicate troublesome rhetoric from the frame of reference entailed in that definition. Although, as Simons argues, there is merit in approaching a rhetorical act unencumbered by formal preconceptions, it is doubtful, as Gronbeck argues, that critics, audiences, and rhetors are able to approach rhetorical acts without culturally conditioned formal and generic preconceptions. Halloran and Carpenter may be rendering explicit a move basic to critical experience—a move which views a rhetorical act in terms of a preestablished frame of reference. The test of a critic bound by preconceptions is her/his ability to see and report salient differences, as Measell does, for example, when he refuses to invent a "rhetoric of repression" unwarranted by the evidence. The critic, conscious of the judgmental constraints imposed in the act of classifying, should also be able to reclassify when the judgmental standards imposed, for example, by a forensic classification of Nixon's so-called "Checkers Speech," fail to illumine the speech.

The utility of the genres defined by Carpenter and Halloran is determined by the quality of insight they yield in explaining rhetorical acts. When faced with a defined genre, the reader may either accept the definitions as operational and suspend judgment until they have been tested in application or may test them by asking, for example, whether the characteristics Halloran attributes to the public proceeding comport with those public proceedings with which the reader is familiar

In both the Carpenter and Halloran essays the defined genres cannot exist independent of the audience. When the critic locates the form or genre in the discourse itself as Measell attempts to do, salient dissimilarities in acts presumed comparable will disconfirm the existence of a genre. But if the genre exists in the interaction of rhetoric and audience as it does for Carpenter, dissimilarities in the rhetoric (e.g., different levels of threat, varying levels of explicitness in the second persona of the chosen people) do not, of themselves, disconfirm the existence of the form or genre. The question, was audience response comparable? and the question, can that response properly be labeled "jeremiadic"?, are controlling.

Despite similarities in their inclusion of the audience in the genre, the essays differ. For Halloran, a public proceeding can be either successful or unsuccessful depending on the response evoked. The public proceeding "dramatizes a model of community, including conflict between members who differ over how the immediate issues are to be resolved and the more fundamental agreements that enable them to transcend the issues at hand and enact their conflicts in an orderly way." The public proceeding is capable of "enlivening" the sense of community or of suggesting the invalidity of the common life. In contrast, for Carpenter the only rhetorical acts worthy of the label "jeremiad" are those which successfully evoke a defined type of response in a specified audience. Carpenter is focused solely on effects, Halloran is not.

The method used by Halloran and Carpenter to assess the audience's contribution to the interaction differs as well. Carpenter measures the impact of the rhetoric by culling historical sources. Halloran assesses the impact of the Hearings by universalizing his reactions as a member of the audience.

If a developmental history of rhetorical acts is to be written, genres, the interplay among genres, and the evolution of genres must be charted. But first, the characteristics which unify individual genres and which separate them from other genres must be isolated. That impulse inheres in Halloran's attempt to distinguish the public proceeding from rhetorical events resembling it and in Bormann's notation that an ungenteel style exists at the same time as the sentimental style defined by Black. Gronbeck's "Celluloid Rhetoric: On Genres of Documentary" establishes a multi-dimensional model capable of placing genres of documentry film in relation to each other.

A number of important questions are grounded in the mapping of genres: To what extent are genres and forms cross-cultural? What accounts for the resonance of a genre at one time and not another? What accounts for the emergence and disappearance of genres and forms? What is the impact of contemporaneous genres on one another? What is the impact of antecedent genres on subsequent genres? There are a few tentative responses to these questions in this volume. Gronbeck's notion that forms are culturally grounded opens the possibility that shifts in recognized genres, e.g., the American documentary, may reveal cultural shifts.

Black's essay attempts to account for the resonance of the sentimental style in the 19th century, and for its current disfavor. Halloran's explanation of the legitimating function of the public proceeding may account for the existence of the public proceeding. Carpenter's notion that an audience which regards itself as the chosen people is susceptible to the jeremiad suggests that that form will have currency at certain points in history. Bormann's analysis of communication styles in Part One notes changes in audience susceptibility to fear appeal. These critical thrusts suggest directions for future research and also indicate that a focus on genre and form does not terminate in the classificatory act.

A focus on form and genre facilitates awareness of the critical constraints imposed and the creative options opened by classification. Critical expectations are a function of the classification imposed on a rhetorical act. A critic whose repertoire of classificatory options is complex minimizes the likelihood of misclassification and misjudgment and maximizes the opportunity deliberately to overlay alternative classificatory approaches on a rhetorical act to achieve fresh perspectives and insight. That is the least we can expect of a focus on form and genre in criticism. In addition, the critic may, with Black, analyze those constancies of consciousness which manifest themselves formally; with Gronbeck, examine the impact of culture on form and genre; with Halloran and Carpenter, explore the interaction of genre and audience; with Measell, probe the relationship between situation and form or genre; with Simons, anticipate a form of a discourse yet unwritten; with Bormann, "chart the boundaries of various (rhetorical) visions, estimate their saliency, their motivational force, emotional intensity, and the direction and speed of their movement." The byproduct of these diverse approaches to the recurrent will ultimately be a developmental history explaining the intricate and complex processes which shape rhetorical acts.

THE SENTIMENTAL STYLE AS ESCAPISM, OR THE DEVIL WITH DAN'L WEBSTER

EDWIN BLACK

In a section of *A Grammar of Motives* called "The Temporizing of Essence," Kenneth Burke noted the tendency of some writers to express essences in terms of origins and *vice versa*.[1] Burke attributed this "double vocabulary" to the pun in the word "priority," which can be used either in a temporal or logical sense.

There are a couple of other terms that, even more clearly than "priority," are at the semantic nexus of the origin-essence interchangeability, and they are worth noting here because, as it happens, they are the key terms of this Conference. The words, of course, are "form" and "genre."

The word "form," used nominally, refers to the shape, the structure, the *essence* of a thing. And used verbally, as in "to form," the sense of the word is to constitute, to shape or mold, to *originate* a thing. We find a corresponding distinction between the nominal "genre" and the verbal "to generate," the noun again referring to essence and the verb to origin.

Adjectivally, our common usage observes a distinction between "formal," which refers to essence, and "formative," which refers to origin, although the roots of the two adjectives are obviously in the word "form." The same distinction applies to the adjectives "generic" and "generative," with their roots in "genre."

To a striking extent, then, the key terms of this Conference are functional mirrors of one another. They exhibit the same nominal, verbal and adjectival variants. They possess corresponding bipartite usages. They parse concomitantly.

Clearly the words "form" and "genre" are not synonyms. They signify differently. But even in their lexical distinctiveness, the two terms still bear a remarkable relationship to one another, and that relationship is one of dialectical complementarity.

You will recall that in Plato, dialectical inquiry concerning the nature of a Form led, when it was successful, to a definition composed of a Collec-

tion and a Division.[2] The terms "genre" and "form" have the same relationship to one another as do the Collection and Division of Platonic dialectic. That is, the genre of a thing is its class—a statement of its relationship to all other commensurable things. The form of that thing is its inherent structure—a statement of its constituents and their relationships to one another. Genre refers to the place of the thing in the universe and to its generation as an adaptive and relational entity. Form refers to the constitution and individuality of the thing and to its formation as an entity sufficiently autonomous to be identifiable. Taken together, the words "genre" and "form" are complementary in that "genre" refers to external relationships and "form" refers to internal relationships.

In Platonic dialectic, the Collection and the Division together constituted the most exhaustive attainable description of whatever reality was their subject. There is simply nothing excluded from the categories of analysis and synthesis. So too it would seem that genre and form together constitute exhaustive topics for the description of whatever artifact is their subject. And considering the remarkable complementarity of the terms "form" and "genre," it is reasonable to suppose that the elucidation of either aspect of an artifact would stand to elucidate the other. That is, any information one may acquire about the form of an artifact may be heuristic for its genre, and *vice versa*.

This last consideration—the heuristic reciprocity of form and genre—is one that can be tested only in criticism. And since I believe that it is only by doing criticism that we can illumine criticism, I turn now to the subject of the sentimental style, and continue my inquiry into form and genre through the medium of a critical paradigm.

To study the sentimental style, we must move backwards in time to the century before our own. Whether the sentimental style is now an archaism or has survived in some form into our day is a question to be reserved for later. But there is no question that in the nineteenth century, at least, in America and in England, at least, there flourished something that can properly be called the sentimental style, and if we want to be sure of observing that style *in situ*, it is to that century we must turn.

II

During the nineteenth century in America, the Oneida Community was surpassed only by Brook Farm in its celebrity as an experiment in communal living, and in at least one technique, the Oneida Community was preeminent. The Oneidist guru, John Humphrey Noyes, believed in free love and the exaltation of sexuality, but he realized that the Community required some method of birth control that would comport with its unorthodox sexual and social doctrines. Noyes preached and the Oneidists practiced as best they could a method of withholding sperm during copulation simply by the couple's not moving. And the technique by which the couple did not move was to think very, very hard of something spiritual.[3]

The image of a man and women, coupled, motionless, racking their minds with supernal fantasies, is a potential subject for ribaldry, but nonetheless the image will serve nicely as a master trope for the nineteenth century. The sort of strainedly bifurcated mentality that was carried in the Oneida Community to what surely must be its ultimate development is exhibited in varying degrees throughout the nineteenth century—the inclination, when pressed from all sides of the consciousness by an insistent demand whose presence one wants not to acknowledge, to think very, very hard of something spiritual.

Such frantic indifference—the calm in the eye of an emotional storm—did not begin with the nineteenth century any more than it ended with it, but that century displays so assiduous and pervasive a cultivation of this willed distraction that the characteristic becomes a key to the time. The public life of the century both here and in England was marked by this characteristic, and it is my thesis that the sentimental style—so admired in the nineteenth century—was not only an apposite expression of willed distraction, but also an ingenious instrument for its realization.

I should not proceed further without some effort at definition, and I can think of no better way of clarifying the sentimental style than by example. The example I submit is from an epideictic address by Daniel Webster, and it is Webster's epideictic that can serve as the paradigm for the sentimental style. Attend, if you please, this passage from "The Bunker Hill Monument Address" of 1825. Webster is commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill, and he turns to address the aged veterans of the Revolution who are seated in a section near the speaker:

> But the scene amidst which we stand does not permit us to confine our thoughts or our sympathies to those fearless spirits who hazarded or lost their lives on this consecrated spot. We have the happiness to rejoice here in the presence of a most worthy representation of the survivors of the whole Revolutionary army.
>
> Veterans! you are the remnant of many a well-fought field. You bring with you marks of honor from Trenton and Monmouth, from Yorktown, Camden, Bennington, and Saratoga. Veterans of half a century! when in your youthful days you put everything at hazard in your country's cause, good as that cause was, and sanguine as youth is, still your fondest hopes did not stretch onward to an hour like this! At a period to which you could not reasonably have expected to arrive, at a moment of national prosperity such as you could never have foreseen, you are now met here to enjoy the fellowship of old soldiers, and to receive the overflowings of a universal gratitude.
>
> But your agitated countenances and your heaving breasts inform me that even this is not an unmixed joy. I perceive that a tumult of contending feelings rushes upon you. The images of the dead, as well as the persons of the living, present themselves to you. The scene overwhelms you, and I turn from it. May the Father of all mercies

smile upon your declining years, and bless them! And when you shall here have exchanged your embraces, when you shall once more have pressed the hands which have been so often extended to give succor in adversity, or grasped in the exultation of victory, then look abroad upon this lovely land which your young valor defended, and mark the happiness with which it is filled; yea, look abroad upon the whole earth, and see what a name you have contributed to give to your country, and what a praise you have added to freedom, and then rejoice in the sympathy and gratitude which beam upon your last days from the improved condition of mankind![4]

Such examples of the sentimental style could, of course, be multiplied from discourses of the time;[5] Webster is only an acutely sonorous representative of the type—one who knew how to keep his metaphors unmixed and who had a voice like a pipe organ.

What I want most to note about this style is the detail with which it shapes one's responses. No scintilla of reaction is left for the auditor's own creation. Every nuance of his response is suggested by the speech. In the passage I have quoted, there is not a degree of heat nor a single drop of moisture that is left to the option of the auditor. What this sort of style seeks is a total control over the consciousness, and this, I submit, is what distinguishes the sentimental style. The sentimental style is notable not so much for its stately movement or its piling on of adjectives or its tendency to tear passions to tatters—though all of these symptoms are often present. It is the *function* of these symptoms that I want to emphasize—what they combine to *do* to people. Their function is didactic. It is to instruct the auditor in how he is to respond to the speech—to regulate every shade of the auditor's feelings as the speech unfolds.

Webster in "Bunker Hill" shuttles back and forth between images that could be painted on the ceiling of a chapel and descriptions of internal states and emotional seizures. The thrust was to associate the two—to instruct the audience in how they were to respond and what sensations they were to experience in the presence of certain images. There seemed an assumption behind this sort of procedure that, without the instructions, the audience might not know what to feel, or they might feel improperly—that one could not trust their spontaneous reactions.

It is also the case that in a milieu in which emotional expression is severely regulated, there will be a special caution exercised in circumstances in which emotional expression is allowed. The sentimental style is a superb instrument for such a situation. It not only elicits affective experiences, but also defines and delimits them. It enables the emotions to be given a recreation under sanctioned auspices.

One can see in the epideictic efforts of Lincoln later in the century a striking contrast to Webster's epideictic. Lincoln was disposed to place more reliance than Webster on the uninstructed propensities of his auditors. Lincoln, understanding better than Webster the puissant symbols of

popular religion, confidently cast political propositions in that idiom and trusted that the audience could generate for itself the reverence associated with the religious symbol in the presence of the political symbol.

We today find Lincoln's style less archaic than Webster's because Lincoln tries less overtly to manipulate us. He provokes and constrains our responses, but he compels us to make them ourselves. Webster is more fastidious and detailed. He wants to control not simply the response but also the exact manner of its expression, and in this piling on of instructional detail, Webster finally leaves us with nothing at all to do except to be completely malleable. Leaving nothing to the auditor, demanding of the auditor that he pay strict attention to the speech for every nuance of his own experience in hearing the speech, the auditor can in the end have no consciousness of anything else except the speech as a speech, and so his tendency would be to view it as display. And if, as would be the case with a modern auditor, he is the least inclined to withhold part of himself from the absolute surrender that Webster demands, he will notice that the speech is implicitly making claims about itself that he is not granting, and the term that may occur to him will be "pompous."

The quality in Lincoln that is missing from Webster is ambiguity, but ambiguity of a special kind. It is not ambiguity in the sense that the claims made are inexact or that they necessarily mean several things at once. It is rather that the auditor's experience is left unstructured. Lincoln gives the auditor the boundaries of experience, but the generation of it is left to the auditor himself.

In so leaving room for this participation, Lincoln left it open for people of other, later times, such as we, to play their own variations on his themes. But Webster, leaving nothing to be created by the auditor, restricted his speeches to those auditors whose emotions would work and be expressed exactly as he required, and the subtlest change in sensibility, consequently, stood to make his speeches obsolete.

Webster is excessively didactic. He over instructs. Permitting no chance response, he prohibits spontaneity. To be the people he wants us to be, to honor the claims he makes on his auditors, we must totally surrender ourselves to his speech; we must feel only what he wants us to feel. And since we cannot bring ourselves to so total a surrender, we stand to some extent outside the speech. We understand what it asks. Hence, we understand that we are not its auditors; we are merely spectators. We are standing apart from a rhetorical transaction, observing it. This orientation enlists our spectatorial responses. We become connoisseurs, and the function of the speech becomes for us display.

The oratory of display, then, is such functionally. A piece functions as display when, intentionally or not, it promotes a disparity between its actual audience and its implied audience. We, its actual audience, sensing this disparity, are predisposed to view the speech as a collection of technical virtuosities. We are overhearing it; eavesdropping. We may, for various reasons, be sympathetic to the speech; we may hope for the success

of the rhetorical transaction; but the difference between that condition and the condition of being the auditor to the speech is the difference between passivity and involvement.

The question remains, why were Webster's epideictic efforts so popular with his contemporaries? Even granting that we today stand outside the speeches, it still is the case that the nineteenth century public admired them. Why? Why did the public of that time so admire discourses that left them with so little freedom to form their own responses?

One is tempted to account for this popularity in terms of emergent but not yet emerged conventions of response—to attribute it to the very inchoateness of the system of responses that by the end of that century was to be much more definite to people. But the temptation must be resisted because, in fact, there were already old traditions of rhetorical response in this country, reaching back into the seventeenth century, responses at which Americans, according to deTocqueville's testimony, seemed indeed notably adept.[6] The reason, I think, is rather to be found in the *evasiveness* of this style. It was popular because it provided the audience with unambiguous cues which, in their very definiteness, excluded alternatives, and thus induced the audience to be unconscious of incipient stimuli that might have uncomfortably solicited their attention. This didactic quality, then, and especially its popularity, should be taken as a symptom of disquiet and unease, of a subtly gnawing conscience and a tacit agreement to repress.

Perhaps in the case of Webster and his audience, it was the presence of slavery that had to be repressed. For what are still not fully understood reasons, the West was not able to assimilate the institution of slavery. The nineteenth century experienced a moral revulsion to slavery that was sufficiently strong to effect its abolition. It was on the wane in Britain and in South America, and it never really gained a foothold on the continent. Well before the overturn of so old and well entrenched an institution, there must be at first dormant, and then stirring with a long crescendo of activity, a set of attitudes that, when fully expressed, will be totally incompatible with the institution. The way in which most people will want to deal with such disquieting attitudes in their yet incipient state will be to let them sleep, and it may have been Webster's particular contribution to the comfort of his contemporaries that he devised themes and a style which combined to lull the stirring conscience of his country. It is significant that Emerson despised him, for Emerson stood for conscience above all else, and against slavery.

Slavery, of course, was a focal issue in nineteenth century American public address, but it was not an autokinetic issue. A process of industrialization and technological development was under way in America and in England, a process that some historians believe put slavery in the course of economic extinction.[7] More important for our analysis, it was a process that, in both countries, created social disruption and human suffering. The god of Progress reigned, and the salient tenet of its theology was to invest one's faith in the momentum of change. Faith in Progress re-

quired that one not be inhibited by social remorse. The accumulating detritus of the process—the ugliness, the exploitation, the social insecurities—all had to be accepted as an inevitable means to a higher good. What precisely the good was, was not clear, but the movement toward it required allegiance, and that allegiance in turn required that one's progress not be retarded by the suffering of others.

A form of consciousness emerged which was adapted to such demands, a form that was characterized by the subordination of moral to aesthetic considerations—by the achievement of psychic comfort and subcutaneous harmony through the refusal to apprehend the jarring, the unwholesome, the corrupt.

The themes of Hellenism and Hebraism in Matthew Arnold's great nineteenth century essay were actual currents of his time, and it is by no means clear that Hellenism was not the dominant current in England and America, if by Hellenism we understand the impulse to subordinate moral to aesthetic claims. Now, there are at least two ways in which a society can express its preference for aesthetic values. One way is to beautify the environment, to adorn the civic life and the private domicile alike with the ornaments of great art. The other way is to develop a perceptual instrument of highly discriminating selectivity, one that will be blind to the ugly and sensitive only to the beautiful. This sort of perceptual instrument can operate with indifference to the environment, and can realize Apollonian values without regard for what Marxists call "the objective conditions of society." But such a perceptual instrument has all the defects of its virtures, and its principal efficacy is its selective imperceptiveness. The instrument is required to be closed to some facts, even as it records others. Its failure to perceive is as important as its perceiving. The development of such an instrument makes possible a Hellenism of the mind, an impulse to beautify that is never projected, a vision of the Good that is characteristically quiescent, an internal harmony in the midst of external squalor, an aesthetic anesthetic. At its crudest (and it was often crude in the nineteenth century) it is Pollyanna and all the other cloying sentimentalities that we associate with bourgoise culture of the time; but it was not always crude, and sometimes it was a very subtly expressed disposition that enabled the elite of that century to abide the most extravagant corruptions and yet to maintain their consciences intact and guiltless.

When Freud wrote of the conscious mind as receiving material that had first passed through a censor, his insight was timelessly valuable, but the insight was of his age. Freud, the discoverer of the unconscious, was also a child of the nineteenth century, and his genius lay in his capacity to generalize from the evidence given him by his patients who, during the foundational formulation of his theory, were creatures of the nineteenth century. And Freud saw in that procession of troubled souls the recurrent configuration of a consciousness that protects itself by a willed ignorance of the ugly facts of its own nature, but an ignorance that, in the case of Freud's patients, was incompletely realized: successful enough to disguise

the rot, but not successful enough to arrest the guilt. That Freud's therapeutic response was not to strengthen his patients' censors, but to throw open their psyches and bathe their guilt in light was what made Freud one of the prime adversaries of this nineteenth century sensibility.

More courageously perhaps than any previous writer, Freud pressed the inquiry into the price we pay for civilization. His good faith brought him to acknowledge—as Rousseau before him had not—that the inquiry itself was an essentially cultural epiphenomenon, and that to pursue it was a profoundly civilized act. Freud demonstrated anew that the construction and sustenance of a civilization depends on hard moral choices, and that one can be free of such choices only in a state of savagery.

That pattern of personal anguish that Freud observed in the simultaneous presence of contradictory impulses crystallized, in the course of the nineteenth century, into a social configuration. Our civilization in that time had given our forebears the power to rape the earth, but it had also given them the moral apprehension of what they were doing. It sustained at once their arrogance and their humility and, having defined the two characteristics as irreconcilable, it sanctioned their anxiety about them. Our fathers had, as we have still, a repertoire for coping with unendurable paradox, and one favorite technique of theirs was to obfuscate it, to befog it in sentimentality. They refined the uses of language as an instrument not of rendering reality, but of obscuring it. They projected their wishes; they propagated their dreams. In their fortunate moments, they found an inconsequential solace and resolution. When their luck failed them, they were entrapped within the moral autonomy of their own fictions and perhaps, in time, they, or we their heirs, recovered from it as from a nightmare, then to look unsentimentally, remorsefully, even loathingly on the cruel achievements of their self-absorption.

The career of Oscar Wilde, and especially its tragic finale, is a particularly instructive example of the apotheosis of aesthetic values. Wilde's comedies and his public persona both carried to parodic extremes the pattern of so exalting the agreeable and the beautiful that they become perceptual filters. In the case of his comic masterpiece, *The Importance of Being Earnest*, for example, the pattern pervades the play and not only controls its plot and characterization, but also suffuses virtually all the wit. And even the moral tale, "The Picture of Dorian Gray," is, you will recall, the story of a man whose corruption is disguised by an attractive appearance, and who might have flourished indefinitely but for a work of art—his portrait—that represented him too well. But it is Wilde's public persona even more strikingly than his writings—a public persona, let me remind you, that was as successfully entertaining in this country as in England—that evidences our argument. If that argument has merit, than it requires us to see Wilde's public persona not as a decadent deviation, but rather as an especially pure embodiment of his time. It was typical of the century that the guardians of British prestige refused to see in Wilde's aestheticism the fulfillment of their own attitudes, for their own equivoca-

tion, being yet another source of moral discomfort, had itself to be a prime object of imperception.

The fury with which Wilde was pursued, hounded and ruined has always been something of a perplexity to Wilde's biographers. They often end by holding Wilde himself responsible for his enduring conviction and imprisonment, as if a refusal to flee can account for the enmity that makes fleeing imperative in the first place.[8] Yet, for all the suggestions of a death-wish in Wilde, driving him to impudence, neither Wilde's tactical paralysis nor his career of fashionable impertinence quite constitutes an Objective Correlative to the relentless persecution that destroyed him. We can begin to see the dynamism of that fury when we see Wilde as having made overt in his art and his life the chronic disposition of the English elite to exalt their tastes to a moral preeminence, and when we guess that they had a secret terror of that exposure. They were, then, moved to outrage because, inadvertently perhaps, Wilde threatened the delicate organization of their consciousness. Had they seriously questioned the moral adequacy of aestheticism, it would have been their own moral adequacy that, in the end, would have been undermined, and they would have been compelled to admit to the formal parlor of their consciousness an ugly rabble of unacknowledged obligations.

It is not enough to say that Wilde's sexual inclinations repelled his countrymen, for the dark world in which he moved flourished in his time as it had before and does now. Wilde's link to that world was unbearable only because Wilde was a special case. He was the epigone of his country's consciousness, and his corruption signified their own to his countrymen. The choice they sensed was between destroying Wilde and shattering their own identity. And history provides recurrent confirmation that men will kill before they will risk the torment of psychic disorder.

However unprepossessing a form of consciousness may be, however disreputable may be its stylistic symptoms, to attribute to it an epistemic function is to judge it as decisive and fateful in the lives of its adherents. Perceptual filters shape not simply the distinction between the real and unreal, but indeed, prior to that distinction, the very determination of what may or may not qualify as a subject for it.

I hope by now to have made my principal initial claims clear. I believe it useful to view the sentimental style as the manifestation of a disposition to subordinate all values to aesthetic values in order, essentially, to escape a burden of moral responsibility. It is in the nineteenth century, I believe that we find the sentimental style achieving its apogee, at least in England and America. Since then, of course, the style has fallen into disfavor, and on those rare occasions when we encounter it, it is likely to seem archaic and contrived.[9]

What has happened to the impulses behind this style? Surely our century has experienced no diminution of repugnant stimuli, and we have no obvious reason to suppose that the self-protectiveness of an aestheticized sensibility is any less useful now than it was a hundred years ago. One may

suspect that the sentimental style has been replaced, that something else now exercises the close regulation of our responses in the way that the sentimental style once did. And the question is, what is that something else?

First, I think we must look to television for some of the answer. In its reportage and documentaries no less than in its soap operas and adventure stories, television subordinates its raw material to the demands of dramatic form. Unlike the sentimental style, television reportage and documentary do not seem to me to be shielding us from ugliness. On the contrary, they tend, if anything, to wallow in it. Television news presents a veritable plethora of moral concern, and we viewers are invited to live lives of unremitting social guilt. But even when it has horrors to convey, television orders, edits, and comments upon its photography with strict attention to the dramaturgic expectations of its audience. Thus, television reportage works, as the sentimental style did, to render public issues aesthetically palatable.

More directly, we find a compressed version of the sentimental style in some television advertising: in the Kodak commercials that show joyous weddings and family reunions and irresistible children, and in the Standard Oil commercials that show beautiful scenes of nature and water birds in flight amidst the benign presence of refineries and derricks. It is comforting to believe that an enduring photographic image is effective against time and mortality. It is reassuring to believe that our technology is consonant with a woodland fixed in tranquility. And so a telegraphic sentimentality presents us with a stoppage of time and of motion—in one case with a precious moment made eternal, and in the other case with a process arrested in repose.

A second and more elusive answer to the question of what has happened to the sentimental style lies, I think, in the understanding that the sentimental style is a necessarily transitory phenomenon. It is necessarily transitory because it is its own eventual undoing.

Thus far I have dwelt on the negative aspects of the sentimental style, on its evasive and circumventive function. It is appropriate now to redress that partiality and to note that the style's way of evading and circumventing is to focus the attention in an affirmative, indeed an arbitrary manner. And working as it does to consolidate selected perceptions with precisely defined feelings in a series of imperative regulations of sentiment, this style is unusually fecund in the generation of new pieties.

What begins in the sentimental style as the construction of a new sentiment can become after awhile the triggering of a stock response. Thus the melodrama of a hundred years ago, which was in technique and in effect a very exact theatrical counterpart of the sentimental style,[10] can become now the romance or the medical story or detective story of television and film. The modern entertainments are cooler and more implicative in style, but they are able to function only because the amalgams of datum and affect which the older drama made explicit have by now become constituents

of our conventional sensibility, and what had to be instructed our forebears may be simply evoked in us.

I am suggesting, then, that the sentimental style is transitory because it is always, when it is effectual, at the threshhold of a sensibility. It is a style that affirmatively answers a deficiency of trust in the appropriateness of certain feeling-states to certain conditions, and it flourishes most in three general circumstances: when a new sensibility is taking form to replace an older one; when a sensibility has been formed, but is competitively marginal to another one; and when an established sensibility is in decline. In any of these three circumstances and because of any of these circumstances some version of the sentimental style may appear. Depending on which of the three circumstances obtains, the style will move either to instruct initiates or to renew the faithful. But absent any of these circumstances, and the sentimental style will be boring and overdone to audiences; it will not flourish because they will not attend it.

What I have been trying to do in my critical remarks is illustrate the relationship between a style and a form of consciousness. When one talks of significant form in rhetorical criticism, the usual referent for that phrase consists of recurrent and abstractable patterns in discourses. That is a necessary, an indispensible construal. But there is , I submit, yet one other locus of form that solicits our attention. It is more elusive and problematic than discursive form because it is not directly observable, but its exploration may represent an ultimate humanistic fulfillment of rhetorical criticism. The form to which I refer is the form of consciousness affected by and manifested in the symbolic currency of rhetorical transactions.

Groups of people become distinctive as groups sometimes by their habitual patterns of commitment—not by the beliefs they hold, but by the manner in which they hold them and give them expression. Such people do not necessarily share ideas; they share rather stylistic proclivities and the qualities of mental life of which those proclivities are tokens.

Below the continously mutable dialectic that shapes and reshapes our social actions, there are deeper constancies of consciousness. Their explication is essential to understanding the varieties of rhetorical experience.

NOTES

[1]Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 430-440.

[2]Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265, 266, 270D; *Philebus*, 16-18; *Cratylus*, 424C; *Sophist*, 226C, 235C, 253 ff.; *Politicus*, 285A ff.; *Laws*, 894A, 936D, 965C.

[3]John Humphrey Noyes, *Male Continence* (Oneida, N.Y.: The Oneida Community, 1872; rpt. in *Sexual Indulgence and Denial*, New York: Arno Press, 1974).

[4]Daniel Webster, "The Bunker Hill Monument," in *American*

Speeches, ed. Wayland Maxfield Parish and Marie Hochmuth, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), pp. 106-107.

[5]Collections of orations from the nineteenth century abound in examples of the sentimental style. One such collection is Alexander K. McClure's *Famous American Statemen and Orators* (New York: F.F. Lovell Publishing Company, 1902) in six volumes. Among the nineteenth century speeches in that collection which exhibit, in whole or in part, the sentimental style are: Eliphant Nott, "How Are the Mighty Fallen," II, pp. 308-335; Henry Clay, "On the Expunging Resolutions," II, pp. 350-354; Anson Burlingame, "Massachusetts and Sumner," III, pp. 13-37; Ignatius Donnelly, "Reconstruction," IV, pp. 197-213; William Lloyd Garrison, "Words of Encouragement to the Oppressed," V, pp. 103-115; and a marvelously antic spoof of the sentimental style that was delivered in the U.S. House of Representatives, James Proctor Knott, "Duluth," VI, pp. 308-327.

[6]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Second Part, Book I, chaps. 18 and 21.

[7]Robert Williams Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, *Time on the Cross* (Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 86-102, review some of these historians.

[8]Hesketh Pearson, *The Life of Oscar Wilde* (London: Methuen and Co., 1954), pp. 305-307; Frank Harris, *Oscar Wilde. His Life and Confessions* (New York: Horizon Press, 1974), pp. 292-305.

[9]The *discursive* style seems, at least at the present, unfashionable but perhaps its epistemic function has been taken up by other media in our century. One remembers the extravagant artistic activities of Nazism and the pervasive "ignorance" among Germans of what was happening in the concentration camps. In 1936, Walter Benjamin concluded his essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," by noting that "Fascism is rendering [politics] aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art." *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 242.

[10]Michael Booth, ed. *Hiss The Villain. Six English and American Melodramas* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964). Booth's introduction to this collection (pp. 9-40) is an exceptionally informative analysis of melodrama. A thorough historical treatment of the genre is Frank Rohill's *The World of Melodrama* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967).

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIME MINISTER WILLIAM PITT AND PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN ON SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS

JAMES S. MEASELL

The privilege of habeas corpus is a basic tenet of both English and American law. The doctrine was first articulated in Article 29 of the *Magna Carta:*

> No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised [i.e., deprived] of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the Land.[1]

In Great Britain, the monarch held the power to suspend habeas corpus at any time and for any reason until the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of 1679 vested this power in Parliament.[2] When the United States Constitution was being drafted by the Congress of 1789, the framers of that document placed this clause under Article I, which sets forth limitations upon Congress: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."[3]

From time to time throughout history, the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended outright by the legislative assemblies of both Great Britain and the United States. Two such occasions occurred during the French Revolution in England and during the Civil War in the United States. In both instances, the executive administrations, under Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, and President Abraham Lincoln, respectively, had, in effect, suspended habeas corpus through a policy of arbitrary arrests and detention of political dissenters. Pitt and Lincoln faced comparable rhetorical problems, namely, the justification of their administrative policy to withhold the privileges of habeas corpus. The purpose of this

essay is, first, to describe the historical conditions which prevailed in these two instances and, second, to compare and contrast the significant features of Pitt's and Lincoln's rhetorical acts in support of suspension of habeas corpus.

The Pitt Administration and the Jacobins

During the early seventeen nineties, supporters of the Pitt Administration in Parliament approved a number of repressive measures, culminating in the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act in May, 1794. Passage of these acts permitted the Administration to stifle dissent over both domestic and foreign policy.

Parliamentary reform, especially regarding the redrawing of boroughs, had been a growing concern for about twenty years. John Horne helped to found the Society of the Supporters of the Bill of Rights in 1769, and his efforts were paralleled by pamphleteers affiliated with other reform societies.[4] In 1785, the young Prime Minister Pitt advocated a parliamentary reform bill in Commons, but the proposal was defeated and pressure for reform subsided for a time. In 1789, the French Revolution sparked renewed interest in the popular quest for parliamentary reform in England. Burke's conservative views in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) brought tart replies from Thomas Paine (*Rights of Man*) and James Mackintosh (*Vindiciae Gallicae*). Several new societies were formed, including the London Revolution Society (1789), the Society of the Friends of the People (1792), and the Friends of the Liberty of the Press (1792). These groups, among others, were labelled "Jacobins" by Pitt. Pamphlets ridiculing the Prime Minister, his adherents, and the political doctrines they favored poured from the presses as writers such as Joseph Gerrald and George Tierney sought to coalesce opposition to the Pitt Government and secure support for Parliamentary reform.[5]

When France and England engaged in open warfare during late 1792, Pitt "undertook to gather together all the enemies of France in a great coalition."[6] This grand idea proved to be a failure, however, for France had emerged victorious in the fighting in 1793, especially in Belgium and Holland. The unsuccessful military efforts were blamed on the Pitt Administration, and the government was criticized frequently in the newspapers.[7]

The groups opposing the Pitt Government distributed pamphlets and held frequent public meetings. On occasion, a sympathetic member of Parliament, such as Richard Brinsley Sheridan or Thomas Erskine, would speak to the members.[8] Toasts were drunk and resolutions were passed, but the societies' numerical power, by any measure, was hardly a threat to the Pitt Government.[9] Supporters of reform in Parliament were outspoken, to be sure, but their voices far outstripped their votes. The largest society was probably the London Corresponding Society, which was headed by John Horne (Tooke) and Thomas Hardy. Although it boasted

of "scores of thousands" of members, its active membership was but "a few thousand."[10] The various petitions sent to Commons regarding parliamentary reform usually contained only a few thousand signatures. The individual reform societies tended to be insular in character, and attempts to meld disparate groups were futile. In October, 1793, for instance, a grand British Convention of reform societies was scheduled, but it, like another such venture one month later, accomplished little.[11]

Although the reform societies seem to have been both ideologically fragmented and politically impotent, the Pitt Government pursued a policy of repression toward them. In May, 1792, King George III issued the "Proclamation for the Prevention of tumultuous Meetings and seditious Writings," a document which alleged that "wicked and seditious writings have been printed, published and industriously dispersed, tending to excite tumult and disorder, by endeavoring to raise groundless jealousies and discontents in the minds of our faithful and loving subjects. . . ."[12] The Government's Home Secretary, Henry Dundas, was zealous in his opposition to the so-called "radical" societies. In October-November, 1792, Dundas went to Scotland where he assessed the strength of support for the Government and assembled a group of informers and spies who infiltrated reform societies and reported on their activities.[13] Another Royal Proclamation, the "Proclamation for Calling Out the Militia," was issued by the King in December. In the first three months of 1793, two repressive measures were passed by Parliament, the Alien Act, which curtailed travel between France and England and established detention areas for "French Assassins and Domestic Traitors,"[14] and the Traitorous Correspondence Act, which regulated commercial intercourse between England and France.

The Royal Proclamations and the repressive legislation were paralleled by other restrictive measures used against dissenters by the Pitt Administration. In November, 1792, Pitt wrote Dundas about the possibility of requiring printers and publishers to register at "some public office" so that the flow of Opposition pamphlets could be shut off.[15] Newspapers critical of the Government were compelled to pay arbitrary taxes, and the *Argus* was forced to cease publication.[16] Individuals were arrested and detained on charges of "seditious libel," but many were released before coming to trial. Convictions were obtained in some cases, and these received much publicity in pro-Government newspapers,[17] but trials of major figures, such as Thomas Hardy and John Horne (Tooke), ended with acquittal. The arrest and detention of Opposition writers and reform society members were, of course, tantamount to executive suspension of habeas corpus, for Parliament did not authorize suspension of the writ until the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act was passed in May, 1794. The Government had contemplated asking for Parliamentary suspension of habeas corpus as early as November, 1792.[18]

The Pitt Government also promoted the formation of a pro-Government loyalty group, the Association for Protecting Liberty and Property

against Republicans and Levellers.[19] Known simply as "The Association," this group was financed by the Government and held loyalty meetings which often featured "Paine burnings."[20] John Reeves was the Administration's chief organizer in The Association, but John Bowles wrote a number of pro-Government pamphlets while in the employ of the Pitt Administration.[21]

Thus, a small group of dissenters against the Pitt Government was kept at bay by a series of repressive measures, which included Royal Proclamations, Parliamentary legislation, arrest and detention as well as the opposition of a pro-Government loyalty association actively supported by the Administration.

The Lincoln Administration and the Copperheads

During the early eighteen sixties, the Lincoln Administration used executive proclamations, Congressional legislation, and a policy of arbitrary arrest to suppress those who differed with Lincoln's plans for preservation of the Union.[22]

When Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, the Civil War was just days away. Although the firing on Fort Sumter marked the beginning of open hostilities, both sides had been preparing for war. The new President inherited a disorganized executive branch from Buchanan,[23] but moved quickly to stabilize his Cabinet by appointing William H. Seward, Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Edward Bates, Attorney General; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General; Caleb Smith, Secretary of the Interior; and Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. Many of these men (or their successors) supported the Administration's policy of repression toward the so-called "Copperheads" or Southern sympathizers.

In Congress, the Lincoln Administration was opposed by such figures as Senator Lazarus Powell of Kentucky and by the eloquent Congressman from Indiana, Daniel Voorhees, who was known as the "Tall Sycamore of the Wabash". Another major opponent was Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, who lost his Congressional seat in the 1862 elections but continued to speak against the Administration. The Copperheads outside of government were loosely organized, but strong regional opposition was concentrated in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. There were some organized groups, such as the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, which was founded by Samuel F. B. Morse, but most of the efforts to disseminate printed rhetoric tended to be local or regional in scope, frequently as adjuncts of a newspaper or printer with Democratic party ties or pro-Southern leanings.[24] As the war continued, the Lincoln Administration was subjected to considerable ridicule in newspapers and pamphlets. Much of the criticism was directed at the government's policy of arbitrary arrest. Many of those arrested early in the war told their stories later in printed form. Such documents as Dennis Mahoney's *The*

Prisoner of State (1863) and *The Four Acts of Despotism* (1863) were widely circulated along with treatises by Vallandigham and pamphlets by Judge Andrew Duff and Dr. Edson Olds.[25] When Lincoln was nominated by his party's convention in 1864, opposition to him became vitriolic, as illustrated by the pamphlet entitled *The Lincoln Catechism, Wherein the Eccentricities & Beauties of Despotism Are Fully Set Forth. A Guide to the Presidential Election of 1864*.[26]

In April and May, 1861, President Lincoln suspended the privilege of habeas corpus in selected geographical areas where opposition forces were particularly active. On April 25, 1861, he authorized General Winfield Scott to suspend habeas corpus "in the extremist necessity" if the Maryland Legislature choose to arm its citizens against the United States.[27] Two days later, Lincoln extended suspension to a line between Philadelphia and Washington, and on May 10 an order authorized suspension on the Florida coast. On June 20, 1861, Lincoln singled out one Major William Henry Chase and directed that his right of habeas corpus be suspended, for he was "alleged to be guilty of treasonable practices against the government."[28] Just before Congress met in special session in early July, Lincoln authorized suspension of habeas corpus on a line between New York and Washington. The Congress ratified Lincoln's proclamations for calling out the militia, but neither approved nor disapproved Lincoln's executive suspension of habeas corpus. This silence amounted to "tacit sanction,"[29] and Lincoln ordered the writ withheld in Maine on October 14, 1861. It is somewhat surprising that Congress failed to act because Lincoln's executive orders had been ruled unconstitutional by Chief Justice Taney in the case of *ex parte* Merryman during June, 1861. For his own part, Lincoln asserted his power to suspend habeas corpus in his message to Congress on July 4, 1861, a position supported by Attorney General Bates and, later in the year, by Horace Binney, in *The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution*.[30] A general proclamation suspending habeas corpus throughout the Union was issued by Lincoln on September 24, 1862.

Although Congress was silent on habeas corpus in 1861-1862, it did pass other repressive measures, such as the Conspiracies Act of July 31, 1861, and the Treason Act of 1862. The former empowered the Administration to deal with defiance by fine and imprisonment for conspiracy "to overthrow the government," while the latter lessened penalties for treason but expanded the definition of treason to include anyone engaging in "rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States."[31] The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 not only recognized the President's ability to suspend habeas corpus, but also permitted military commanders to ignore the writ.[32]

The Lincoln Administration's repressive policies were facilitated by the military structure. The power to suspend habeas corpus was delegated to military commanders in Lincoln's executive proclamations; consequently many arbitrary arrests were carried out by the military.[33] When Simon

Cameron left his Cabinet post as Secretary of War in early 1862 and Edwin M. Stanton took his place, much of the power to control internal security passed to Stanton. Duties, including the release of prisoners, formerly authorized by Secretary of State Seward, were assumed by Stanton. The new Secretary of War was firm in his resolve to use the means necessary to preserve the Union and repress Southern sympathizers; a few weeks before taking office, he added these lines to a report signed by Secretary of War Cameron: "Those who make war against the Government justly forfeit all rights of property, privilege, and security derived from the constitution and the laws against which they are in armed rebellion . . . ."[34] Stanton took control of the Union railroads and virtually nationalized the telegraph system, having a telegraph installation placed next to his own office in the War Department.[35]

Copperhead newspaper editors were at times subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, but the Lincoln Administration did not pursue an overly aggressive policy of repression against newspapers. From time to time an editor was arrested and held, and occasionally the publication of a newspaper was halted by military force.[36] On at least one occasion, Stanton ordered the arrest of several newspaper editors.[37]

Support for the Lincoln Administration was encouraged by the formation of the Union League, or Loyal League as it was also known. Governor Oliver P. Morton oversaw much pro-Lincoln activity in his home state of Indiana, and his effective organization, speeches, and petitions eventually "turned public opinion against the . . . Copperhead legislature."[38] The Union League was most active in Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois and Indiana, but late in 1862, Union Leagues were founded in the East as well. These loyalty associations did not play a significant role in the elections of 1862, which were generally Democratic landslides, but in the April, 1863, elections the Union Leagues were effective in producing votes for the Lincoln Administration.[39] There is evidence that Secretary of War Stanton encouraged, both verbally and financially, the formation of the Loyal Publication Society, which was directed by Francis Lieber of New York.[40] Lincoln apparently took no active role in the Loyal Leagues although he did accept honorary membership in the Union League of Philadelphia and spoke before that same group in June, 1864.[41]

Thus, the Copperheads were checked by a variety of repressive measures, including arbitrary arrests and suspension of habeas corpus, both of which were initiated by the executive branch of government. The War Department, under Secretary Stanton, used military power to control transportation and communication. Opposition newspapers were often harassed, and a coterie of loyalists produced pro-Government publications with the blessings of the Lincoln Administration. Congress was slow to support the repressive measures but the Conspiracies Act, the Treason Act and the Habeas Corpus Act were passed, lending some legislative support to the Lincoln Administration's policies.

Pitt and Lincoln on Suspension of Habeas Corpus

From the foregoing descriptions of the historical conditions in which Prime Minister William Pitt and President Lincoln found themselves, it seems clear that both viewed suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as a key ingredient in their respective policies of repression. Certainly, many historical factors in each situation were unique. Pitt, for instance, was fighting a war upon foreign soil, while the Civil War was almost on Lincoln's doorstep. Nevertheless, there are some interesting similarities between the two periods, such as the policies of arbitrary arrest, the pamphleteering of the opposition, governmental harassment of opposition newspapers, governmental support of loyalty groups, and, of course, administrative interest in suspending habeas corpus. Consequently, the question naturally arises: How did Pitt and Lincoln justify their suspensions of habeas corpus? Or, put another way: What rhetorical means did Pitt and Lincoln employ to support their suspension of habeas corpus? In order to provide some answers to these questions, the most significant rhetorical acts of Pitt and Lincoln on the habeas corpus question will be examined. The Prime Minister's speeches of May 16, 1794, delivered in the House of Commons during debate on the Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill, form the most complete account of his position on the issue.[42] President Lincoln's written reply to Congressman Erastus Corning and others, which appeared in the New York *Tribune* on June 15, 1863, is generally regarded as Lincoln's most fully developed statement on habeas corpus, along with the similar letter to Matthew Birchard written a few weeks later.[43]

Both Pitt and Lincoln argued consistently that future dangers, not merely past facts, were the strongest support for suspension of habeas corpus. Pitt began his address with reference to a lengthy report detailing the activities of various reform societies, and went on to argue that "there was not one moment to be lost in arming the executive power with those additional means, which might be sufficient effectually to stop the further progress of such a plan [for a convention of the reform societies], and to prevent its being carried into final execution" (p. 497). In justifying the policy of arrests, Lincoln differentiated between ordinary criminal arrests and arrests in time of rebellion, and argued that his Administration's policy was aimed at averting future acts:

> Indeed, arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small per centage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime; while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the government, which, at most, will succeed or fail, in no great length of time. In the latter case, arrests are made, not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The lat-

ter is more for the preventive, and less for the vindictive, than the former.

While Pitt wanted to jail leaders and reform advocates to keep them from poisoning the minds of the populace, Lincoln sought to curtail the activities of dissidents who desired to persuade Union soldiers to desert or to lay down their arms. The Prime Minister predicted that failure by Parliament to suspend habeas corpus would result in the destruction of the Government:

> [The reform societies' documents] carried with them no faint illustration of what they could be expected to do in the full majesty of power. There would be found resolutions arraigning every branch of government, threatening the sovereign: insulting the House of peers, and accusing the commons of insufficiency, there would be found notice taken of the measures of parliament, which . . . should be rescinded, under their doctrine, *Salus populi suprema lex*, and that the constitution had been utterly destroyed (p. 504).

Lincoln reasoned that efforts to subvert the morale of the Union army by inducing soldiers to desert or by encouraging young men to refrain from enlisting would damage his policy of keeping the states together: "he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a union soldier in battle." In an aptly-expressed line of thought, Lincoln argued that agitators who encourage desertion were perhaps more heinous criminals than those who might be persuaded to desert:

> Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings, till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy, that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy.

Pitt's desire for immediate passage of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill, along with his probable knowledge that the numerical superiority of his supporters would sustain the measure, permitted him to speak with vehemence, and even sarcasm, as he characterized the membership of reform societies. Pitt alleged that the members came from "manufacturing towns," where, because of "the vast concourse of ignorant and profligate men who necessarily collect in such places," the reform leaders could find persons "whose understandings were most subject to be misled by their doctrines, and rendered subservient to their views." Elsewhere,

Pitt castigated his opponents as "wretches" and "outcasts of society." In contrast to Pitt's vitriolic style, Lincoln's treatment of his opposition is almost deferential. The letter to Erastus Corning and others opens with an attempt on Lincoln's part to maintain common ground. He commended the ultimate position taken by the assembly at Albany, New York, from which Corning had communicated the resolutions of the meeting: "the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part to maintain our common government and country, despite the folly or wickedness, as they may conceive, of any administration." Lincoln's comments isolate the essential issue: "This position is eminently patriotic, and as such, I thank the meeting, and congratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and myself have a common object, and can have no difference, except in the choice of means or measures, for effecting that object."

Lincoln faced the immediate questions of the constitutionality of his suspension of habeas corpus and the fairness of his policies of arbitrary arrest. Pitt, who was merely asking Parliament to exercise its right under the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of 1679, faced no such legal problem, and he chose not to defend his Government's arrest policies, except to refer to the voluminous report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons respecting Seditious Practices, which Pitt and Henry Dundas had prepared. The meeting at Albany asserted that Lincoln's policy of military arrests was unconstitutional. Lincoln replied tersely "I think they are not," and, after detailing the grounds for arrest and providing a brief account of his views of the plans of the insurgents, he addressed the fundamental constitutional issue:

> Ours is a case of Rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of Rebellion; and the provision of the constitution that "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety may require it" is the provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the constitution that ordinary courts acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. Habeas Corpus purpose that in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. Habeas Corpus, does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the constitution on purpose that, men may be arrested and held, who can not be proved to be guilty of defined crime, "when, in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." This is precisely our present case—a case of Rebellion, wherein the public Safety does require the suspension.

Lincoln did not directly address the question of *who* was to decide when the public safety was threatened by rebellion or invasion—Congress or the

President—but he did note that the question itself would allow "spies and others" to remain at large while the suspension decision was being made. Of course, Lincoln argued, "if . . . the executive should suspend the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur," and the "clamor" over this would be "of some service to the insurgent cause." Thus Lincoln argued that either a delay in suspension of habeas corpus or a swift suspension of the writ aided the rebels. The President argued that this apparent dilemma was part of the Southern plan, and he left no doubt that he felt it to be his duty to suspend habeas corpus:

> It needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemies' programme, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures, which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the constitution, and as indispensable to the public Safety.

Later in the letter, Lincoln argued that common sense dictates that extraordinary measures must be employed in extraordinary times. This was perhaps the most shopworn argument, for Binney and others had used it, but the President gave it an added degree of vivacity with an apt comparison in a well-balanced antithetical sentence: "I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measure in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man, because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one."

The position that extraordinary circumstances dictated determined policies undergirded Pitt's remarks, also, but one of the Prime Minister's most apparent strategies was to show that the tumult which made the times extraordinary was the work of conspirators. He wanted to show two sorts of conspiracies operative in the reform societies which opposed him. First, Pitt quoted from letters between Thomas Hardy's Society for Constitutional Information and other groups in order to document that a "settled design" was afoot to organize a convention of all reform-minded citizens. Such a convention, Pitt asserted, was "an open attempt to supercede the House of Commons in its representative capacity, and to assume to itself all the functions and powers of a national legislature." Second, and more important, was Pitt's unremitting position that English reform societies were hatching a conspiracy in concert with comparable groups in France. The Prime Minister referred frequently to letters, and he regularly labelled the English reform groups "Jacobins". He alluded frequently to the existence of a "dangerous conspiracy," and he began his peroration on the Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill by alleging that "so for-

midable a conspiracy had never before existed." He concluded with a brief reference to the dictum that extraordinary times called for unusual measures:

> It had been usual, . . . in time of danger, to enact a temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus laws; as those were made for the preservation of the constitution on the one hand, so on the other they could not exist if the constitution was gone. The temporary sacrifice of this law was on certain occasions as necessary to the support of the constitution, as the maintenance of its principle was at all others. It was suspended, . . at a time when the constitution and liberty of the country were most peculiarly guarded and attended to: and that suspension was more particularly called for now, when attempts were made to disseminate through the realm, principles and means of action that might endanger that constitution, for the preservation of which that law was made, and produce much more lamentable effects, and at last be remedied by more dreadful means. . . (p. 505).

It might be inferred that some members of the Lincoln Administration, particularly Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, considered the Copperheads a conspiracy,[44] but Lincoln did not reflect this viewpoint in his letter to Erastus Corning. The President did charge that the rebellion had been in planning for "more than thirty years," and he did charge that "sympathizers pervaded all departments of the government and nearly all communities of the people," but he did not attempt to prove that his opponents were united in a conspiracy. There is perhaps good reason why Lincoln apparently rejected the conspiracy theory. Seeking as he did to preserve the Union at all cost, he could little afford to alienate forever the Southern leaders whose aid he might require during reconstruction. Indeed, in explaining his arrest policy, Lincoln enumerated a list of rebels—including Breckenridge, Lee, Magruder, and Preston, among others—and noted that none had committed any crime before the rebellion began. Lincoln could have branded all of them "Copperhead Conspirators," but he chose instead to note rather ruefully "I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for making too few arrests rather than too many." Indeed, Lincoln seems not to have used the pejorative "Copperhead" in his public speeches or writings, although the term does occur a few times in private memoranda or notes intended for Cabinet members.[45]

In his attacks upon the so-called "Jacobins," Prime Minister Pitt made much of his allegation that captured reform society documents provided "a full and authentic account of certain proceedings" and that his reading "of their own books proved sufficiently . . . that it was through hypocrisy they pretended their object was a parliamentary reform. . . ." Actually Pitt had no more than the public records of the various reform groups, as Charles James Fox pointed out in the debate on the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, but Pitt was able to make the public sources appear to be

"reluctant" evidence. Although Republican newspapers delighted in regaling their readers with exposés of secret rites and handshakes of Copperhead groups, and the War Secretary's office commissioned a report on the activities of Copperhead groups,[46] Lincoln, in contrast to Pitt, did not attempt to distort public records.

Charges of "party politics" were frequently made at the Lincoln Administration despite the fact that the Cabinet was bi-partisan. Perhaps the polarities of North-South and Union-Confederate were paralleled by a Republican-Democrat dichotomy. At any rate, Lincoln replied to his critics in the letter to Erastus Corning, with both invective and irony:

> In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I can not overlook the fact that the meeting speak as "Democrats." Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves "democrats" rather than "American citizens." In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform; because I am sure that from such more elevated position, we could do better battle for the country we all love, than we possibly can from those lower ones, where from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength, in finding fault with, and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful, for country's sake, that not all democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried, is a democrat, having no old party affinity with me; and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. V. on Habeas Corpus, is a democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. V. while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I can not assert that there are none such.

Conclusions

Pitt and Lincoln faced a similar rhetorical problem: the need to justify the suspension of habeas corpus. The historical situations in which the heads of government found themselves were somewhat unique and idiosyncratic on the one hand because of the different legal procedures and political structures of the respective countries, but there were, on the other hand, some noteworthy similarities between the two situations, including the

policy of arbitrary arrests, a vocal opposition and, of course, the government's desire to suspend habeas corpus.

Although sections of each rhetorical act are devoted to particular concerns, such as Lincoln's reply to charges of partisan politics and Pitt's attempts to use public records as "reluctant" evidence and to propound a conspiracy theory, these contrasts may be of less interest to the rhetorical critic than are the features common to the rhetoric of Pitt and Lincoln. Despite the contrast between Pitt's vehement style and Lincoln's restrained but sometimes sarcastic language, both Pitt and Lincoln chose to argue that future dangers rather than past facts formed the strongest rationale supporting suspension of habeas corpus. Further, Lincoln argued that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures, a position underlying Pitt's view that conspirators were the cause of the extraordinary times.

Additional studies of national leaders who seek to justify the suspension of habeas corpus, in addition to isolating the unique elements of the historical situations in which the advocates are enmeshed, may provide further evidence for the patterns of argument which seem to form the bases for Pitt's and Lincoln's separate justifications for suspension of the "great writ," habeas corpus.

NOTES

[1]Ann Pallister, *Magna Carta: The Heritage of Liberty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 117.

[2]On the development of habeas corpus in English law, see Robert G. Simmons, "The Writ of Habeas Corpus: The Most Celebrated Writ in the English Law," *American Bar Association Journal, 41 (May 1955), 413-416.*

[3]United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 9, clause 2; for a thorough study of the drafting of the clause, see Francis Faschal, "The Constitution and Habeas Corpus," *Duke Law Journal*, Volume 1970 (No. 4 August), 605-651. There is still considerable controversy over whether this clause applies to Congress or to the President. That controversy began during the situation described in this paper; see the sources given in note 22 below.

[4]On John Horne (Tooke), see Eugene Charleton Black, *The Association: British Extraparliamentary Political Organization 1769-1793*, Harvard Historical Monographs, 54 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 10-22. Other pamphleteers were Major John Cartwright, John Jebb, and Granville Sharp.

[5]Gerrald wrote *The Only Means of Saving Us from Ruin* and Tierney produced *The State of the Representation of England and Wales* in 1793; for information on these men, see Lucyle Werkmeister, *A Newspaper History of England, 1792-1793* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967).

[6]Donald Grove Barnes, *George III and William Pitt, 1783-1806* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1939), p. 271.

[7]The primary Opposition newspapers were the *Oracle*, the *Diary*, the *Courier*, the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Argus*, and the *Morning Post;* the index prepared by Werkmeister (pp. 555-560) provides citations of attacks on the Pitt Government by these newspapers.

[8]According to Werkmeister (p. 200), Erskine's speech on December 22, 1792, to the Friends of the Liberty of the Press was printed in an edition of 100,000.

[9]Barnes, pp. 214-215 and Black, pp. 226-227. Earlier studies of the reform societies reached a similar conclusion; see G. S. Veitch, *The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform* (1913; rpt. London: Constable, 1965) and Philip Anthony Brown, *The French Revolution in English History* (1918; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), pp. 148-149.

[10]Werkmeister, p. 194.

[11]Veitch, pp. 283-288; Werkmeister, pp. 446-448.

[12]*Annual Register*, 34 (1792), 158.

[13]Correspondence between Dundas and Pitt is available at the Clements Library (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); see James S. Measell, "William Pitt and Suspension of Habeas Corpus," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 60 (December 1974), 471-472.

[14]*Public Advertiser*, 3 January 1793.

[15]Pitt to Dundas, 8 November 1792 (Clements Library).

[16]Werkmeister, pp. 30-41, 143, 163-169.

[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 230-236, 341-349.

[18]Pitt to Dundas, 28 November 1792 (Clements Library).

[19]Veitch, pp. 230-233 and Black, pp. 233-274.

[20]Daniel Stuart, *Peace and Reform, against War and Corruption*, 2nd ed. (London: n. p., 1784), pp. 20-22 and Werkmeister, pp. 142, 145, 180, 199.

[21]Werkmeister, p. 27; Bowles wrote, among others, *A Short Answer to the Declaration of the Persons Calling Themselves the Friends of the Liberty of the Press* (London: J. Downes, 1793) and *The Real Grounds of the Present War with France* (London: J. Debrett, 1793).

[22]The Constitutionality of Lincoln's executive action remains a concern of modern historical and legal scholarship; see J. G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln*, rev. ed. (1926; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), esp. Chapters II, III, VI, and VII; Samuel Klaus, ed., *The Milligan Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), pp. 3-62; Sherrill Halbert, "The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by President Lincoln," *The American Journal of Legal History*, 2 (April 1958), 95-116; Frederick J. Singley, Jr., "Denial of Habeas Corpus: A Contrast in Blue and Gray," *American Bar Association Journal*, 49 (February 1963), 172-175; and Dallin H. Oaks, "Habeas Corpus in the States — 1776-1865," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 32 (Winter 1965), 243-288.

[23]Philip G. Auchampaugh, *James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve*

of Secession (Lancaster, Pa.: privately printed,1926) and Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, *Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 87-118.

[24]Frank L. Klement, *The Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 104-105; for one of Morse's many pamphlets, see Frank Freidel, *Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), I, 525-550.

[25]Klement, pp. 102-103.

[26]Freidel, II, pp. 981-1015.

[27]The various Lincoln letters and proclamations referred to in this paper are in *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953); the documents are arranged in chronological order for easy access. For the letter to General Winfield Scott, see vol. IV, p. 344. Hereafter cited as *Collected Works*.

[28]*Collected Works*, IV, p. 414.

[29]Randall, p. 128.

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 124; the Binney pamphlet is in Freidel, I, pp. 200-252.

[31]Randall, p. 80.

[32]*Ibid.*, pp. 163-168.

[33]*Ibid.*, pp. 140-161; Klement, pp. 17-23, provides an account of arbitrary arrests in the Midwest. Thomas and Hyman, pp. 248-249, briefly evaluates Stanton's role in deciding policy regarding the use of arbitrary arrests.

[34]Thomas and Hyman, p. 134, n. 7.

[35]*Ibid.*, pp. 153-155, 285-289; Randall, pp. 481-484.

[36]Randall, p. 492.

[37]Thomas and Hyman, pp. 301-302.

[38]Klement, p. 56.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 211.

[40]Thomas and Hyman, p. 370 and Freidel, I, pp. 4-14.

[41]*Collected Works*, VI, pp. 533-534 and VII, p. 397.

[42]Accounts of Pitt's speech may be found in the *Annual Register*, 36 (1794), "History of Europe," 268-274 and in *The Parliamentary History of England . . . to . . . 1803*, ed. William Cobbett, 31 (14 March 1794—22 May 1795), 475-573; both are third person accounts, but the *Parliamentary History* version, used for all quotations in this essay, provides an adequate reconstruction of Pitt's remarks.

[43]For the letter to Corning, see *Collected Works*, VI, pp. 260-269; the letter to Birchard is in *Collected Works*, VI, pp. 300-306.

[44]Thomas and Hyman, pp. 247-249, 293; for a study of exposés and treason trials which provided "evidence" of conspiracies, see Klement, pp. 170-205.

[45]*Collected Works*, VII, pp. 216-217, 334-335; VIII, p. 46.

[46]Joseph Holt, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, produced a document entitled *Report of the Judge Advocate General, on the "Order of American Knights," or "Sons of Liberty." A Western Conspiracy in Aid of Southern Rebellion* in October, 1864. For the report, see Freidel, II, pp. 1040-1075.

THE HISTORICAL JEREMIAD AS RHETORICAL GENRE

RONALD H. CARPENTER

Historians are persuaders. Like their counterparts in politics, for example, historians adapt language rhetorically to persuade. And when, as Strout suggests, the public responds to such history "not only as a mode of understanding but also as a final destiny," readers may come to an "acceptance of the concrete world of human history as a source of ultimate values and fulfillment."[1]

For some critics, an appropriate perspective would examine the historian's use of evidence and discursive logic. My critical orientation toward a genre of historical writing is somewhat different. I am concerned with rhetorical form and structure rather than specific content and evidence. Furthermore, formal similarities are significant not just because they help identify a discrete genre, but also because they are instrumental in achieving a suasory impact.

To locate a discrete genre of history based on the analysis of significant form, two essential criteria are useful. First, the treatises to be examined must have achieved, in addition to their own widespread readership, a stature whereby they became cornerstones upon which subsequent historical interpretations were founded. Second, the significant form of historical genre must have been instrumental in achieving a suasory impact which is *clearly evident* in audience reactions.[2]

One such treatise is Frederick Jackson Turner's 1893 essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," a work whose rhetorical style has been described elsewhere.[3] The Frontier Thesis, as it came to be known, enjoyed not only the widest readership through its numerous reprintings but became a dominant influence upon the thought of other American historians, as they wrote and taught in succeeding decades.[4] In assessing the Frontier Thesis from the perspective of American intellectual history, Noble called Turner a Jeremiah. For Noble's purposes, a Jeremiad was the work of an American historian since 1830 who, like Puritan theologians of the second half of the seventeenth century, "accepted

the burden of warning the people" who would stray from the "purity and simplicity" of the New World and thereby return this society to the tragic vicissitudes of life characterizing Europe of the Old World.[5]

The Frontier Thesis has no statements "warning" readers of the dire consequences of their straying from certain "real" ideals; nor does Turner's treatise articulate atoning actions that Americans as a chosen people might take as a means of assuring their salvation. So the reactions of many American readers must be the result of other cues. Insofar as a discourse leads readers to anticipate and then attain satisfying, imaginative closure, it has an instrumental and hence significant form. This critical perspective reflects the Burkean notion of form as "the psychology of the audience"; or as Burke has put the principle, "*Form* . . . is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form insofar as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the experience."[6]

The historical Jeremiad, then, is a secular treatise which accomplishes its goals rhetorically by a process leading readers to view themselves as a chosen people confronted with a timely if not urgent warning that unless a certain course of atoning action is followed, dire consequences will ensue. Although the warning and the recommended course of action may be stated quite explicitly, the historical Jeremiad often achieves its objectives indirectly, through the reader's imaginative interpretation of the treatise.

A comparative analysis of three essays will identify and illustrate the ways in which the historical Jeremiad achieves its end. One of these will be Turner's famous forty-four page essay on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History."[7] Another historian subjected to recent rhetorical analysis is Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose *Influence of Sea Power Upon History* exerted a profound influence upon subsequent world events.[8] In addition to persuading its immediate audience, Mahan's historical account found a vast readership that included other historians and geopoliticians who founded their subsequent doctrines upon concepts articulated in the 1890's in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. In Mahan's case, the entire book is inappropriate for consideration, for the essence of Mahan's Jeremiad is his "Introductory" to the book and the first chapter, "Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power." Still another important historical Jeremiad is Sir Halford Mackinder's "The Geographical Pivot of History," an essay which utilized an account of historical events to demonstrate the strategic importance of the Eurasian heartland. As presented to the Royal Geographic Society on 25 January 1904, this short essay became the basis of much of Mackinder's later, more popular writing, all of which exerted substantial influence not only a mass readership but also on subsequent interpretations of historical events and international policies.[9] As originally published in the *Geographic Journal*, the essay is followed by remarks of persons who heard Mackinder on that occasion; and these provide valuable insights into the responses of his immediate audience as well as the ultimate impact of the essay.

In each of the three discourses, a sense of urgency and impending doom

is suggested at the very outset. Indeed, Turner's opening statement became well known to Americans, for his first three sentences brought to national attention what readers took to be the foreboding message of an obscure census bulletin:

> In a recent bulletin of the superintendent of the census for 1890 appear these significant words: "Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it cannot, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports." This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement.[10]

As it reappeared over the years in various anthologies, and also as Chapter One of Turner's 1920 book, *The Frontier in American History*, that proem might have been the initial cue from which readers inferred that a certain urgency was implicit in the message.[11] Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, said that Turner had "put into definite shape a good deal of thought which has been floating around rather loosely."[12] For other readers, the Frontier Thesis was "uplifting and timely"; and another wrote that Turner had "done the country a great service in publishing it at this time."[13] As still another reader expressed it, Turner's treatise had "*meaning* for the life of his own time" as well as for "the present and future life of America."[14] By suggesting at the outset that his readers stood at a pivotal point in time, Turner's proem was the first in a series of cues creating a sense of timeliness and urgency.

In contrast, Mackinder's proem approached grandiloquence with opening sentences emphasizing an epochal and ominous moment:

> When historians in the remote future come to look back on the group of centuries through which we are now passing, and see them foreshortened, as we today see the Egyptian dynasties, it may well be that they will describe the last 400 years as the Columbian epoch, and will say that it ended soon after the year 1900. Of late it has been a commonplace to speak of geographical exploration as nearly over. . . . But the opening of the twentieth century is appropriate as the end of a great historic epoch, not merely on account of this achievement, great though it be. The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer, the miner, and, of late, the engineer, have followed so closely in the traveller's footsteps that the world, in its remoter borders, has hardly been revealed before we must chronicle its virtually complete political appropriation. In Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Australasia there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of ownership, unless as a result of a war between civilized or half-civilized powers. . . . From the present time forth, in the post-

> Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.[15]

These opening statements contributed to a sense of urgency; for as one critic wrote: "As I was listening to the paper, I looked with regret on some of the space that is unoccupied here, and I much regret that a portion of it was not occupied by members of the Cabinet."[16]

Of the three historical Jeremiahs discussed here, Mahan was the least hortatory in his proem. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* began with objective definitions of several key terms as well as thoughtful explanations of crucial differences among galleys, sailing ships and steamers. Shortly afterward, however, Mahan stated his thesis that "at a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's history, Sea Power had a strategic bearing and weight which has received scant recognition" and prefaced his exposition of "the general conditions that either are essential to or powerfully affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea." Mahan asserted that "This study has become more than ever important now to navies, because of the great and steady power of movement possessed by the modern steamer."[17] Despite this relatively dispassionate tone, these words impressed some readers with a sense of urgency, as suggested by Kaiser Wilhelm's reaction: "I am just now, not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book and am trying to learn it by heart . . . . It is on board all my ships and constantly quoted by my captains and officers."[18] Other readers felt that the work was "published at a very opportune time"; for in what were perceived as "days of changing and unsettled opinions as to the merits of this or that type of ship, weapon, or armor, Captain Mahan constantly applies his principles to the present situation."[19] Despite the more factual quality of Mahan's treatise, the factor of timeliness did emerge for his readers as well.[20]

A Jeremiad's urgency and timeliness are pertinent primarily to those readers who perceive themselves as a chosen people confronted with doom unless they atone by returning to their former ways and ideals. Each of these three historical Jeremiahs did seem to evoke in respondents that anticipatory sense of a relevant destiny. To present a persuasive rhetorical vision to a readership, discourse can suggest, as Bormann indicates, an "abstraction personified as a character" who has certain praiseworthy values.[21] This is the "second persona" whose critical function Black explains: "The critic can see in the auditor implied by a discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become."[22] Ultimately, the second persona may be the means by which "The audience, essentially a group of individuals, reacts with a desire to participate in that dramatic vi-

sion, to *become* 'the people' described by the advocate."[23] Such characterization can evoke responsive chords in readers. For instance that portrayal made Turner's treatise "a human sort of thing, rather than just a chronicle of events which happened on certain remote dates, hazy in the imagination"; and by infusing "real life into the dead bones of a great deal of the evidence which is coming to be heard," the Frontier Thesis "touched not merely on the historical, is not merely scientific in treatment and value, but has its element of romance as well."[24] Each discourse examined here offers this element of characterization in varying degrees.

Mahan was the most direct. One of the "principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations" was the "character of the people"; and Mahan was quite explicit in his praise of traditional Anglo-Saxon, and particularly British, traits such as "healthy excitement of exploration and adventure," "wisdom," "uprightness," "quick instinct," a firm dedication to "personal freedom and enterprise," a "national genius" for "planting healthy colonies," as well as a generally broad tendency to be "bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling" (in contrast, for instance, to the French with a tendency toward "hoarding" or the Spanish and Portuguese, who brought "a blot" on their national character because "the desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice").[25] Many readers may have been motivated to *be once again* the chosen people described by Mahan; as Secretary of the Navy Joseph Daniels attested, for example, "it is most helpful to younger men to read your clear call to hold fast to the ancient landmarks our fathers set."[26]

Mackinder developed his second persona indirectly. The praiseworthy values of his readers as a chosen people were apparent only to the extent to which they perceived themselves as those performing a "valuable social function" by standing in opposition to "a mere crowd of human animals" and "external barbarism."[27] Thus, Mackinder subtly interwove cues of Christendom against the Huns; the Franks and the Goths "making common cause against the Asiatics"; the settled people of Europe against "the hordes" of a "remarkable succession of Turanian nomadic peoples"; and Western civilization itself resisting "a cloud of ruthless and idealess horsemen sweeping over the unimpeded plain—a blow, as it were, from the great Asiatic hammer striking freely through the vacant space."[28] Although the imagery caused some negative reaction, such as that of one person who observed that "these great movements of Central Asian Tribes . . . may, I think, be over-estimated in their importance," Mackinder's personification of "the great struggle between the east and the west" aroused in the mind of another respondent a conception of "the whole of history and the whole of ordinary politics under one comprehensive idea."[29] As the moderator said in concluding the program at which the paper was presented, Mackinder's depiction of human events and certain values relevant to the salvation of race had dealt with "the old, old story from the very dawn of history to the present day."[30]

Originally, Turner's objective in the Frontier Thesis was to alter the thrust of historiography in this nation's universities; as Turner himself put it, the paper was "a protest against eastern neglect, at that time, of institutional study of the West."[31] Ultimately this happened; historians did change their focus to examine unique frontier experiences rather than institutions presumed to have been transplanted from their "germs" in the forests of Medieval Germany.[32] To achieve his goal, Turner dutifully repeated his theme in conjunction with fourteen distinct facets of the frontier that could be studied advantageously (as Turner put it, "I found it necessary to hammer pretty hard and pretty steadily in the frontier idea to 'get it in'.").[33] But Turner's wide, popular readership did *not* focus on the problem of historiography.

For the nation, Turner performed another, more socially relevant task: personifying those ideals and attributes of character to which Americans as a chosen people owed their immediate successes and ultimate salvation. This is most evident in the response to one crucial passage which seemed to epitomize the meaning of the Frontier Thesis for the popular mind. In one review of Turner's *The Frontier in American History*, the passage was quoted and prefaced this way: "The author's thesis is set forth in the following extract, which also shows something of the quality of his writing."[34] The single passage from Chapter One, which was Turner's original 1893 Frontier Thesis paper, reads this way:

> . . . to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy, that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom, these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier.[35]

Other reviewers quoted that passage as embodying the essence of the Frontier Thesis for Americans; and the promotional statement from the National Book Buyers' Service had it as one of two direct quotations from the book.[36]

For most readers, Turner had personified those attributes worthy of emulation by Americans. As one person expressed it to Turner directly, the nation's children were growing up learning "false ideals" and should return to the path of salvation by acquiring a "thorough appreciation of the great strength of the Americans of the past."

> Our boys and girls are growing up possessing wealth which their fathers and mothers did not. With this wealth has come false ideals. Your great work, it seems to me, has been to impress upon our young

> people here the great work which their fathers accomplished. You gave them insight into the true greatness of America and the true greatness of the West, which I believe no other man can do.[37]

The frontiersman was rhetorically the second persona for virtually any reader who sensed a need "to apply the old spirit to modern life."[38] Some of the attributes of the past to be appreciated in the present and future included initiative, cooperativeness, optimism, individualism, self-reliance, resiliency, steadfastness, neighborliness, confidence, wholesomeness, enthusiasm, calmness of purpose, and a spirit of adventure.[39]

To lament the loss of the values is to suggest, however indirectly, a threat to our continued successes and salvation as a chosen people. Beyond the ominous warning of Turner's proem about the closing of the frontier, though, his essay did not articulate any dire consequences of the loss of ideal attributes of the frontiersman.

Similarly, Mahan's Jeremiad only implied a threat to those nations which did not develop and sustain the sea power that had assured salvation to chosen peoples in the past. This was the inescapable conclusion from the historical analogies presented in the treatise, including its "Preface" in which Mahan had articulated the dire consequences of Hannibal's inability to control the seas in the Second Punic War:

> The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long perilous march through Gaul, in which more than half of his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from Rome on to Spain to intercept Hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and Italy . . . .[40]

In one review, that statement was the *only* lengthy quotation from the entire book; and in what was the most authoritative and comprehensive review of the book, J. K. Laughton repeated the same generalization to illustrate the "permanence of principle" with which Mahan dealt.[41] Similarly, Theodore Roosevelt's reviews of Mahan paraphrased the same generalization and concluded that the historian "makes this point so clear that it is difficult to see how it can be controverted successfully."[42] It is no wonder that many persons, particularly naval officers, appreciated Mahan for his "great effect in bringing home to our statesmen and legislators the vast importance of sea power to England."[43] Mahan's was not just a "book to be placed on the table of every house in Britain and her colonies"; Englishmen perceived their special kinship with other Anglo-Saxons and the need for America to "cultivate" sea power as a means of assuring "its future."[44]

The most overtly threatening of the historical Jeremiads was "The Geographical Pivot of History." To complement the epochal stance of his

proem and the vivid imagery of the Heartland's hordes laying waste to Europe, Mackinder enumerated the awesome strategic power latent in a Eurasia of twenty-one million square miles having "more than one thousand million people, or two-thirds of the world population."[45] He then described how Russia was consolidating a base for world influence within that impenetrable heartland, as she replaced the Mongol Empire.[46]

Mackinder's respondents clearly perceived the threat. As one person put it, "the main point, I take it, which he has brought out is really as to the enormous importance to the world of the modern expansion of Russia."[47] Still another alluded to Britain's tactical inability in the Boer War to "coerce some 40,000 or 50,000 farmers who lived on a dry steppe-land" much like that of the Russian-dominated heartland: "That photograph Mr. Mackinder was showing reminded me exactly of what you could have seen not so many months ago in South Africa—I mean, that picture of wagons crossing the river was, except for the shape of the roof over the wagon, exactly like a picture of a Boer commando crossing a drift. We had the same difficulty in coercing them that all civilized powers have had with steppe people."[48]

Each of the Jeremiads suggested a means by which the audience could insure its continued well-being and ultimate salvation. Because chosen peoples sensed an impending doom, they also anticipated the alternative courses of action recommended by each discourse. Reflecting the relatively dispassionate tone of his treatise, Mahan made the most direct and terse statement of a solution: "The influence of the government should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy which, if not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to keep clear the chief approaches to its own."[49] Despite the brevity of his recommendation, the rhetorical impact of his historical analogies was impressive. For example, one reviewer apparently missed the brief statement of solution, concluding that Mahan had "nowhere specifically" stated his motive but went on to conclude that the underlying theme of the work "is still evident. It is to turn the minds of countrymen to sea affairs."[50] And while another respondent felt that the hortatory element marred "to a considerable degree the force of his thesis" as an historical work, the reviewer acknowledged indirectly a secular counterpart to the traditional, religious Jeremiad in the fervor of Mahan's "constant tendency to point a *moral* for our fresh-water Congressmen, and to *preach the gospel* of American commerce and new navy."[51]

Similarly, Mackinder suggested a solution that included a "modern naval strategy and policy as expounded by such writers as Captain Mahan"; and "The Geographical Pivot of History" stressed the importance of achieving a "ring of outer and insular bases for seapower and commerce, inaccessible to the land-power of Euro-Asia."[52] Clearly, the far-flung British Empire and its ideals, if sustained and nurtured, might be the entity by which the strategic threat of the heartland could be alleviated. Indeed, a British interpreter of Mackinder saw such a course as "the his-

torical function of Great Britain since Great Britain was a United Kingdom."[53]

Turner did not state a solution to the closing of the frontier because he was ostensibly concerned in 1893 only with altering the emphases in historical scholarship. But his popular audience over the years reacted differently, illustrating how readers could develop their own "rhetorical vision" of the relevance of frontier attributes to the solution of contemporary problems.[54] An examination of popular responses to the Frontier Thesis convincingly demonstrates that Americans came to believe that they would be successful in life in proportion to their ability to emulate the frontiersman in reacting to economic problems confronting the country, in responding to political unrest, and even in preparing to fight in France in World War One as well as in insuring the peace afterwards.[55] That the second persona of the frontiersman was persuasive is demonstrated further by the fact that Turner was begged to make that portrayal and its moral lesson available and convenient to an even wider audience, "to guarantee a reading . . . by every intelligent thinker in this country, whether a student, or a businessman, or a labor leader"; and instead of "being buried in old periodicals" or "technical journals," for example, the pioneer's attributes "ought to come to the larger American audience directly" to "enhance their influence"[56] In Turner's case, the Jeremiad's recommendations about appropriate courses of action were not the product of "*discursive logic*" but "*creative imagination.*"[57]

Each of the Jeremiads concluded with a peroration which offered a final indication of the urgency of the situation and recommended a source of ultimate salvation. Mahan was the most terse and direct about the creation of a United States navy: "Let us hope it will not come to the birth too late."[58] His brevity was balanced by the weight of the historical evidence he provided and by the way in which Mahan's style contributed to his *ethos*. The ultimate influence of his discourse was profound and far-reaching, for even now, Soviet naval expansion is analyzed as if it might almost have been inspired by the prophetic writings of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.[59] As Theodore Roosevelt concluded Mahan was "one of those few men who leave a permanent mark on history and literature, aside from their profound and far-reaching influence on contemporary thought."[60]

The hundreds of letters in the Huntington Library's Frederick Jackson Turner Collection indicate that he, too, exerted a profound and far-reaching influence on contemporary thought. This was, in part, a function of Turner's peroration. The previously cited passage personifying the frontiersman—to which so many people responded so positively—was its foundation. Turner's last sentences then reminded his readers that the source of their greatness as a chosen people—the frontier—might "never again" be able to exert its influence:

What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of

custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe more remotely. And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history.[61]

The persuasive intent of the conclusion is indicated by a similar statement made over two years earlier. In an 1891 address on "American Colonization" to the Madison Literary Club, Turner had said:

Indeed, it is only in the present that the colonizing era is coming to a close. I do not hesitate to say that this fact is the key to American history. As the occupation of the New World transformed Europe, so the occupation of the Great West has determined the flow of American energies, been the underlying explanation of political history, and has had profound reactive effects upon the social and economic life of the East. What first the Mediterranean Sea, and later the New World, were to the Aryan peoples, breaking the bond of custom, and creating new activities to meet new conditions, that the underdeveloped West has been to the American descendants of these Aryans.[62]

The passage suggests the distinctly rhetorical roots of the peroration which impressed his readers so profoundly.[63]

The most prophetic of the perorations was Mackinder's, whose final sentences even now have ominous implications:

In conclusion, it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position. Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.[64]

Mackinder's "heartland" interpretation did not achieve its ultimate form until he expanded his 1904 essay into a book, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, first published in 1919. In an attempt to influence "our statesman" at Versailles, Mackinder coined the series of statements as a formal climax that was to make his conception unforgettable:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.[65]

In Germany the doctrine of controlling the heartland became "a basic idea among the students of *Geopolitik*, of whom General Karl Haushofer was the leading figure."[66] A generation later in the early 1950's, American college students studied Mackinder's theory as part of their curriculum in Air Force ROTC when, during the height of the Cold War and the Korean Conflict, they were prepared intellectually to fight Russia—or whoever controlled the heartland.[67] Like Mahan and Turner, Mackinder was a writer who used history rhetorically to influence the lives of readers, on several continents, for successive generations.

The specific ideas of these writers differ, but the essays share salient formal characteristics. In each, proems and perorations evoked feelings of impending doom. Readers came to feel that adherence to older values and the adoption of a specific policy would insure continued well being and ultimate salvation. Permeating all three essays, but in varying degrees of explicitness, was a second persona, a model of the reader as a part of a chosen people, a collective identity that might have been an impelling source of the responses to these works. These salient characteristics define a significant rhetorical genre—the historical Jeremaid.

NOTES

[1]Cushing Strout, *The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 1.

[2]I acknowledge indebtedness on this point to Phillip K. Tompkins, "The Rhetorical Criticism of Non-Oratorical Works," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55 (December, 1969), 438-439. In his essay advocating rhetorical criticism directed at answering those "*functional* questions' *i.e.* how do sender, message, and receiver interact in concrete, verifiable ways?" Tompkins argues forcefully for a critic's reliance on a "*concrete explication of documented effects.*"

[3]Ronald H. Carpenter, "The Rhetorical Genesis of Style in the 'Frontier Hypothesis' of Frederick Jackson Turner," *Southern Speech Journal*, 37 (Spring, 1972), 233-248.

[4]See for instance Ray A. Billington, *The Genesis of the Frontier Thesis* (San Marino: Huntington Library Press, 1971), pp. 3-4; and Charles A. Beard, "A Review of *The Frontier in American History*," *New Republic*, 25 (16 February 1921), 349. See also Carpenter, 234.

Billington says that between 1910 and the Great Depression of the 1930's, the Frontier Thesis "dominated the profession so completely that the American Historical Association was branded one great Turner-verein"; and that, with the possible exception of Charles A. Beard's economically oriented analysis, the Frontier Thesis "did more to vitalize the study of history than any other interpretation . . ."

[5]David W. Noble, *Historians Against History: The Frontier Thesis and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965), pp. 3-4. Noble's position

on the Jeremiadic character of the Frontier Thesis is confusing. In the introduction he is explicit in describing Turner as a Jeremiah. However, in a subsequent chapter on Turner, he writes: "Turner could find no way to interpret the change which had occured between 1865 and 1890 [the urban-industrial development which had closed the frontier] as one of Bancroft's moral dramas. He was not able to argue that an alien group was conspiring to destroy American democracy and introduce European complexity. He could not write a Jeremiad to rally the people to a puritanical defense of the national covenant." (p. 41). The apparent contradiction in Noble's position reflects Turner's ambivalence. On the one hand, Turner believed that primitivism (the frontier) had produced the unique qualities in American character; on the other hand, he believed that history was an evolutionary process so that he had no choice but to see as progress the urban-industrial development which closed the frontier.

[6]See Kenneth Burke's "Psychology and Form" and "Lexicon Rhetoricae," both in *Counter-Statement* (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1931). pp. 30-31, 124. See also Burke's observation that "form, having to do with the creation and gratification of needs, is 'correct' in so far as it gratifies the needs which it creates" p. 138.

[7]As a 1973-74 Fellow of the Huntington Library, I had opportunity to work in San Marino with the substantial Frederick Jackson Turner Collection which provided evidence for this analysis.

[8]Ronald H. Carpenter, "Alfred Thayer Mahan's Style on Sea Power: A Paramessage Conducing to *Ethos*," *Speech Monographs*, 42 (August, 1975), 190-202.

[9]According to Edmund W. Gilbert, Mackinder's writings can be compared in impact "with those of Mahan on the influence of sea power." In "Halford Mackinder," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 516. For Gilbert's more extensive account of Mackinder's influence, see his *British Pioneers in Geography* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972), pp. 139-179.

[10]Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," as reprinted in Fulmer Mood, *The Early Writings of Frederick Jackson Turner* (Freeport, New York, 1969), p. 185. This text of the Frontier Thesis is as it appeared in print originally in the *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin* (Madison, 1894).

[11]Mood's anthology contains a valuable, annotated bibliography suggesting the extent of those reprintings; and that appendix demonstrates that except for very minor changes in its body, the Frontier Thesis was not altered in its broad form during successive publications. See Mood, pp. 233-292.

[12]Theodore Roosevelt to Turner, 10 February 1894, Box 1 of the Huntington Library's Frederick Jackson Turner Collection, hereafter cited as FJT.

[13]James A. James to Lawrence Larson, 22 May 1919, in FJT Vol. I "Red Book" (a collection of letters from students and friends upon

Turner's leaving Wisconsin to teach at Harvard); and David Kinley to Turner, 24 August 1896, FJT Box 2.

[14]Phillip F. LaFollette to Joseph Schafer, 12 August 1933, FJT Box 50 A. Italics are LaFollette's.

[15]Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal*, 23 (April, 1904), 421-422.

[16]Remarks of Spencer Wilkinson, in *ibid.*, 437-438.

[17]These quotations from the reprinting of Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), pp. 18-19.

[18]Wilhelm had telegraphed that reaction to Poultney Bigelow in England, who in turn forwarded a longhand copy to Mahan, 26 May 1894. In Box 3 of the Alfred Thayer Mahan Collection at the Library of Congress, hereafter cited as ATM. I was able to work with the Mahan Collection and the Naval Historical Foundation Collection as a result of a 1972 Social Sciences Institute Grant from the University of Florida.

[19]*Royal United Service Institution Journal*, 34 (1890-91), 1067; and *Literary World*, 5 July 1890.

[20]The dispassionate quality complements the tone of prudence and impartiality suggested to readers by Mahan's tendency to introduce extensive qualifying clauses within his sentence structure. See Carpenter, "Alfred Thayer Mahan's Style on Sea Power," *loc. cit.*

[21]Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (December 1972), p. 401.

[22]Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (April 1970), p. 113.

[23]Michael C. McGee, "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical Alternative," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 61 (October 1975), pp. 239-240.

[24]To Turner from Helen Wengler, 10 March 1921, FJT Box 31; and from Charles Andrews, 6 February 1894, FJT Box 1.

[25]Mahan, pp. 25, 43-50.

[26]To Mahan, 1 May 1914, ATM Box 3.

[27]Mackinder, 422-423.

[28]Mackinder, 426-427.

[29]Remarks of critics appended to Mackinder, 438-439

[30]Mackinder, 444.

[31]Turner's autobiographical letter to Constance L. Skinner, 15 March 1922, MSE 902 in the Turner Collection at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. For further discussion of Turner's persuasive intent in 1893, see my "Rhetorical Genesis of Style in the 'Frontier Hypothesis' of Frederick Jackson Turner," 237-238.

[32]See Billington's *Genesis*, p. 3; or his *Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) pp. 186-187. This point is reviewed briefly in my "Rhetorical Genesis of Style," 233-234, 238.

[33]To Arthur M. Schlesinger, 18 April 1922, FJT Box 31 A.

[34]*Washington Star*, 24 March 1933. This and other newspaper reactions to Turner cited herein are among the extensive clippings in FJT File Drawer 15 D.

[35]Turner, "Significance of the Frontier," pp. 227-228.

[36]*Detroit Saturday Night*, 8 January 1921; and Carl Becker's review in *The Nation*, 111 (10 November 1920), 536. Only dated 1920, the promotional announcement is in FJT File Drawer 15 D, too.

[37]Charles McCarthy to Turner, 23 June 1910, FJT Vol. I "Red Book."

[38]To Turner from Guy Emerson, 30 June 1920, FJT Box 30.

[39]See for instance: *Boston Transcript*, 19 November 1920; *New York Churchman*, 2 April 1921; *Pacific Christian Advocate*, 5 January 1921; *New York Times*, 17 March 1932; and a commencement address at Bradley Polytechnic Institute by Christian C. Kohlsaat, 24 June 1898, in the *Peoria Journal* of that date. See also Arthur H. Buffington to Turner, 30 December 1920, FJT Box 30; and Lewis Stilwell to Charles Edwards, 26 April 1924, in FJT Vo. II "Blue Book," a collection of letters upon Turner's retirement from Harvard.

[40]Mahan, p. xii.

[41]*Boston Evening Transcript*, 14 May 1890; and *Edinburgh Review*, 172 (1890), 422.

[42]*Atlantic Monthly*, 66 (1890), 564; and *Political Science Quarterly*, 9 (1904), 171-172.

[43]To Mahan from Admiral Sir H. V. Noel, 23 December 1890, ATM Box 3.

[44]To Mahan from Lord Charles Beresford, 12 January 1891, ATM Box 3; and Noel, *ibid.*

[45]Mackinder, p. 431.

[46]Mackinder, pp. 434-436.

[47]The reaction of Spencer Wilkinson in Mackinder, p. 438.

[48]Reaction of "Mr. Amery," in Mackinder, p. 440.

[49]Mahan, p. 75.

[50]*Living Age*, 187 (1890), 402.

[51]*Literary World*, 5 July 1890. Italics mine.

[52]Mackinder, 432-433.

[53]Remarks of Spencer Wilkinson in Mackinder, p. 483.

[54]I am indebted to Bormann's explanation of this imaginative function of the "rhetorical vision" achieved by discourse. See in particular his discussion on pp. 398, 400-401, and 405-406.

[55]Salient examples of these applications appear in the following: *Boston Evening Record*, 22 August 1896; *Boston Herald*, 22 August 1896; and 15 November 1920; *New York Times*, 7 November 1920; *Pacific Christian Advocate*, 5 January 1921; *New Haven Courier Journal*, 13 July 1932; *Chicago Tribune*, 30 August 1896; the *Times* (Lowell, Massachusetts), 7 September 1896; and the *New York Post*, 4 December 1920.

See also the following: Lloyd William Brooke to Caroline Mae Turner,

13 March 1933, FJT Box 50; Edgar E. Robinson to Turner, 27 April 1918, FJT Box 28; and Arthur H. Buffington to Turner, 13 December 1920, FJT Box 30; "Reminiscences of F. J. Turner by August C. Krey," to Ray A. Billington, 18 April 1960, FJT Box 52; as well as letters from Theodore C. Smith, June 1910 and Rosa M. Perdue, 23 April 1910, both in FJT Vol. I "Red Book."

[56]To Turner from Guy Emerson, 29 September 1919, FJT Box 29; and A. Lawrence Lowell, 18 October 1920, Frederick Merk, 23 June 1920, Ulrich Phillips, 16 December 1920, all in FJT Box 30. Thirteen other letters in the box also state readers' reactions that Turner's essays, and the Frontier Thesis in particular, ought to be collected and published in a convenient form for a national, mass readership.

[57]Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, trans. Susanne Langer (New York: Harper, 1946) pp. viii-ix.

[58]Mahan, p. 76.

[59]See my "Alfred Thayer Mahan's Style on Sea Power," p. 190.

[60]Theodore Roosevelt to Mahan's wife, 5 December 1914, ATM Box 2.

[61]Turner, p. 229.

[62]This manuscript, thirty-three pages long, is located in FJT File Drawer 15 A. Although delivered on 9 February 1891, Turner's note on the title page suggests it was drafted in the main during January 1891.

[63]See my "Style in Discourse as an Index of Frederick Jackson Turner's Historical Creativity: Conceptual Antecedents of the Frontier Thesis in his 'American Colonization' Address to the Madison Literary Club, 9 February 1891," *Huntington Quarterly*, 40 (May 1977), pp. 269-277.

[64]Mackinder, p. 437.

[65]From the reprinting of *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942), p. 150. The rhetorical efficacy of form in this particular kind of statement impressed Kenneth Burke; for as he probed identification via formal devices, Burke extolled the following *gradatio:* "Who controls Berlin, controls Germany; who controls Germany controls Europe; who controls Europe controls the world." See Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York: George Braziller Incorporated, 1955), p. 58. See also my "Stylistic Redundancy and Function in Discourse," *Language and Style*, 3 (Winter 1970), 65.

[66]See Gilbert, *British Pioneers in Geography*, p. 257.

[67]To supplement the study of presumed bombing missions against the heartland, or air defense against attacks from there, polar projection maps were used which exaggerated the size of the Eurasian landmass hovering over the United States. Mackinder was summarized in a text supplied by the Air Force, G. Etzel Pearchy, Russell H. Fifield and Associates, *World Political Geography* (New York: Thomas Crowell Company, 1948), pp. 26-27.

DOING PUBLIC BUSINESS IN PUBLIC

MICHAEL HALLORAN

Consider the following public events:

—A trial with important social or political implications is held, and a few dozen spectators crowd into the courtroom.

—A local board of education conducts its monthly meeting in the high-school auditorium. As required by law, the meeting is open to the public, and approximately one hundred taxpayers attend.

—A state legislative body meets in regular session to debate and vote on a controversial piece of legislation. The session is carried live on educational television, and several thousand citizens watch the proceeding.

—A major political party conducts its convention to adopt a platform and nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Several million people watch the "gavel-to-gavel" coverage on network television.

Any one of these events might interest a rhetorician, since it is evident that rhetoric is occurring in all of them. The attorneys in the courtroom, the members of the school board, the legislators, and the participants in the convention will all make speeches and argue with each other. Each proceeding is a series of persuasive messages addressed by participants to other participants whose agreement they hope to win. What may not be so immediately evident is that in each case the series of messages is also an ensemble, a single message addressed to the spectators by the body conducting the proceeding.

In some ways, proceedings of the sort I am talking about are like plays. Just as a play combines a series of interactions among its characters to form an aesthetic unity for contemplation by the audience, the proceeding combines a series of interactions among its participants to form a rhetorical unity addressed to the spectators. Each is a structure having a beginning, a middle, and an end. While it is possible to lift individual parts out of the whole and look at them as if they were structures complete in themselves, the full significance of each part can only be grasped in relation to the structure of the whole. Hamlet's "To be or not to be" soliloquy

can be examined as a philosophical essay, but it becomes far more interesting when viewed as a part of the aesthetic whole that is *Hamlet*. Likewise, Barry Goldwater's 1964 address accepting the presidential nomination of the Republican Party can be viewed as simply a ceremonial speech, but it has considerably more significance as the climax of a convention at which Nelson Rockefeller had been loudly boo'd.

The analogy between a political convention, a trial, or a meeting of a legislative body and a play is useful, but by itself cannot satisfactorily account for the rhetorical nature of these events. For one thing, the proceedings have immediate practical consequences, whereas a play does not. For another, the unity of a play derives from the creativity of a single person, the playwright, whereas that of a proceeding must emerge from the dedication of many people to a common purpose.

It is my belief that the events in question are rooted in rhetorical situations that are similar in important ways, and that as discourses they exhibit important formal similarities. I believe that these similarities are sufficiently relevant to the critic for the events to be regarded as instances of a rhetorical genre, which can be called the *public proceeding*. In the remainder of this essay I shall develop a conception of the genre in terms of both situation and form, and then illustrate its critical utility by examining the televised debate of the House Judiciary Committee on the impeachment of Richard Nixon as an example of the public proceeding.[1]

I

By a public proceeding, I mean an official business session of a representative body, including debate and decision on specific issues, conducted before an audience made up of members of the body's constituency. The body may be representative in a strict elective sense, as in the cases of the legislature and the schoolboard, or in some wider sense, as in the cases of the court of law and the political convention. In any event, the members of the audience have a real interest in the outcome of the body's deliberations. Because matters of consequence to them are at stake, they are rhetorically *available*. The public proceeding thus serves a dual purpose: it settles whatever matters are before the body, just as a similar proceeding held in closed session would; it shapes the views of the audience directly, as a proceeding held in private could not.

This preliminary definition of the genre distinguishes the public proceeding from other sorts of rhetorical events that bear superficial resemblances to it. A hearing meant to inform the public or to elicit information as a basis for future action may on the surface look very similar to a public proceeding. For example, the Senate Watergate hearings of 1973 bore certain resemblances to the Judiciary Committee debate of 1974, and many people confuse the two, using the name of one while meaning the other. Yet there is an important difference in that the hearing, unlike a true public proceeding, cannot include official action by the body. There is

no sense of closure in the hearing, no need for the body to resolve issues and declare itself as a body on this or that side of the question before it. This means that the form of the hearing will be determined primarily by the need to inform or to elicit information. In a public proceeding, by contrast, there is business to conduct, a decision to be made. Even in a case in which the business is nothing more than a formality, for example a political convention that has only to renominate an unopposed incumbent, the business nonetheless must be conducted and the basic form of the event will be determined by the nature of that business.

The primary role of the audience in a public proceeding is to witness. Indeed, the generic concept I am attempting to develop is intended to focus attention on precisely those modulations that occur when an audience is present at an event whose primary rationale does not call for an audience. To return to the play analogy, a public proceeding is comparable to the traditional sort of play in which the audience is expected to sit quietly through the performance, in contrast to theater in the participatory idiom which calls on the audience to take an active part in the dramatic event. Within that broad category of non-participatory theater there are many dramatic styles, each demanding a different mode of aesthetic involvement. For example, Brechtian theater calls for a critical and emotionally-detached audience, whereas Artaud's "theater of cruelty" calls for an intense emotional engagement.[2] In a similar manner, different modes of rhetorical involvement are called for by different kinds of public proceedings. A limiting case would be the ordinary courtroom trial, in which the audience is expected merely to witness the event. Aside from admonitions by the judge to observe the proper decorum, the form of a trial will normally show little if any adaptation to the audience. (I am speaking here of the audience of spectators as distinct from a jury.) Since under ordinary circumstances the audience has no power to influence the outcome of the proceeding, neither side is likely to exert any effort to win the agreement of the audience, or for that matter even to make its case comprehensible to them. Yet by exerting themselves to "overhear" the arguments not addressed to them, the spectators become a rhetorical audience. At the opposite extreme would be the political convention, in which the business at hand is merely an essential prelude to another proceeding—the election—in which the audience will play a decisive role. Consequently, the convention delegates will be wooing the audience rhetorically at the same time that they are discharging the business at hand.

Aristotle says that a rhetorical audience must be composed of either judges (those who decide) or spectators (critics), and he classifies speeches in part according to which of these two roles the audience is called upon to perform.[3] Speeches requiring the audience to judge are either deliberative or forensic, depending on whether the audience is to judge proposals for future action or actions already completed. Speeches that call upon the audience to be spectators are epideictic. Lloyd Bitzer makes a related point when he says that a rhetorical audience is composed of those who are

capable of effecting change with regard to the exigence at the base of a rhetorical situation.[4] Viewed in this light, the distinctive character of the public proceeding becomes clearer. The immediate issue before the body holding the proceeding is in every case one calling for judgment in the Aristotelian sense: the body conducting the proceeding must decide and make a binding pronouncement upon either the quality of something that has happened or the advisability of some proposed course of action. Yet the audience that gathers to witness the proceeding cannot judge in that sense; in Bitzer's terms, they are powerless to modify the exigence. They can only approve or disapprove. The are *spectators*—mere observers, as Aristotle would have it. The proceeding that is, in the first instance, either deliberative or judicial thus takes on the character of epideictic rhetoric as well.

The exigence at issue in the deliberative or judicial arguments in a public proceeding is never a matter of private business. The members of the body conducting the proceeding act in the name of a larger community. They are empowered by specific social arrangements—customs, laws, and procedures of appointment or election—to represent the community in doing specific kinds of public business. Justice is done, laws are passed, policy is established, candidates are nominated—always in the name of the people.[5] The fact that the body is being observed at work by an audience of those people who see themselves represented in that body gives rise to another exigence, considerably broader and in most instances much more significant than the first: the body conducting the proceeding must legitimate itself. Opening the proceeding to the public in effect poses a question about the quality of the body's representation. Will the court act according to the community's standard of justice? Will the party conduct itself in keeping with the American political tradition as the people understand it? Will the school board act responsibly, in the best interests of both taxpayers and children?

There are, in other words, two issues or sets of issues at stake in any public proceeding: (1) whatever the specific questions or proposals before the body, and (2) the legitimacy of the body as representative of the community. The first issue is either deliberative or judicial; the second is epideictic. The relationship between these two issues, or exigences, is complex. The authority of the body conducting the proceeding to deal with the first issue rests on an implicit agreement in the community, an agreement formalized in the customs, laws, and procedures of election or appointment that constitute the body's mandate.[6] While at a given moment the agreement might seem solid and enduring, history suggests that it really is quite fragile. Moreover, it is not difficult to exploit the fragility of that agreement in a public proceeding. Political activists of the late 60's and early 70's, for example, learned that it is possible to turn a trial into an attack on the judicial system. A public proceeding can thus transcend the immediate issues at hand, raising questions that touch the very nature of the community in which it takes place.

An important concept here is *representation*. The body holding a public proceeding is representative in the obvious political sense that it acts for the community in disposing of the immediate issues before it; it is an agent of the community. At the same time, the proceeding is a representation in something like the aesthetic sense of that term: It expresses, stands for, or articulates an image of something—in this case, the community itself. In conducting public business before the public, a representative body presents an image of the community to the community, "holds the mirror up . . ." not to nature but to the people. As with a work of art, the "mirror" is actually more like the lens of a magic lantern. What is presented is one of many possible images of a reality that is itself ultimately more fiction than empirical fact. The proceeding constitutes an image of a community, and the audience can either identify with that image as a model of their own common life or reject it. To the degree that the audience identifies with the image, the body achieves credibility.

I am talking about fictions—powerful imaginings that shape the lives of people. Empirically, the "body" that conducts a public proceeding is not one thing but many; it is a collection of individuals with certain interests in common and many more that conflict. The "community" is likewise simply a vast number of people whose lives overlap in certain ways, but whose sense of fellowship with each other is tenuous at best. Belonging to a community is a matter of implicitly giving one's consent to a great fiction, of agreeing to pretend together with a mass of others, and for the most part to deny even to oneself that the community is ultimately pretense.[7] Membership in a representative body is likewise consenting to a fiction, though to the degree that one chooses membership in such a body the consent is more consciously granted, and therefore more readily subject to qualification or withdrawal. The body exists as a figment of the imaginations of its members, who choose to enact their conflicts according to established procedures, thereby affirming common interests that transcend immediate conflicts. When a representative body conducts its business behind closed doors, the individual members are free to lay their private and conflicting interests out and bargain their way toward resolution of the issues before them; "the common interest" may become a very remote abstraction, to be weighed by each member against whatever individual needs or special interests he sees at stake. Much of this bargaining would appear unseemly in public proceedings.[8] Some degree of "staging" is therefore virtually inevitable in a public proceeding, which thus becomes a fiction in the sense of a falsehood as well as in the more powerful sense suggested above.

The practical significance of this perspective becomes apparent if one considers the dilemma of the individual member of a body who opposes the majority view of how an issue should be resolved. To the degree that the proceeding articulates an image of community with which the audience can identify, the force of its decisions in shaping public opinion will be underlined by a strong *ethos*. Assuming that there is some means of reversing

the body's decision after the proceeding (e. g., appeal, veto, repeal, referendum), the member who opposes the majority view can press his own case by undermining that *ethos* in the forum which holds the power of reversal. He might, for example, level charges of unfairness against members of the majority or try to provoke them into shouting matches or other unseemly displays. If he can succeed in generating an image of mean contentiousness within the proceeding, this may undermine public confidence in its outcome, as the Republican convention of 1964 and the Democratic convention of 1968 both demonstrate. But if a member of the opposition chooses to undermine the *ethos* of the majority position in this way, his tactics will have the further effect of undermining the legitimacy of the body. Yet if he does not follow such tactics, if instead he argues in the manner of "the loyal opposition," he is, in effect, cooperating in a rhetorical strategy favoring the majority by contributing to the *ethos* that supports their position. To the degree that he identifies with the body, he may undermine his own position on the issue before the body. A member of the opposition is therefore confronted with a hard choice between the immediate issue before the body and the broader issue of its legitimacy. In certain types of proceedings, there are strict rules governing the conduct of those who support a minority position; in the judicial system, for example, an attorney or a witness who attempts to undermine the *ethos* of the court will be cited for contempt. In proceedings in which there are no such rules, one can expect to see the majority dealing very carefully with the minority to prevent them from engaging in divisive tactics.

So far I have used the term *ethos* as a rough synonym for "source credibility," which is the sense in which most contemporary rhetoricians seem to use it. In this sense the term is quite neutral and scientific, but the term has a larger meaning as well. *Ethos* is the spirit of a culture or people, the spirit that enables persons to transcend immediate problems and experiences, thereby giving meaning to the immediate and transforming an aggregation of individuals into a community.[9] *Ethos* in this sense is the meaning of the fictions I spoke of earlier. *Ethos* as a source credibility is rooted in this larger sense of the word in that a speaker achieves credibility to the degree that he makes present to his audience something of the spirit that binds him in community with them. The rhetor therefore becomes the preserver and shaper of culture. Isocrates recognized this point and consequently set a high value on epideictic rhetoric, which is in this sense an exercise in pure *ethos*.

It is in this context that the epideictic character of the public proceeding must be understood. The proceeding dramatizes a model of community, including conflict between members who differ over how the immediate issues are to be resolved and the more fundamental agreements that enable them to transcend the issues at hand and enact their conflicts in an orderly way. If the model presented has validity, if it rings true and seems to touch a living tradition, it can articulate a spirit that enlivens the sense of community. If the model seems invalid—false, "staged," unfair—the proceed-

ing can demoralize its audience by saying that their common life is likewise invalid. What may ultimately be at stake in a public proceeding is the communion that makes community possible.

In summary, then a public proceeding must be viewed under two aspects. It is: (1) a forum in which questions of immediate concern to a community are discussed and decided according to procedures rooted in tradition and law; (2) a ritual of communion, celebrating the identity of the community. There is a tension between these two aspects, and in a given instance one or the other may become fully dominant. Under ordinary circumstances, a courtroom proceeding would be dominated by the need to dispose of specific and immediate issues, and the ritual aspect would be fully subordinated to this need to "do business." At the other extreme, a political convention in which the platform and candidates had been decided beforehand would become pure ritual, with the agenda serving merely to set the pattern of the ritual: the 1972 Republican convention would be a good example. More often both aspects are, or at least appear to be, realized simultaneously in a mutually constraining fashion: the ritual celebration of identity proceeds according to the form prescribed for the conduct of business in the forum; business in the forum is conducted under the substantial added weight of its ritual significance.

The overall form of the proceeding is, as I suggested at the outset, dramatic. Members of the body conducting the proceeding are *dramatis personae* who act out a conflict centering on how the issues before them are to be resolved. As in a play, the action will tend naturally to be unified, sometimes in defiance of the nature of the business at hand. The conflict will fall into a pattern of rising action, the exchanges between the actors moving climactically toward a single moment of resolution—the jury's verdict, the nominee's acceptance address, the vote on the central issue. If there are several issues before the body, lesser issues will be dealt with as means of defining the conflict and furthering the movement of action toward the resolution of the major issue. If there are other matters to be disposed of after the resolution of the conflict, they will function either as a denouement or an anticlimax.

II

As an example of the public proceeding, I will consider the televised debate of the House Judiciary Committee from July 24 through 30, 1974, on the proposed impeachment of Richard Nixon. I choose this example because the fact that the debate was held as a public proceeding rather than in closed session contributed materially to the weight of an issue of indubitable historical significance.

The impeachment debate was the culmination of a long and arduous process. As early as July 31, 1973, committee member Robert Drinan had placed an impeachment resolution before the full House of Representatives.[10] By October 10, 1973, the committee had produced a 718-page

study of the concept of impeachment.[11] In February 1974, the committee received formal authorization for its investigation by a vote of 410-4 in the full House,[12] and full-scale closed sessions were underway. During the closed sessions, 38 volumes of "evidentiary material" were accumulated as the basis for the final deliberations and the vote on five proposed articles of impeachment.

To be more precise, the debate was not the culmination of the process, but rather one step on the road leading toward an impeachment trial in the Senate. The process was truncated by Nixon's revelation of the June 23, 1972 conversation in which he and H. R. Haldeman had committed a casual obstruction of justice amid talk of Mrs. Nixon's hairdo, and by his subsequent resignation. It would have been possible to press on with the impeachment process, and there was some support in Congress and the general public for doing so.[13] The overwhelming consensus, however, was that to continue the impeachment process would serve no end. On the purely practical level, this was obviously true: removal from office is the only punishment an impeachment trial can impose, and Nixon had already removed himself from office. Yet impeachment serves a symbolic as well as practical end. It clarifies the values of the society—articulates *ethos*, if you will—by pronouncing judgment on the conduct of public officials. On this symbolic level, however, I would argue that it was unnecessary to continue the impeachment process precisely because the Judiciary Committee elected to conduct their debate as a public proceeding before the nation. Because it was a public proceeding—a ritual celebration of identity as well as a practical decision-making forum—the impeachment debate fulfilled that symbolic end.

During the long, publicly excruciating chain of events that led up to the impeachment debate, impeachment had been transformed in the public mind from a left-wing fantasy into a real and, for many people, a frightening possibility. Jimmy Breslin reports that Drinan's original impeachment resolution had been tabled because House Majority Leader Tip O'Neill and Speaker Carl Albert agreed that the time was not yet politically ripe: "At this time the most votes an impeachment resolution could possibly get would have been twenty-five. Such a vote would appear in the newspapers as a vindication of Nixon by Congress."[14] Impeachment was not simply a matter of legal business in the Congress, and proponents and opponents alike knew it. A decision to impeach would have to be rooted in public understanding and acceptance of the basis for such a drastic action. To impeach and remove from office the highest elected official in the country would touch in a fundamental way the American people's understanding of themselves as a people. By the time of the televised debate, the people had read or heard about the tape transcripts; created a "firestorm" over the dismissal of Archibald Cox and the resignations of Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus; and puzzled over who was responsible for the mysterious 18 1/2-minute gap in one of the tapes, and what damning evidence had been destroyed. These and other events had, in the words of

political scientist Charles Hamilton, *impugned* Nixon, thus making impeachment possible.[15] During the same period, the methodical and circumspect work of the Judiciary Committee had made it credible as an instrument for removing Nixon from office. When on July 19, just five days before the opening of the televised debate, Presidential news secretary Ronald Zeigler referred to the committee as a "kangaroo court," his remark provoked considerable public outrage.

But while impeachment was not *simply* a matter of legal business in Congress, it was that too. The question that loomed so large in the press and in public opinion—Should Nixon be impeached?—tended to overshadow the more esoteric and involved legal questions that had occupied the committee during its closed sessions—questions of precedent, evidence, and procedure, questions of what precisely constitutes an impeachable offense and how such an offense must be proven. Yet these were the questions that formed the agenda for the televised debate. There was not one broad question before the committee but rather five articles of impeachment alleging five particular offenses: 1) obstruction of justice in the Watergate cover-up, 2) abuse of power through misuse of such agencies as the FBI and IRS, 3) failure to honor the lawful subpoenas of the Judiciary Committee, 4) unlawful bombing of Cambodia, and 5) tax evasion and acceptance of unlawful emoluments.

This distinction is simply an application of the general point made above that a public proceeding has two aspects. On one level, the impeachment debate was a forum in which a problem of immediate and practical concern to the nation was discussed and decided according to procedures rooted in law and tradition. From this perspective, the power of the Juciciary Committee was severely delimited: it could merely recommend to the full House of Representatives, which in turn would decide whether or not to impeach.[16] And impeachment would be merely a prelude to trial in the Senate. The debate was a legal proceeding in which it would be necessary to decide such evidentiary questions as whether a "policy" can be implicit in a pattern of actions or must be stated explicitly.[17] Yet on another level, the debate was a ritual of communion articulating an image of the United States as a political unit—a community. At this level, the single question at issue was whether the American *ethos* could tolerate Richard Nixon's conduct as President. In this case, the precise content of the debate would matter less than whether it was conducted with appropriate solemnity.

The form of the debate reflected the inevitable tension between these two aspects in a number of ways. Most obvious was the allocation of time. From the viewpoint of the debate as a forum for doing business, each of the five articles was as important as each of the others, and one would therefore expect roughly the same amount of time to be devoted to consideration of each. Instead, the debate proceeded according to the following schedule:

Wednesday, July 24 — Opening remarks by individual members
Thursday, July 25 — Opening remarks, continued

Friday, July 26 — Debate on article I
Saturday, July 27 — Debate on article I, continued; vote on article I
Sunday, July 28—Recess
Monday, July 29 — Debate and vote on article II
Tuesday, July 30 — Debate and vote on articles III, IV, and V.

Thus while the agenda did cover each of the five articles, only one-third of the total debate was devoted to consideration of articles II through V. Even assuming that the need to settle procedural matters would naturally slow down debate on the first article, the disproportion remains striking. However, if one views the debate as a ritual of communion, the discussion of articles II through V was extraneous, perhaps even anticlimactic. Once Nixon's conduct had been considered and formally condemned, the ritual was, for all practical purposes, complete. While the agenda of the debate reflected its function as a working forum and a single step in the larger process of impeachment, the allocation of time to items in the agenda tended to emphasize its ritualistic function, and therefore to lend additional weight to its decisions.

The timing of the debate gave further emphasis to its ritualistic aspect. As indicated, the final debate and balloting on article I took place on Saturday and was followed by a full day of recess. A very strong sense of closure at the end of this portion of the debate underlined the significance of the vote on article I. From the viewpoint of dramatic structure, the climax of the proceeding was the Saturday evening vote, Chairman Peter Rodino's voice cracking audibly as he cast the final ballot and called the recess. The weekly news magazines tended to underscore further the impression that the debate was fully resolved in this one vote, since they went to press too soon for the Monday and Tuesday sessions to be reported. The issues of *Time* and *Newsweek* that were on the newsstands and in people's mailboxes as the debate was ending carried cover stories on what happened up to the Sunday recess. Both magazines had headlines referring to the balloting on article I as "the fateful vote,"[18] and both placed some emphasis on the emotional responses of individual members after casting "the most momentous vote of their political lives, or of any representative of the American people in a century."[19] *Newsweek* carried a page of photographs of individual committee members at their desks, all in poses of high seriousness, Charles Wiggins of California apparently weeping.[20] All of this tended to minimize the fact that the committee was considering a series of particular issues to make recommendations to the full House, and to emphasize instead the one great issue before the committee.

The language of the debate illustrates the mutually constraining effect of the dual aspects of the public proceeding as working forum and ritual. The most obvious examples are the formulaic courtesies and parliamentary jargon that run through the transcript. On the level of the debate as forum, these exchanges were merely the linguistic conventions of Congressional debate, with no more rhetorical significance than the casual

greetings exchanged by acquaintances or colleagues. Yet for the television audience, these recurrent verbal formulae took on the character of incantations and helped to establish the ritual solemnity of the debate.[21] Insofar as the formulae prescribed for Congressional debate were linguistically unfamiliar to the audience, this incantatory effect was further emphasized, just as the Latin of the old Roman Catholic liturgy emphasized its ritual character. Recurrent phrases from the debate—"I thank the gentleman for yielding," "The chair recognizes the gentleman from California," "The amendment is/is not agreed to"—were thus in a certain sense equivalent to the "Dominus vobiscum" of the old Roman mass. In both cases, the rhythm and solemnity of the ritual is enhanced by the recurrence of stylized verbal refrains.

A similar point can be made about the recitations of evidence offered by members of the pro-impeachment bloc in the committee. For the most part, these were the dullest sort of narrative, with frequent and tedious references to dates and times, painstaking cross-references to related events, and passages of direct quotation from transcripts of conversations that were dull at best and opaque at worst. They were usually offered in response to legalistic questions that went beyond the interest and understanding of the vast majority of viewers, which is to say that they had very specific technical meanings for the participants in the debate as a forum. Yet for the audience that watched on television, these recitations tended to take on less specific but far weightier meanings—ritualistic meanings. A particular piece of narrative might be offered in support of an allegation that Nixon had withheld "relevant and material evidence or information from lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States." (article I, sub-paragraph 2). For the ordinary non-lawyer citizen, who would have no way of judging whether what had been withheld was indeed "relevant and material evidence" or whether the President was legally justified in withholding it, the tale would become part of a litany of vices, a demonic myth recited by priests of the cult of law. From this viewpoint the significance of such recitations was less in their particular details than in their overall weight. While in the debate as forum they served as arguments, in the debate as ritual they became incantations.

This effect was particularly noticeable on Saturday, the second day of debate on article I. On the previous day, the opponents of impeachment had made much of the issue of "specificity," arguing that the language of the proposed article was so general as not to provide the President with due notice of exactly what he was charged with having done, thus denying him the opportunity to prepare a defense. The merits of this abstruse legal argument were impossible for the audience to evaluate, since it rested on the concept of "due notice" and the conventional procedures for drawing indictments. The real force of the argument was not, however, in its legal merits, but in the suggestion it offered that the proponents of impeachment were not being fair to Nixon. On Saturday, the proponents of impeachment came up with a nice parliamentary tactic to answer this argument

without narrowing the language of the article as the anti-impeachment members had wanted. Walter Flowers (D, Alabama) offered a series of motions to strike the various subparagraphs of the article; these motions were not made in earnest, as was demonstrated by Flowers voting 'present' on each of them. Rather, they gave other members of the pro-impeachment bloc an opportunity to read lengthy narrative summaries of the evidence as "specifics" in support of the general charges made by the subparagraphs.[22] On the level of the debate as forum, these recitations were entirely irrelevant to the claim that specific allegations should be made in the language of the article of impeachment itself. Yet they satisfied the audience's need for a story, told with due ritual solemnity, to support the general claim that Nixon's conduct was so unworthy as to merit his removal from office. The ritual character of the recitations was enhanced by the frequent repetition of the word "specifically" to introduce episodes of the story.[23] This had the further effect of emphasizing for the anti-impeachment members the fact that they were being hoist with their own rhetorical petard; Charles Sandman (R, New Jersey), who on Friday had argued as strenuously as anyone for "specificity," was obviously angry and frustrated by Saturday's turn of events.

From the viewpoint of the dramatic form of the debate, it is worth pausing over the fact that it was Flowers who took on the role of establishing the platform from which the "specifics" could be read to the audience without being written into the impeachment articles. Had it been one of the long-time Nixon foes, such as Conyers or Drinan, the series of motions to strike would probably have appeared to be what it in fact was—a parliamentary tactic to side-step the issue of whether the articles should or shouldn't include specific allegations. And such an appearance would have undermined somewhat the impression of scrupulous fairness and thoroughness the committee had so-far given. Flowers was a Democrat, but a southern conservative Democrat who had supported George Wallace and whose congressional district had gone solidly for Nixon in 1972. His established political loyalties seemed to place him closer to the pro-Nixon forces than to the known proponents of impeachment. He had been depicted in the popular press as so deeply anguished over the evils brought to light in the committee's investigation that he had developed an ulcer as a result. He was thus the right person to lead the pro-impeachment bloc as they moved toward the climactic vote because he of all the supporters of impeachment was least likely to seem a man after Nixon's scalp. His willingness to assume the role would itself be a kind of reluctant evidence of the essential rightness of their cause. In return for taking on this role—at some political risk, given the nature of his constituency—Flowers was granted five minutes to speak between the completion of debate on all amendments and the calling of the roll on the first article, the most pregnant moment of the entire proceeding. His speech, one of the most eloquent of the debate, was for the most part a justification of his vote for impeachment.[24]

I have already argued the general point that the performance of those members who oppose the majority view in a body holding a public proceeding is especially important, since they can exploit conflict within the body as a means of reducing its *ethos* and thereby narrowing public support for the majority view. The danger of such exploitation of conflict in the impeachment debate was particularly acute, since as the debate opened it was really the only tactic left to those who opposed impeachment. In their opening statements, exactly half of the committee's 38 members in one way or another indicated that they would vote for impeachment, and another eight suggested that they were leaning very strongly in that direction.[25] It was thus certain that the committee would recommend at least one article of impeachment to the House of Representatives, though it was as yet not certain that the full House would follow the Committee's recommendation, or that the Senate was prepared to convict Nixon in an impeachment trial. Which way the full House and the Senate would come down on the issue would be largely determined by which way the political wind seemed to be blowing. The one likely way to avoid impeachment was therefore to undermine the Judiciary Committee's *ethos* and thus blunt the effect of its inevitable report in shaping public opinion. According to Jimmy Breslin, the White House had already gone to some trouble in a futile attempt to discredit the committee by smearing its chairman, Peter Rodino.[26] Ronald Zeigler's "kangaroo court" remark might well have been intended as a signal to the pro-Nixon committee members, suggesting that they do what the White House had been unable to. In order to minimize the public impact of the impeachment vote, they should strive to damage the committee's *ethos* by making it appear that it was unfair and/or incompetent.

Certain anti-impeachment members—most notably Sandman of New Jersey—followed just such a strategy. Yet surprisingly, the committee member who came to be regarded as the ablest and most outspoken opponent of impeachment refused to follow the strategy. Charles Wiggins (R, California) chose instead to mount a legalistic attack on the sufficiency of admissible evidence supporting the charges. While Sandman attacked the pro-impeachment members, in effect trying to prevent the debate from becoming a valid ritual of communion, Wiggins identified with them as "my colleagues," thus validating the legitimacy of the proceeding and contributing to its ritual force. Consider, for example, the ways in which Sandman and Wiggins argued in support of one of the Flowers motions to strike a subparagraph of article I:

Sandman—

The thing that amuses me the most today, what a difference 24 hours makes. Yesterday they had so much testimony they were afraid to put in nine simple sentences. Now today every other word they

breathe is the word "specify." Isn't that unusual? So unusual. Everything is so specific. But they have not changed one word in the articles, have they, not a word. There has got to be a reason. You know what the reason is. When you tame it down to a time and a place and an activity, they do not have it. All they have is conjecture. They can tell you all about what Dean told somebody, Ehrlichman told somebody, what somebody else told somebody. This is going to be the most unusual case in the history of man. They are going to prove the whole case against the President of the United States over in the Senate with tapes and no witnesses. Won't that be unusual? And this is what it all amounts to.

Now, if I went through this thing paragraph by paragraph I could cite with great detail no Presidential involvement. They know it, you know it, I know it.[27]

Wiggins—

Now, I want to refresh the recollection of the members as to whether or not the President's concern about CIA was justified under all of the circumstances. We remember that McCord was in fact arrested and a former CIA agent. We remember that Barker was in fact arrested and a former CIA agent, perhaps an active CIA agent. Martinez was arrested and he was an active CIA agent. [Continues offering particulars on the Watergate burglary].

Given those facts, ladies and gentlemen, we are asked to conclude that the President corruptly, instructed his aids to request that there be coordination between the CIA and the FBI so as not to reveal unrelated CIA covert activities.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is all the evidence there is in between the 23rd of June and the 6th of July. There is no question that John Dean acted improperly. I am willing to stipulate to that. But that does not execute the President's instructions which were given on the 23rd of June. On that issue, ladies and gentlemen, the question really is not all that close. I would think that the weight, if not the preponderance, of the evidence in favor of the President is that he acted in the public interest as distinguished from corruptly. Surely, however, there is not a clear and convincing showing that the President acted corruptly given the facts and the knowledge that he had at the time he issued the instructions.[28]

These two passages illustrate a number of contrasts that are fairly typical of the argumentative styles consistently followed by the two men: 1) Wiggins argues substantively, whereas Sandman concentrates on attacking the motives of the pro-impeachment members; 2) Wiggins is formal and polite

toward the other members, whereas Sandman is more casual and at times even disdainful; 3) Wiggins addresses his remarks to the other members, whereas Sandman seems to be speaking to the television audience; 4) Wiggins finds the arguments he opposes weighty enough to merit serious rebuttal, whereas Sandman dismisses them with contemptuous sarcasm. In general, one can say that Wiggins argued as "the loyal opposition;" he identified with the committee, thus implicitly acknowledging the validity of its proceeding. Sandman attempted to bring his case to the community represented by the committee and undermine the validity of the proceeding in that larger forum.

The contrast between Sandman and Wiggins poses a nice critical problem. If one considers only the issue of impeachment, Sandman would have to be judged the better speaker. Given the rhetorical situation within which the debate was conducted, his means were reasonably well-chosen for pursuing the end of preventing impeachment, whereas Wiggins' tactics were bound to fail. In fact, Wiggins can actually be seen as having contributed to building public support *for* impeachment in at least three ways: 1) He undermined the effectiveness of Sandman's tactics by not cooperating with them; 2) Wiggins contributed to the committee's *ethos* by identifying with the other members and their procedures; 3) By offering a narrowly legalistic defense of Nixon, Wiggins implied that the best one could say of him was that one couldn't be absolutely certain he was guilty of particular crimes. Far from being "the point man for the defense,"[29] that many commentators took him to be, Wiggins was in many ways the best ally the pro-impeachment members had.

But there is always the larger issue of legitimacy in a public proceeding, and in the case of the impeachment debate that issue was of enormous importance. The shabby dealings we know as "Watergate" had cast a shadow on American politics generally. Public confidence in the institutions of government had been severely shaken. Insofar as the institutions of government represent the people, are indeed a representation of the people insofar as they share a common life, it can rightly be said that the people's confidence in themselves had been shaken.[30] The means indicated for avoiding impeachment by the full House—the Sandman strategy of undermining the committee's *ethos*—would have further eroded public confidence in the institutions of government, and would thus have been demoralizing to a nation whose morale was already low. Wiggins' rhetorical tactics must therefore be seen not as a series of bad choices in dealing with a particular issue before the committee, but as the expression of a judgment on the larger implications of how that issue was to be resolved. In acting the role he did, he set the nation's confidence in itself above the immediate issue. One might pronounce Sandman the abler speaker, but one would have to find Wiggins the wiser man.

A cynic might claim that the wisdom of Wiggins was in the end nothing more than the survival instinct. Nixon's cause turned out to be a sinking ship that would take down many who clung fast to the wreckage. It might

be argued that, by defending Nixon in the way he did, Wiggins was simply fulfilling the requirements of party loyalty while protecting his own credibility with the electorate. It is certainly worth noting that Wiggins' was reelected to Congress in November 1974, while Sandman was defeated. Wiggins' manner of arguing the case against impeachment may have been just the work of a clever rat sneaking unnoticed off a ship he knew to be doomed, though I am not inclined to think so. Impeachment was such an unprecedented issue that no one could tell just where in it political advantage was to be found, which is why the rest of Congress was happy to see Nixon resign and let impeachment rest where the Judiciary Committee had left it.

But whatever his personal motives, Wiggins' manner of arguing the case for Nixon helped make the impeachment debate a model of public life that the American people could and evidently did take as valid representation of themselves.[31] Even those members of the television audience who could not approve the committee's recommendation could at least identify with a voice in the committee, a voice that confirmed the validity of the proceeding even as it disputed the outcome. In a similar manner, citizens from diverse backgrounds and with diverse ideological commitments could hear voices in the committee speaking for them. Barbara Jordon (D, Texas) spoke of herself as having been included in the "We the people" of the Constitution only by the process of amendment and interpretation, thus identifying herself as a representative of blacks and women.[32] Tom Railsback (R, Illinois) expressed particular concern for the effect of Watergate and of the committee's proceeding on the minds of young people.[33] Edward Mezvinski (D, Iowa) spoke of his parents having emigrated from czarist Russia, thus identifying himself with the concerns of "hyphenated Americans."[34] Charles Rangel (D, New York) made himself a spokesperson for war veterans by refering to the men "who died next to me in Korea."[35] William Hungate (D, Missouri) spoke for those who were more outraged by Nixon's humorless and self-righteous pomposity than his specific violations of law and public trust.[36] Conyers (D, Michigan), Waldie (D, California) and other long-time Nixon foes spoke for various elements of the left and the anti-war movement. Flowers (D, Alabama) spoke as a representative of a Wallace-Democrat constituency. Even on the level of phonetics, the committee contained a diversity of voices, from Drinan's flat Bostonian and Rangel's gravelly New York east-side to Hungate's sharp Missourian and James Mann's genteel South Carolina tidewater.

The diversity of voices in the committee could very easily have produced a cacophony, which of course would have served the ends of the Nixon White House quite well. But thanks to the good sense and good will of the great majority of the committee members, and to the skillful leadership of Rodino, the committee remained unified in its diversity. The members spoke to each other and to the nation in mutual respect and a conscious awareness of a fundamental agreement that transcended their regional and

ideological differences. Many of them alluded to that agreement by referring to "the founding fathers" or to specific passages from the Constitution; Barbara Jordan's reference to the phrase "We the People" in the preamble was an especially lucid instance. Rodino expressed his own sense of that agreement with simple eloquence: "I am proud," he said to his colleagues, "to be a part of you, to be among you, to be of you."[37] On the level of rhetoric, these references to the agreement underlying the diversity of the committee suggest the importance of Kenneth Burke's observation that "Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division."[38] On the level of politics, and of *ethos* in its larger cultural sense, they recall the motto *"E pluribus unum."*

III

What I have presented in this paper is neither a full analysis of the impeachment debate nor a complete theory of the public proceeding as a rhetorical genre. Neither would be possible in such a brief space, if indeed a "full analysis" or a "complete theory" of any rhetorical phenomenon would be possible in any amount of space. Rather, I have made an essay, in the old sense of a tentative effort or a probing. Assuming that the effort has seemed interesting enough to warrant further exploration, it might be appropriate to conclude by suggesting some directions.

1. I have tried to conceptualize the genre broadly enough to accommodate very different sorts of proceedings, but in the absence of analyses of public trials, political conventions, legislative sessions, and the like, it remains possible that the genre has been drawn too narrowly. And, if it is broad enough as it stands, the differences between sub-classes within the genre could be delineated. A televised political convention may be sufficiently like the impeachment debate to be regarded as belonging to the same rhetorical genre, but it surely is more like another political convention, which suggests that sub-genres or species of public proceedings could be described. Other events should be examined from the critical perspective of this essay, not only to come to an understanding of those events, but also as a means of developing a fuller understanding of public proceedings in general. Perhaps something like the model of documentary film genres presented in Bruce Gronbeck's essay in this volume could be developed for public proceedings.

2. Certain aspects of the critical perspective developed in this paper suggest hypotheses that could be submitted to empirical testing, either in field studies or in experimental settings. One might, for instance, try to discover what sorts of people take the trouble to attend school-board or city council meetings, or to tune in the state legislature rather than *All in the Family*. The effect of various interactive styles and argumentative strategies on the attitude changes a public proceeding brings about in its audience could be measured. Whether such empirical research should or could lead to a predictive theory that could be used to control public attitudes toward

representative bodies and the policies they espouse is a question for others to answer. It could, however, help refine the critical tools available for analyzing and evaluating public proceedings.

3. With respect to the impeachment debate, any number of alternative critical perspectives might be brought to bear on the event. One could, for example, analyze politically the behind-the-scenes bargaining among members of the committee; perform a Toulmin-based analysis of the argumentative structure of the debate; examine audience response as evidenced in press accounts, correspondence with congressmen, public opinion polls, and the like; or do a fantasy-theme analysis of the discussions of Nixon's conduct in the debate.[39] The general point to be made here is that criticism is and ought to be pluralistic. There is no one correct perspective on the impeachment debate, or for that matter on any public proceeding or any other rhetorical event.

NOTES

[1]This paper owes much to Lloyd Bitzer's "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* I (January 1968), 1-14. However, insofar as Bitzer suggests that discourse arises directly from situation and need only be "fitting" in terms of prior situational constraints, I disagree with him. The public proceeding is defined as a rhetorical genre by a complex interaction between situation and the form of discourse. In the case of the impeachment debate, for example, no antecedent situational constraints demanded that the debate be conducted on national television; rather, the decision to televise the debate helped establish a rhetorical situation that was further articulated by the particular form of the debate as it was being conducted, as well as by many extrinsic factors.

[2]See Antonin Artaud, *The Theater and Its Double* (New York, 1958) and John Willett (ed.), *Brecht on Theater* (New York, 1964).

[3]*Rhetoric*, I, 3; see Lane Cooper (trans.), *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (New York, 1932), 16-17.

[4]Bitzer, 8

[5]The impeachment resolution recommended by the House Judiciary Committee contains the following preamble: "Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself *and of all the people of the United States of America*, against Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors." (emphasis added) *Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States: The Final Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives* (New York, 1975), 1.

[6]The notion of agreement I take from Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 65-114.

[7]The fictionality of social structures and the consequences of recogniz-

ing them as fictions is an important theme in modern literature. See, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre's *Nausea*, Samuel Beckett's *Watt*, Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*, and Robert Coover's *The Universal Baseball Association*.

[8]This distinction between how politics works behind closed doors and the face politicians present to the public is one of the central themes of Murray Edelmann's *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1964). The public proceeding might in fact be regarded as a subcategory of the form of political communication Edelman calls "hortatory language" (pp. 134-8.).

[9]This concept of *ethos* is developed at greater length in my "On the End of Rhetoric, Classical and Modern," *College English* XXXVI (February 1975), 621-31, and "Tradition and Theory in Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* LXII (Oct. 1976), 234-41. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives as the first definition of *ethos* "the characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment, of a people or community; the 'genius' of an institution or system;" as authority for this meaning the OED cites Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, II, 12-14.

[10]The Staff of the New York Times, *The End of a Presidency* (New York, 1974), 221.

[11]Jimmy Breslin, *How the Good Guys Finally Won* (New York; Viking 1975), 70.

[12]*The End of a Presidency*, 241; this resolution, H.R. 803, was in effect merely the ratification of a process that had begun months before at the direction of the House leadership.

[13]For example, Jerome Waldie urged continuation of the impeachment process in his "Separate Comments" appended to the Judiciary Committee's final report. *The Final Report of the Commitee on the Judiciary*, 410-13.

[14]Breslin, 44.

[15]In Demetrios Caraley *et al.*, "American Political Institutions after Watergate—a Discussion," *Political Science Quarterly* LXXXIX (Winter, 1974-75), 729.

[16]H.R. 803 directed the committee "to investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America." Barry Sussman, *The Great Cover-Up: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate* (New York; Signet, 1974), 289.

[17]This issue produced some of the most pointless and confusing interchanges of the entire proceeding. See, for example, the discussion of an amendment to article I in which Tom Railsback (R, Illinois) substituted the words "course of conduct or plan" for the word "policy." When asked to explicate the change, Railsback replied in part ". . . I am not sure that I can answer that there is that much difference between the word 'plan' and 'policy' except there seems to be a feeling on the part of the counsel that I

dealt with in drafting that 'policy' seems to give more of an impression of an affirmative, orchestrated, and declarative decision." *Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, Pursuant to H. Res. 803* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1974), 265.

[18] *Newsweek*, Aug. 5, 1974, 18; *Time*, Aug. 5, 1974, 10.

[19] *Time, 10;* note that this evaluation seems to draw an equivalence between the committee's decision to *recommend* impeachment and the Senate's decision on whether to *convict* Andrew Johnson in an impeachment trial.

[20] *Newsweek*, 19.

[21] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell makes a related point about the conventional courtesies of the debate: "Because congressional debate is relatively inaccessible, these conventions have special rhetorical impact for the public—after an era of confrontation, this is civilized disagreement. When times are good, congressional courtesy can be considered frivolous, simply manners, mere decor. But when times are bad, this decor becomes the vital matter of decorum. And decorum is sorely needed in a situation in which the President of the nation is being judged for deeply indecorous behavior." "The Judicial Context: The House Judiciary Committee Debates Over Articles of Impeachment," paper presented at the 1975 convention of Speech Communication Association.

[22] The discussion of these amendments runs from page 251 through page 325 of *Debate on Articles of Impeachment*.

[23] See, for example, the recitation by William Cohen (R, Maine), *Debate on Articles of Impeachment*, 272-3.

[24] *Debate on Articles of Impeachment*, 326-7.

[25] As I read their opening statements, the following members declared for impeachment: Donohue, Kastenmeier, Edwards, Hungate, Conyers, Eilberg, Waldie, Hogan, Butler, Danielson, Sieberling, Drinan, Rangel, Jordan, Thornton, Holtzman, Owens, Mezvinsky, and Rodino. Leaning were McClory, Brooks, Railsback, Fish, Flowers, Sarbanes, Cohen, and Froehlich. In addition to these 27 members, James Mann, whose opening statement expressed no commitment one way or the other (but who was known to favor impeachment), eventually voted for impeachment.

[26] The story of how pressure was applied to former Congressman Neil Gallagher of New Jersey, then in federal prison for tax evasion, to cooperate in a smear attempt is told in *How the Good Guys Finally Won*, 146 ff.

[27] *Debate on Articles of Impeachment*, 296-7.

[28] *Ibid.*, 299-300.

[29] R. W. Apple Jr., "Introduction" to *The Final Report of the Committee on the Judiciary*, xv.

[30] In concluding their "Statement of Evidence on Article I," the committee stated that "President Nixon's actions resulted in *manifest injury to the*

confidence of the nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and justice" (emphasis added). ***The Final Report of the Committee on the Judiciary***, 198.

[31]A story in the August 28, 1974 New York *Times* (11.4) reported that the Gallup Poll recorded an 18% increase in public confidence in Congress over the figures for April 1974, and that the increase was directly attributable to the televised impeachment debate.

[32]***Debate on Articles of Impeachment***, 111.

[33]***Ibid.***, 28

[34]***Ibid.***, 129.

[35]***Ibid.***, 107.

[36]***Ibid.***, 28-32 and ***passim***.

[37]***Ibid.***, 136.

[38]Kenneth Burke, ***A Rhetoric of Motives*** (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1969), 22.

[39]On the method of fantasy-theme analysis, see Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," ***Quarterly Journal of Speech*** 58 (December 1972), 396-407.

CELLULOID RHETORIC: ON GENRES OF DOCUMENTARY

BRUCE E. GRONBECK

Film and television documentaries are ubiquitous. Travelogues flood public broadcasting; instructional films using "stories" are often aired on commercial networks in the late afternoon and on Sundays; substantial audiences view hour-long television specials by National Geographic, Jacques Cousteau, David Wolper, and the networks; network news specials and other public information programming follow closely on the heels of major news events (e.g. in 1976, the Karen Quinlan controversy and the death of Franco) or treat issues pressing for moral decision (e.g. rape, hunting, alcoholism); and even feature-length films can be made in "documentary style," as were *The Battle of Algiers*, *Serpico*, and *Hearts and Minds*.

The concept sprang from the French word "*documentaire*," which signified travel films early in the century. It came into more general usage after John Grierson applied it to Robert Flaherty's *Moana*, an anthropological study of South Sea islanders of the 20's. Grierson referred, initially, to what he termed the "creative interpretations of actuality."[1] But his own work, first as filmmaker for the Empire Marketing Board (*Drifters* in 1929) and then as overseer for the British General Post Office (e.g. *Night Mail* in 1939), and the work of Pare Lorentz in this country (*The Plow That Broke the Plains* in 1936 and *The River* in 1937), multiplied the definitions of "documentary", as filmmakers began to explore the informational and persuasive potentials of nonfiction film.[2]

Throughout its fifty-year history the documentary has been viewed as a mere recorder-of-information, a presenter of counterpoised pro-and-con argument, or a medium leading implicitly or explicitly to social action.[3] The customary disjunctions in definitional disputes—"fiction" vs. "fact", "information" vs. "interpretation"—as well as concern over "material distortion" and "technological distortion" raise the wrong questions. I shall urge that: (1) *A documentary never can be neutral;* (2) *Rather, the*

documentary is an inherently rhetorical medium. More specifically, descriptive and evaluative materials of the type treated in documentaries affect beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors of people because they inevitably touch upon cultural rules and behavioral codes; the various technological "languages" of television and film documentary raise and then satisfy audiences' expectations via standardized formulae given power by processes of acculturation; and, psychologically, documentaries are grounded in affective mechanisms rooted in important processes of collectively sanctioned attitude change.

A cultural-rhetorical analysis of television and film documentary should (1) refocus the definitional wars by offering another perspective from which to classify generically such pervasive communicative artifacts; (2) demonstrate the utility of rhetorical analysis to examine communicative enterprises which feature nonverbal elements; and (3) help sensitize consumers of documentaries to the ways in which celluloid rhetoric works upon and through particular cultures, in the words of McLuhan, "massaging" the consumers' sensibilities and even altering thought patterns.

This position will be developed in three stages. First, the theoretical perspective will be described; then, documentaries will be categorized on the bases of treatments-of-reality and socio-psychological processes; finally, the yields of such a rhetorical-generic analysis will be explored.

The Rhetorical-Generic Model

This analysis requires three sets of terms—one set to develop the notions of rhetorical forms, one to allow discussion of the specific treatments of materials which comprise messages, and one to treat the psychological-mediational processes which account for rhetorical effects. One needs, in other words, an understanding of forms, contents, and audience capabilities.[4] The result will be a cubic model which will describe a series of genres and will allow us to map filmic discourses in such a way that fundamental socio-cultural questions can be asked.

Rhetorical forms. By "form" I mean to imply nothing more complicated than patterns of arrangement which are given rhetorical force by their habitual use and codifiability. With Burke, I take "form" to mean the arousal and satisfaction of expectations via controlled structuring of message bits.[5] For example, when attending a play, I notice that it begins with narration, then offers a "problem," and next develops a crisis; because by now I have seen many classic tragedies, I assume that the following section of the drama will offer a resolution to the problem. Or if, when reading a poem of fourteen lines in iambic pentameter, I discover an initial rhyme scheme *abab/cdcd* in the first eight lines, having been exposed to Shakespearean sonnets before I assume that the last six lines will take an *efef/gg* sequence, with *efef* unwinding the problem and with *gg* offering a pithy couplet for contemplation. Again, if a public speaker first tells about something which happened in 1920, then about events in 1936, and next re-

views some events in 1942, I am led to conclude that a chronological pattern is being used. I also assume that the speaker wishes to leave me with impressions of either cyclical or periodic growth and development of ideas or institutions, because within western culture those are the sorts of conclusions best suited to a chronological form.

The notion of rhetorical form is important for two reasons: (1) it forces us to search out systems of cues or structures for guiding meaningfulness, and (2) it is socially learned and hence represents conventionalized patterns-for-thought. That is, rhetorical forms not only arrange meanings through time and space, but also have powers to affect beliefs, attitudes, and values because they arise out of social reality. A "tragedy," a "sonnet," and a "chronologically ordered speech" are not natural objects; rather, they are quasi-linguistic cells for cerebration provided by cultures for their members. If I do not understand or use these forms, I am liable to be thought at least undereducated, at most, a social misfit. Such forms, therefore, are more than literary constructs, for they are grounded, not merely upon technical plot devices, rhyme schemes, and textbook pedagogy, but upon culturally imposed criteria for thinking. Both macro-units of form (i.e. arrangement patterns) and micro-units of form (e.g. transitions, fadeouts in film, retards in music) are taught to me, often in rule form, in order to standardize the reception of information and of evaluative reaction. They are preeminently rhetorical.[6]

Material propositions. One must now ask, what sorts of materials or ideas are fit into rhetorical forms? While there are innumerable approaches to this question, for our purposes three treatments-of-reality appear with sufficient frequency to warrant commentary. Some messages rely primarily on *descriptive cues.* These messages treat, seemingly, the world-as-it-is-sensed. The six o'clock news visually reproduces the events-of-the-day; a pamphlet describing the seven danger signs of cancer principally offers information about health; a community center demonstration on how to macrame belts and purses offers technical skills of possible interest. The words "primarily" and "principally" punctuate this discussion because, of course, giving information is not simple. Someone, after all, has decided what news we should see, which signs of cancer are most revelatory, and which patterns of macrame are most useful. Not only does distortion result because selection underpins any message, it also can occur purposively. Even the most obviously descriptive cues in messages have attitudinal and behavorial dimensions that cannot be ignored.

A second important way of treating reality hypothesizes that there are conflicting views of ideas and concepts. ***Argumentative treatments*** explicitly recognize that individuals react to the same event in terms of various experiences, with differing purposes, and even through the perceptual blinders of contrasting cultures or subcultures. Argumentative treatments of reality counterpoise one set of beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors against one or more other(s), in the hope that those exposed will make up their own minds, will choose the stronger/more accurate, or will

find some way of resolving the intellectual and emotional tensions inherent in confrontation. Again, of course, cautions are in order: CBS's "60 Minutes" may seem only to be recording Israeli and Arab disputes over the Suez Canal, but the producers of the show—protestations to the contrary—may well have a certain stake in "helping" us resolve the tensions in a certain direction; the lawyer who, with all dispassion, offers a recitation of legal precedents for his or her client undoubtedly is not concerned solely with abstract justice, but also with gaining a victory. While argumentative treatments, therefore, both recognize the value-laden processes of information-giving and seek to objectify public discoursing, nevertheless public argumentation is liable to material and personal distortion.

Perhaps, then, all treatments-of-reality are subjective, and ultimately persuasive in communicative mode and intent. A third sort of message—the *didactic treatment*—explicitly recognizes this human condition, and surrenders to it. By "didactic" I do not refer merely to raw sermonizing, although such messages certainly fit into his category. Didacticism can result from the purest of motives (although when it does, we call it "education"). Nevertheless, I want to use the term with relative neutrality to refer to any message which seeks to reinforce existing systems of beliefs, attitudes, or values or to construct a partially or wholly new system of beliefs, attitudes, or values via a process of selecting informational cues, attitudinal probes, and value-orientations which tend to support a particular ideology. I would include among didactic discourses, then, not only Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* (1936) and other political commercials, but also (potentially) a lecture on behaviorism, Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, and, of course, this essay. From another point of view, if argumentative treatments of reality are marked by a kind of horizontal dialectic between competing positions, didactic treatments are characterized by a vertical integration of facts, beliefs, attitudes, values, and ideological perspectives on the world. The one-sidedness of didacticism, in other words, is more complex than mere distortion; it is admittedly subjective but also philosophically defensible and consequently represents the ultimate challenge to the dispassionate positivism of the twentieth century.

Psychological processes. Before commenting upon rhetorical forms and contents further, two concepts arising from socio-psychological speculation need to be introduced. The first of these is *differentiation.* Briefly, differentiation is a psychological-mediational process which occurs with the aid of descriptive cues, when bits of reality (sense data, statements of belief, concrete concepts) are used internally to alter attitudes. That is, at some junctures in the process of concept formation, beliefs drive attitudes; as concepts are developed, filled out, or changed radically by the introduction of new information, attitudes change. So, a travelogue on Yugoslavia, by presenting pictures of happy sheepherders, sun-lit knolls, small villages engaged in folk festivals, and cheering city crowds amidst skyscrapers and

bustling business districts, can provide us with statements of belief which tend to make us view the country more positively.[7]

Now, imagine a different film on Yugoslavia. Instead of the travelogue, this film depicts the country's heroic self-defense during World War II. We see film clips of the Slavs aiding escaping Jewish refugees, of guerrilla bands combatting Mussolini's regiments; we watch Tito arising from among the people, molding an independent economic, social, and political structure; we view the country caught between Fascism and Nazism, using Russian protection to facilitate development. "Fierce independence," "plucky courage," "growing democratization" and other value-concepts from the American ideology are overlaid. A resonant narrator, folk tunes swelling into the national anthem, an heroic script with overwrought metaphors and inflated description, and well-shot footage of both industrial production and happy proletarians pervade the film. In this experience, *transference* is likely to occur. That is, by framing Yugoslavia in god and devil terms resonant to American culture and by musically, acoustically, and visually creating a poetic identification between those terms and Yugoslavia, the film will solicit positive beliefs and attitudes toward Yugoslavia. Transference occurs when our attitudes drive our beliefs, when our attitudes are directly assaulted in order to change our perceptions of objects; in a sense, then, transference is a psychological-mediational process which mirrors differentiation but works in the opposite direction.[8]

The rhetorical-generic model. It is now possible to classify and comment on nonfiction films themselves. First, however, a few words about the model itself. Traditionally, documentaries are classified either by nationality or by purpose. That is, some discuss American, British, Russian, French, etc., documentaries, on the assumption that the production facilities, methods for training filmmakers, cinematic tastes, ways of financing films, and even governmental demands for certain sorts of films dictate characteristics.[9] Others approach documentaries by purposes—news documentaries, instructional films, historical pieces, and the like; such scholarship assumes that filmic invention takes place within a teleology determined by human drives and media-of-communication.[10]

The model suggested here, while neither eschewing the need for historical surveys of national cinemas nor depreciating the value of understanding the effects of media, film markets, and techniques of filmmaking as influenced by an *auteur*, nevertheless does aim at a different and a broader framework. One refrain pervades the preceding discussion of form, content, and mental process: that *all elements of documentaries are susceptible to a cultural analysis.* Form has been viewed as a product of cultural expectations; content, as the philosophies governing display of information in a collectivity; and psychological process, as patterns of perception and valuation rooted in the socialization processes of the American consciousness. "Culture," seen here as a body of bio-basic, socially acquired rules for handling information, ideas, and general con-

cepts, is the overarching term, which accounts for whatever congregations of documentaries one can isolate. This "rhetorical analysis of genres" is predicated upon the existence of culture-specific rules operating to control cuing systems and interpretive processes.

The resulting model—a three dimensional cube—is shown in Figure 1.

In this paper I shall deal only with one face of the cube—the interaction of "content" and "psychological process" (learning models). To make all of this manageable, I shall presume to analyze only the three kinds of content and the two sorts of mental habit already identified, generating a three-by-two matrix for inspection (see Figure 2.)

The Classification of Documentaries

The diagram which follows shows the face of the cube with the three treatments-of-reality (descriptive, argumentative, and didactic) along the top and the two sorts of psychological process (differentiation, depending primarily upon belief statements, and transference, depending primarily upon attitudinal probes) down the side. For the sake of identification, I have chosen labels for the resulting cells from other disciplines. First I shall move across the top layer of the matrix, then, the bottom.

Fig. 1.—A Rhetorical-Generic Model



(G_1 = genre #1, G_2 = genre #2, G_3 = genre #3, etc.)

Fig. 2.—The Matrix

TRANSFERENCE
Primarily attitudinal probes

DIFFERENTIATION
Primarily belief statements

OSTENSIBLY DESCRIPTIVE	OSTENSIBLY ARGUMENTATIVE	PATENTLY DIDACTIC
Report: Content —"slice-of-life" as in cinéma vérité film —the camera apparently merely records. Treatment —"natural" sounds, everyday incidents, but shot and edited to lead audience's perceptions. Examples *High School, A Time for Burning, The Titicut Follies, From 10 A.M. to 3 P.M., Hiroshima-Nagasaki* (perhaps).	*Dialectic:* Content —"pieces-of-life" (incidents, actions, interviews) matched against each other as in news documentary —usually narrative story or problem/solution format. Treatment —juxtaposition of opposing forces, ideas, people, with or without biased script. —can be edited/selected to make one side "win." Examples *Protest* series (INTEXT), *60 Minutes* programs, *Selling of the Pentagon.*	*Moral Philosophy:* Content —recognizable one-sided narrative/testimony. —either telling a story or making a direct appeal. Treatment —documentary style ("life," interviews, scenes, etc.) —dwelling on seamy side of opponents, virtues of self. Examples *When Wallace Got the Vote, Operation Abolition, Hearts and Minds.*
Romance: Content —narration or explanation (problem/solution). Treatment —"bigger-than-life" via lush pictures, music, poetic/heroic narrative. Examples *The River, The Plow That Broke the Plains, Night Mail, Man of Aran, Making of the President series* (perhaps)	*Melodrama:* Content —narration or explanation, but usually narration. Treatment —"bigger-than-life" via lush pictures, music, "story." —populated with easy-to-recognize heroes and villains, the brave. Examples *Let My People Go, Men of the Lightship, What Trees Do They Plant?* (perhaps)	*Morality Play:* Content —narration or explanation with easily identified moral or lesson. Treatment —varies, although may use vignettes, cartoons, fables, indirection. Examples *V.D. Blues, A Short Vision, All My Babies, Salesman.*

Belief-oriented Documentaries

The report. With the advent of high speed film, transistors, and light portable sound and camera equipment came the possiblity of capturing spontaneous, unplanned incidents and activities on film or videotape and what has been called Realist Cinema, Direct Cinema, or Cinéma Vérité emerged. Cinéma Vérité—relying, not upon completely controlled aspects of icon and sound, but upon acute observation often in places traditionally inaccessible to cameras—in many ways represents the most popular form of this first genre of documentary: the report.[11]

In the report, the camera presumably merely records action taking place in front of it. "Natural" sounds, everyday incidents, often "dirty" images and unfocused shots, long takes with relatively few edits, minimal zooming, occasional swish pans to capture reaction shots (because one-camera setups are not uncommon)—such cinematic techniques create the feeling that the viewer is watching unrehearsed events. Viewers feel they have attained Zola's goal and are seeing a "slice of life." The report, then, is the least cinematic form of documentary in many ways, and creates a sense of honesty and directness, apparently controlled as it is by the subjects and not the filmmakers.

But even cinéma vérité, one must remember, *is* cinema; it is not a shapeless mass of film footage. As the director-producer of *A Time for Burning*, William Jersey, points out: "Obviously, the film is not completed when it is photographed. It must be edited. And here is where even the so-called Cinéma Vérité filmmakers cop-out. The juxtaposition of images and sounds and the addition of narration provide an opportunity for the big lie, frequently a convincing lie, because the camera technique gives the illusion of reality."[12] Even "mere description" in an editing process is selected, shaped, and ordered.

High School, a 1968 documentary about a Philadelphia middle-class school done by Frederick Wiseman, is illustrative. I select it because of its obvious debt to the theory of cinéma vérité (hand-held cameras, natural lighting, some scenes almost five minutes long) and because its lack of music, narration, and other obvious devices of continuity gives it an ambiguity allowing maximum viewer involvement in the interpretive process.[13] *High School*, in other words, could be taken as a neutral depiction of an American institution. When one examines the segments quantitatively, however, its loading becomes clear. As Wiseman edited twenty-two days of in-school shooting into a 74.5-minute product, he made a series of choices, some of which are noted in Table 1.

High School opens with a car driving through backstreets in Philadelphia, with shots of rundown buildings and factories moving to the fenced-in school, and with the film's only effects music, Otis Redding's rendition of "Dock of the Bay," playing in the background. We then are exposed to a series of events in classrooms, the offices of the vice principal and a counselor, gym classes, school halls, and assembly meetings. A tension between individualized, creative instruction and counseling and highly

ordered, authoritarian, mass-produced instruction and counseling emerges. As Table 1 indicates, almost twice as much time is devoted to heavy-handed counseling (especially at the hands of a martial, regimented vice principal in a crewcut) as is given to discussions with alert students seen as capable of directing their own lives. Teachers stressing social and moral conformity appear almost twice as often as those seeking personalized interpretations of contemporary society. Only in the category of student discussions, where students are seen worrying about North East High School as "morally and socially a garbage can" does one find more critique than conformity in the school. Occasionally, to be sure, for Wiseman the "good guys" win: twice as much time is spent with a literature teacher using Simon and Garfunkle's "The Dangling Conversation" to facilitate poetic analysis as with one droning out "Casey At The Bat"; and the instructor teaching sociology via discussion of Martin Luther King, Jr. (assassinated shortly before the film was made) and contemporary racial groupings is given thirty seconds more than the one using a purely recitative pattern for presenting facts about John L. Lewis. Yet,

TABLE 1

TIME DEVOTED TO VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IN WISEMAN'S *HIGH SCHOOL*

Regimented Approaches*	Neutral*	Personalized Approaches*
	Counseling Sessions	
1195 seconds (8 segments)	285 seconds (1 segment)	630 seconds (4 segments)
	Classroom Sessions	
785 seconds (8 segments)	365 seconds (5 segments)	655 seconds (5 segments)
	Student Discussion Sessions	
135 seconds (2 segments)	—	300 seconds (2 segments)
	Continuity Scenes	
	120 seconds (5 segments)	

*A segment was judged to show a "regimented approach" if teachers or counselors recommended actions based on society's standards, on majority rule principles, or offered standardized answers to interpretive questions. It was judged to show a "personalized approach" if teachers or counselors called for individualized judgments and interpretations, personal opinion, or information about the student's own life and situation before giving advice. In "neutral" sessions, there were either no interpretations or no preponderance of regimental and/or personalized advice.

overall, the most convincing interpretation of *High School* is that the institution attempts to turn out automated conformers, conceived to be numbers. Wiseman himself opts for this interpretation, when he comments on the last scene, which depicts a faculty meeting in which a letter from a graduate about to be dropped into the DMZ in Vietnam is read: "There it (the letter) was, and it expressed the whole essence of the school. The boy has adopted the 'correct' attitudes to society, and what does it matter if he had lost his own uniqueness along the way. It was also the perfect counterpoint to the beginning (the trip down the streets of Philadelphia). You begin the film showing a factory process, and you end with a view of the perfect product."[14]

High School, then, exemplifies "a report." Cinéma vérité techniques—the most reportive of filmic conventions or forms—are used to record everyday incidents; the filmmaker's selection and editing, however, introduce informational cues most easily resolved in particular ways, in this case, as harsh commentary on a social institution. The most negative figures in this film—the crewcut vice principal, a short balding hall monitor, an overweight female physical education teacher pushing physical beauty as a girl's way into the world—continually reinforce both authority and social measures of success; the most positive figures—an educational counselor, a man working with distraught parents, the young student-oriented teacher of poetry—push for individual interpretations and lifestyles. The authoritarian figures, however, control the scene; the report inherent in *High School* is not optimistic. Our knowledge of this film's language guarantees that.

Dialectic. In selecting the term "dialectic" for this genre, essentially I am referring to films and television programs which seek to explore problems and/or solutions to those problems by airing the competing voices discussing them. Many of the televised programs which fit here resemble position papers. Most focus on contemporary problems. Indeed, the genre of dialectic is more a televised than a filmic medium of communication, suitable as it is for exploring in a matter-of-fact fashion contemporary problems, and susceptible as it is to praise for its objectivity. This sort of product was stimulated by the popularity of Edward R. Morrow's "See It Now" series, sustained by "The Twentieth Century" and "CBS Reports" series, and continues with "60 Minutes". The genre, however, is not limited to television. ***Medium Cool*** (1969) is a commercial film in this class, and Leacock and Pennebaker's ***Primary*** (1960) is a classic version of a dialectic at work on political material.

To illustrate this genre, I turn to a short "educational" film treating George Wallace at the "schoolhouse door" in 1963—***Protest: All of the People Against Some of the People*** (1970)—because it pretends to be balanced and objective.[15] Table 2, however, reveals the film's actual intent. Of the fourteen-and-a-half minutes in the film, George Wallace talks two minutes, John F. Kennedy, four minutes, five seconds. Furthermore, supporting Kennedy's side are Martin Luther King, Jr. (almost a minute),

citizens of Alabama (thirty-five seconds), and a segment soliciting a backlash, a racist speech praising Wallace by Ku Klux Klan dragon Robert Sheldon (fifty-five seconds). In other words, Wallace has less than one-third the time given Kennedy's side, in a film almost half of which is composed of quoted material. Furthermore, the federal government's side is bolstered by comments in the narration: (1) The central question is posed in language favoring the government's interpretation ("Who speaks for the citizens of Alabama, the governor or the president?"); (2) the narration indicates that the dispute is over rights "guaranteed to all Americans"; (3) we are told that the two students attempting to register at the University of Alabama were greeted with "applause and no jeers," so that "all of the people had prevented some of the people" from taking away citizens' "rights"; (4) the film's closing credits flow over a picture of Kennedy haloed by the American flag. And finally, one should note that quotations from Wallace come, in part, not from the summer 1963 incident, but from his 1962 campaign speeches, and that Kennedy's final "speech" is composed of segments both from his report to the nation on the incident (forty-five seconds) and also from his commentary on earlier summer disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia (sixty-five seconds). Since the narration does not point out either fact, the viewer is lead to assume that Wallace uttered potentially racist statements during the incident and that Kennedy warned the country of "tension," "violence," "moral crisis," and "repressive police action" in response to Wallace's stance.

In other words, the presumably objective, dialectical look at states' vs. federal rights has been turned into an uneven competition between a racist governor and a messianic president, via imbalanced quotation, skewed narration, and distorting selection of material. In the process of opposing peoples, ideas, and governmental processes, one side has been allowed to "win." Selected informational cues are used to urge a conclusion never specifically stated.

TABLE 2

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TIME IN *PROTEST*

Pro-Federal Government Speeches		Pro-States' Rights Speeches	
J. F. Kennedy:	245 secs.	G. Wallace:	120 secs.
M. L. King, Jr.:	50 secs.		
Citizens:	35 secs.		
KKK speech:*	55 secs.		
	385 secs.		120 secs.
(Total time of film = 865 secs.)			

*Because this speech by KKK dragon Robert Sheldon is clearly racist, I assume it acts negatively to support the federal rather than the state government.

Obviously, more balanced dialectical treatments are possible, but, as noted in the previous section, perhaps it is impossible to guarantee that one side will not triumph. News documentaries and educational films of this sort probably more often than not coerce subjective conclusions; again, the mere recording and editing processes—not to mention the need for narration—probably guarantee that dialectical products are inherently rhetorical.

Moral philosophy. In its relatively subtle forms, a piece of filmic moral philosophy takes but a few intellectual steps beyond dialectic, as did, say, *Operation Abolition* (1960). In that film which examined the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings in San Francisco, one catches glimpses of the competing ideas. But they are so distorted by quotations taken out of context, non-chronological editing, and narrative inaccuracies that the result is almost unadulterated propaganda—in this case, supporting anti-Communist witch-hunting. In less subtle forms, filmic moral lecturing dispenses with the illusion of fair play altogether. The feature film *Hearts and Minds* (1975), for example, quotes pro-war figures only to satirize their positions in subsequent scenes. In this genre, then, one is dealing with recognizably one-sided narratives or testimonials either telling a story or appealing directly for belief on the basis of a predetermined ethic.

A prime example is a short film prepared by the AFL-CIO's educational organ, the Committee on Political Education (COPE), in 1972. The message of *When Wallace Got the Vote* is unmistakable: By voting heavily for Wallace in 1968, U.S. laborers helped elect Richard Nixon. The message is reinforced by a series of speech clips from Nixon and Wallace, by "interviews" with "laborers," and by statistical visuals demonstrating Alabama's anti-labor record under Wallace. Wallace (and Nixon) in the "interviews" are blamed for unemployment, high prices, the continuance of right to work legislation, and lies told to American labor. Hardhats, office workers, skilled technicians, and organizers all confess to being duped by Wallace, and all promise repentance. A single refrain—"I voted for Wallace, and what I got was Richard Nixon, and unemployment, higher taxes . . . [etc.]"—pounds at the viewer. The film is short, hard-hitting—overtly didactic. It calls upon organized labor's gods and devils with efficiency and with attractive cinema. Moral philosophy is dispensed with dispatch.

Attitude-oriented Documentaries

Romance. I now turn my attention to the bottom row of the matrix, those nonfiction films seemingly aimed at a kind of psychological transference which attacks attitudes directly. The first is the poetic counterpart of the report—the "romance."

With the romantic documentary, one enters the world of "larger-than-life" heroes and environments, of lushly artistic cinematic photography, of

musical mood-setting, of poetic (even heroic) narration. This is a world of dramatic art; but it is also a world of rhetorical artifice because it is populated with "real" people, actual situations, and current ideologies.[16] Interestingly, most of the examples of romance listed in Figure 2 come from the 1930's, from the era of Flaherty, Grierson, Riefensthal, and Lorentz;[17] these were documentarists of the traditions of the fictive film, and it probably seemed appropriate to these film makers to draw an aesthetic from earlier filmic practice. One must note, however, that romance certainly has continued beyond that early period of governmental films, especially in the hands of David Wolper, whose *The Making of the President* series and specials for National Geographic overflow with sentiment and heroic crescendoes.

There are no better exemplars of this genre than the works of Pare Lorentz, particularly *The River* (1937). Combining dramatic photography (e.g. the sequence showing ice melting on a mountain, flowing in rivulets into streams, and from thence into rivers and finally the Mississippi), the ballads from Stephen Foster and symphonies from Virgil Thomson, and the "luck" of the 1937 Mississippi flood (which happened unexpectedly in the middle of shooting), *The River* opens with Thomas Chalmer's staccato narration, reminiscent of the style of Walt Whitman:

> From as far West as Idaho,
> Down from the glacier peaks of the Rockies—
> From as far East as New York,
> Down from the turkey ridges of the Alleghenies
> Down from Minnesota, twenty five hundred miles,
> The Mississippi runs to the Gulf
> Carrying every drop of water, that flows down two-thirds of the continent.
> Carrying every brook and rill, rivulet and creek,
> Carrying all the rivers that run down two-thirds of the continent
> The Mississipi runs to the Gulf of Mexico.
> Down the Yellowstone, the Milk, the White and Cheyenne;
> The Cannonball, the Musselshell, the James and the Sioux;
> Down the Judith, the Grand, the Osage, and the Platte, . . .
> [another twenty-two rivers are mentioned in this way]
> Down the Missouri three thousand miles from the Rockies;
> Down the Ohio a thousand miles from the Alleghenies;
> Down the Arkansas fifteen hundred miles from the Great Divide;
> Down the Red, a thousand miles from Texas;
> Down the great Valley, twenty-five hundred miles from Minnesota,
> Carrying every rivulet and brook, creek and rill,
> Carrying all the rivers that run down two-thirds the continent—
> The Mississippi runs to the Gulf.

The same pulsing repetition of place names recurs, when ports-of-call

along the Mississippi are listed, and species within a genus are called in roll ("we built a hundred cities and a thousand towns," or "Black spruce and Norway pine; Douglas fir and red cedar; scarlet oak and shagbark hickory") again as dikes are visualized, clear-cutting discussed and terrifying flooding foretold. The problems of soil depletion, over-zealous forestry, greedy harvesting, floods, and uncontrolled tributary systems are reinforced visually, audially (the sharp whistle blasts which warn of floodtides), musically (Stephen Foster dirges over depleted cotton crops), and by vocal tone (the huskiness of Chalmers' voice at the opening of a TVA dam). The film clearly loses some of its punch in the last third (the "solution" section), yet overall, one reacts to it as did Gilbert Seldes in his 1938 *Scribner's* review:

> If this is propaganda, make the most of it, because it is masterly. It is as if the pictures which Mr. Lorentz took arranged themselves in such an order that they supplied their own argument, not as if an argument conceived in advance dictated the order of the pictures.[18]

This sense of organic or "natural" order is the core of the appeal of the romance, whether the form is problem-solution or chronological, in much the same way as cinéma vérité techniques often guide the more "factual" report. *The River* is romance—with an instructional twist.

Melodrama. The melodrama can be viewed as an expanded romance. It, too, relies upon narration or explanation (usually narration), music, spectacle, overwrought language, and a sense of expansiveness or magnification. But in contrast to the romance, its energizing principles are embodied in characters drawn in broad strokes. The melodrama is populated with easily recognized heroes and villains, philosophies to be embraced and ideologies to be disdained. Given the iconicity of film and television, the ease with which peoples and situations can be juxtaposed, and the artistry with which music and voice can be overlaid, it is not surprising that melodramas work so well on celluloid and mylar.

The war documentaries of many countries fit into this genre, with Britain's *Men of the Lightship* (1940), the depiction of Nazi bombing of a lightship patrol boat, and America's *Fellow Americans* (1942), pivoting on relationships between Pearl Harbor and the folks at home,[19] exemplar melodramas. One of my favorites, however, is a post-World War II film completed by David Wolper, with Richard Basehart's mellifluous tones carrying the narrative. *Let My People Go* (released by Xerox in this country in 1965) relies upon newsreel footage and re-creations photographed on aged black-and-white stock to trace the history of Zionism in this century. Among the great heroes, of course, Herzl and Ben Gurion take on mythic stature, while the enemies include the Arabs (always seen in desert dress and often on camels), the British (depicted as vacillating, at best, militarily too efficient at worst), and the land (a hostile desert to be turned into a garden). The enemy of greater proportions, however, is the faceless, uniformed Nazi. Rare shots from the Warsaw

ghetto (with Hebrew dirges and wailing cantors dominating the soundtrack), trainloads of Jews shunted to concentration camps, and the reactions of ordinary Germans to the burial of Jews once the camps have been liberated make the film grisly. These nameless villains are contrasted with the common European Jew, conquering the Alps, squeezed into leaky boats, packed away in refugee camps while the world (the U.N.) decides the Jews' fate. The hill of cedars, a memorial to six million fallen, follows the triumphant U.N. vote establishing the nation of Israel, as the film soars off with a swelling orchestra and Basehart's promise of Palestinian eternity. Heroes and villains, then, are personified in great leaders but, more importantly, are seen as common folk living easily recognizable principles—hate, intolerance, efficient ease, and nameless inhumanity on the one side, and love, drive, vision, struggle, and supreme humanity on the other. The claims of the Arabs, the role of the promises of the British government to both sides, and the broken promises of some Jewish leaders are never approached, in the melodrama's drive to people its universe with gods and devils. Transference occurs easily, as that which we recognize as good and evil are embodied in the film's characters.

Morality play. In one sense, this genre is misnamed, for the label conjures up images of ponderous sermonizing in veiled dramatic forms. To be sure, one could be discussing a contemporary version of "The Second Shepherd's Play"—e.g. *The Battle of Algiers* (1968), a feature done in documentary style and one admitting no ambivalence—but one also can consider here instructional films and tapes which rely upon dramatic conventions to carry messages, and even some products in the cinéma vérité mode. In some of these nonfiction films (e.g. *V.D. Blues*, 1972), the dramatic conventions merely are convenient vehicles, adding human interest and entertainment: Dick Cavett's monologues, the singing (e.g. "Don't Give a Ghost to the One You Love Most"), and the vignettes in dialogue (a woman discussing syphillis with a doctor who was her carrier, or the discussion between a syphillis and a gonorrhea virus) function primarily as sugar-coating. In other specimens of this genre (e.g. *All My Babies*, 1952), the dramatic action houses characters capable of being models. Thus, Mary becomes the ideal midwife, and the two poor mothers (one, neglecting her pregnancy, the other carrying through properly) embody negative and positive models for future midwives and mothers. It is especially in the latter sort of drama, the kind with integrated action, that one finds "documentary" and "morality" conjugally related.

Perhaps one of the most controversial celluloid morality plays of recent years is Albert and David Maysles' *Salesman* (1969), a documentary in the cinéma vérité tradition which ruthlessly exposes Catholic Bible salesmen. In the film, one follows four salesmen—focusing on one, Paul—through their calls at churches to obtain lists of prospective customers, at customers' homes, at a sales meeting (where "the world's greatest salesman of the world's best seller" inspires them), in motel rooms calling wives and girl friends, playing poker, etc. The customer-as-hapless victim,

the salesmen-as-cunning-manipulator, and the church-as-accomplice are the images which emerge. This occurs in real-life; the dialogues actually took place, the characters are real salesmen. The Maysles brothers were criticized for selecting *only* immoral salesmen, *only* disgusting sales managers, *only* unthinking customers, and *only* the most crass of presentations—for being, in a word, propagandistic.[20] While perhaps true, such criticism has little point, if one remembers the rules governing morality plays. Devils are necessary as foils for superior moral codes, codes which need "don'ts" to contrast with "do's." *Salesman*, then, offers a form (cinéma vérité or direct cinema, as the Maysles brothers prefer to call it) different from those which clothe *V.D. Blues* and *All My Babies*, yet the film belongs to the same genre. While the specific formal conventions called upon vary from one to the other, all three burrow into viewers' minds via predetermined beliefs, attitudes, and values; all three are didactic.

Metacritical Implications

This admittedly exploratory examination of nonfiction film genres from a rhetorical-cultural perspective has been short, and unfortunately, has relied upon brief descriptions of a few examples. Its purpose, however, has not been one of finding definitive categories for every film and television program anyone might wish to call a "documentary". Nor have I sought iron-clad cages in which to incarcerate celluloid rhetoric, for distinctions between cinematic dialectic and moral philosophy or between cinematic melodrama and morality play are not easily drawn. Rather, my primary purpose has been to discover a method potentially capable of penetrating this culture's tastes in documentary, of understanding how different filmic products function to affect the beliefs, attitudes, and values of Americans. If the analysis has been true to its assumptions, then certain implications of this approach to filmic analysis deserve pursuit in subsequent studies of documentaries.

1. *The other facets of the cube provide for more cinematic, less distinctively rhetorical, looks at documentary.* I have not systematically charted the formal conventions appropriate to the filmic televised documentary; that is, the third dimension of the cube (form) has not been treated systematically. Semiotic studies of film, currently enjoying considerable popularity, should soon rectify this problem. As we develop a vocabulary for talking—again, *systematically*—about meanings inherent to conventions (e.g. long shots/close ups, fades/jump cuts, depth-of-field, direct cinema/staged scenes), we shall be able to categorize types of reports, types of dialectic, types of moral philosophies, types of romances, etc., in more formal cinematic terms. When this is done, the notion of genres of documentary will have even greater relevance to students of film.

2. Despite such an important limitation, however, *this study, in determining genres via an examination of interactions between kinds of content and psychological learning models, avoids problems encountered by many*

literary critics of genre. Critics in the past have sought to define genres by unitary principles. Some have taken up Aristotle's challenge, attempting to work with notions of rhythm, metre, number of voices—i.e., physical characteristics (radicals of presentation). Others find the idea of "voice" paramount, worrying about the presence or absence of narrator, questions of stream of consciousness, direct address, and the like. Still others probe the relationship between author and auditor, as do those singling out the "epistolary novel" for inspection. Another important group accepts the structuralist's argument for ways of working through those cultural myths compelling assent, and hence follows Claude Lévi-Strauss and Northrop Frye into schemata for mythic analysis.[21] All of these critics face a common problem: They are attempting to employ a single dimension (one, often, which represents clusters of techniques, yet one which is, nevertheless, unitary) to define genres.

This study, however, has argued for a view which stresses definition based on points of interaction. Only by seeking to discover genres in both form and content (in the tradition of the structuralists), both content and mental operation (as I have here), both form and mental operation (as the semiologist would), or better, in terms of complex interactions among all three variables, will we as critics bridge the all-important gaps between literary and sociocultural explanations for genres. In other words, *rhetorical genres* must be defined by both message characteristics *and* sociocultural rules. Only then will critics be able both to analyze artifacts and account for their presence, successes, and failures.

3. The outer limits of the concepts of the documentary have not been explored. This essay has assiduously avoided earlier problems of definition. It has, however, broached some questions concerning the outer limits of the concept. It would be possible, for example, to argue that as one moves to the left in the upper lefthand corner of the matrix, that is, as one moves beyond "report" to "mere reproduction" (e.g., as Andy Warhol does, in *Empire),* one comes close to leaving the realm of *documentaire.* With mere filmic reproduction, one has sacrificed the interests of the creative artist for those of the viewer—the documentarist has virtually surrendered the interpretive processes to the receiver, who is given almost complete freedom to "read" by himself. Any movement to the left of the lower lefthand corner—beyond "romance"—seems to take us into purely aesthetic frolicking and celebration, as, for example, in the popular *After the Rain,* in which one sees a thundershower pass over a landscape, leaving a series of wet, brilliant images. Again, the interpretive process, while in part determined by the filmmaker, nevertheless depends almost exclusively upon the appreciative capabilities of the viewer; the conventions governing the learning of socially important information have been replaced with those guiding aesthetic enjoyment.

The same sorts of comments apply to the right edge of the matrix. Any movement beyond the genre of "moral philosophy" takes one out of filmic conventions, perhaps, and into hardcore lecturing (which only happens to

be recorded on film or mylar). And, were one to push "morality plays" farther, one would move into pure instruction (e.g. safety films), sheer drama (where political-social questions provide subject matter rather than points of reference), or patent paternalism (e.g., "religious" plays for children). In other words, I have begun to define "documentary" in terms of social rules for interpretation, codes for meaning, and subject matter of cultural importance, but the definition has not hardened. And, probably, it should not, for if documentaries are defined too carefully, one is in danger of setting only formal, pre-established artistic norms, useful for calling fouls, yet potentially debilitating if used for purposes of academic purism. Rigid definition of "documentary" may prevent us from understanding the full range of vehicles capable of producing attitudinal change.

4. *This determination of genres likewise has avoided the tendency to impose externalized frames from other studies.* Rhetorical critics, for example, often are tempted to steal their genres from academic disciplines (political rhetoric, social rhetoric, religious rhetoric, etc.), from the settings in which discourse occurs (the rhetoric of the used car lot, inaugural addresses, the keynote speech, etc.), or from a list of topics (the rhetoric of war, the rhetoric of reform, the rhetoric of women's liberation, etc.). There is nothing wrong with employing any of these schema, because they do provide insights into perspectives, communicative arenas, intentions, and recurring approaches to social issues. Indeed, here I have borrowed labels for cells from other places. But all such approaches, one must remember, have two important limitations: (1) *They tend to obscure important ways in which media affect messages.* Thus, a political speech, a political play, and a political film all have at least philosophical and thematic implications in common, but they also exhibit important differences in construction, in delivery, and in acceptance. Again, I can "apologize" in many ways— via letter, via an apologetic essay, in a televised speech, through messages on restroom walls, or by dropping leaflets—but the medium I use says almost as much about *me* and the justification as does the message. McLuhanism's forceful analysis on this point cannot be overlooked. (2) *Furthermore, seldom do most generic critics account for the responses of audiences.* It is one thing to specify reaction, quite another to explain it. Genres are nothing more than pigeonholes capable of sorting artifacts if they do not include explorations of the cultural rules which give such configurations social force. Unless one speculates about *why* a televised apologia works, *how* it engages an audience's expectations, and *through which* learning mechanisms it worms its way into our collective psyches, one will have engaged only in an academic exercise. A rhetorical, sociocultural approach to generic classifications, especially one which ferrets out categories which are part of the language of a medium, allows for genres which have been nurtured within a culture's ideological structure.

5. *Somewhat similar treatments of genres in other visual arts demonstrate the generalizability of this approach.* John W. Cawelti's *The Six-Gun Mystique* (1970), for example, takes a "content" (Western films),

a concept of "form" (mythological formulae), and a culture's self-conception (the great American dreams of nineteenth and early twentieth century literature) to define genres, and to account for popular expectations.[22] Horace Newcomb's *TV, The Most Popular Art* (1974) borrows from Cawelti and more general works on the popular arts to approach television's daytime and prime-time programming, in a series of chapters on situation and domestic comedies, westerns, mysteries, doctors and lawyers, adventure shows, soap operas, television documentaries, and news shows. As he notes in his conclusion:

> Television is a crucially important object of study not only because it is a new 'form,' a different 'medium,' but because it brings its massive audience into a direct relationship with particular sets of values and attitudes. . . . We have been able to see how those formulas affect what has been traditionally thought of as non-dramatic entertainment or as factual information.[23]

Cawelti stresses formulae more firmly than I have, and Newcomb's strength is in his evaluative cultural analysis, yet both fall into the critical school I have attempted to outline—a school which urges complex, almost simultaneous commentary upon form, content, and culture.

6. *Ultimately, by grounding generic analysis in both the form-content tension and in cultural rules for interpretation, i.e. by grounding generic analysis in a rhetorical-cultural perspective, one may be able to produce comparative studies of theoretical and practical importance.* Exploring much more specifically than I have, e.g., the species of documentary particularly popular in the 1930's vis-à-vis those particularly popular in the 1960's reveals much about major cultural shifts over that thirty-year period. The fact that most "romances" mentioned arose in the 30's while most "reports" and "dialectics" discussed emerged in the 60's says something about tastes in documentarists and the role of government in the process, to be sure; but perhaps it also indicates what happened to the American culture through the war years and the electronic revolution/information explosion. Not only aesthetics but, more importantly, cultural attitudes toward "problems," "solutions," and "information" shifted markedly. A comparative study of documentaries then and now is possible with this approach, because a rhetorical-cultural perspective stresses cultural, rather than *auteur*/technological/cinematic, explanations.

On a larger scale, much work remains to be done cross-culturally. Certain truisms in the scholarship surrounding documentaries—that England led America into the field in the 30's, that the French led most countries in the cinéma vérité tradition, that Eisenstein in Russia was among the first to demonstrate the power of historical re-creation[24]—suggest that the field is vitally concerned with comparative scholarship. But, such comparisons would have more power if set against the background of the French, British, American, and Russian cultures of the times. Why did

Griffith abjure Eisenstein's stark social realism for use of heavily romanticized scenes, even though he had somewhat similar purposes in roughly the same period? Why have American producer-directors employing cinéma vérité altered the conventions devised by the French to allow for more continuity, more "story"? Such questions move us into cultural mores, communicative patterns, and the perceptual machinery available within particular cultures for processing information and ideas.

7. *Intriguingly, I think, this sort of rhetorical-cultural analysis can be applied to other classes of American communicative artifacts.* One could argue, for example, that classical exegeses are reports, theological disputes are dialectics, and catechetical addresses, pieces of moral philosophy; the classical homily has characteristics of the romance, conversionary appeals often take the form of melodramas, and full-blown "enthusiastic" harangues (e.g. of the eighteenth century) can be considered morality plays. Similarly, among the types of discourses found in a political campaign, position speeches function as reports, the Kennedy-Nixon debates were dialectics, and Kennedy's Houston Ministerial Association speech of 1960 was a piece of moral philosophy; Nixon's "Checkers Speech" of 1952 assuredly was a romance, while his 1972 television commercials (e.g. the one showing "McGovern's" hand sweeping toy airplanes into a waste basket) were melodramas; and, Muskie's "election eve address" of 1970 probably can be viewed as a morality play. The search for parallel genres in speeches, in television programming, in magazine articles, in social pamphlets, etc., ultimately could produce a full taxonomy of rhetorical genres, medium by medium. Such a taxonomy would be useful for two important purposes: (1) Close comparisons could be made between, say, a dialectical play and a theological dispute, allowing critics to discuss concretely the effects of particular formal conventions (those of drama and those of religious language) upon audience expectations and reactions. (2) Cross-cultural studies could take an interesting turn into specific cultural rules. Should one find a political culture which did *not* have, for example, the report or the dialectic form among its political addresses, one would be in a position to offer a unique critique of communicative systems, a critique based in conceptions of social reality rather than mere political ideology.

Finally, one must admit that this essay has done little to advance theoretical discussions concerning the definition of "documentary" or "non-fiction film," has peeked at only a few illustrative documentaries, and has not offered rigid containers into which all documentaries can be classified. But it has urged a serious, rhetorical examination of a patently rhetorical medium. It has recognized, with Eric Barnouw, that "the documentarist has a passion for what he *finds* in images and sounds—which always seem to him more meaningful than anything he can *invent*," and that "its plausibility, its authority, is the special quality of the documentary—its attraction to those who use it, regardless of motive—the source of its power to enlighten or deceive."[25] And, in overlaying a cultural analysis,

this essay has attempted to put these examples of celluloid rhetoric into a perspective explaining their power to enlighten and deceive.

NOTES

[1]This notion is expanded in Grierson's "First Principles of Documentary," in *Grierson on Documentary*, ed. Forsyth Hardy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1947), 99-111.

[2]Descriptions of these films can be found in almost any history of documentary, although I shall rely upon three when making comments about the evolution of the medium:—Richard Meran Barsam, *Nonfiction Film: A Critical History* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1973); Erik Barnouw, *Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Richard Dyer MacCann, *The People's Films: A Political History of U. S. Government Motion Pictures* (New York: Hastings House, 1973).

[3]For a definition of "documentary" stressing public information, see Basil Wright, "Documentary To-Day," ***Penguin Film Review*** 2 (Jan. 1947): 38; presentation of argument, former NBC President Robert Kintner, quoted in William A. Wood, *Electronic Journalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 72; actuation, A. William Bleum, *Documentary in American Television* (New York: Hastings, 1965), 14. Such definitional disputes result from a concern for "fact" vs. "fiction," "authenticity" vs. "interpretation," "material distortion" (i.e. leaving out events, facts, etc.) and "technological distortion" (i.e. using particular lenses, shots, editing techniques, etc. to lead a viewer). Those from the television industry, especially, stress fact/authenticity/minimal distortion, while those from the film industry, usually, recognize the need for fictive recreation/interpretation/necessary distortion. The most extreme positions can be found in Wood (n. 3) and in Harrison Engle, "Thirty Years of Social Inquiry: An Interview with Willard Van Dyke," *Film Comment* 3 (no. 2, Spring 1965): esp. 26. Philip Dunne ["The Documentary and Hollywood," *Hollywood Quarterly* 1 (no. 2, Jan. 1946): 167] goes even further than Van Dyke when he says, "In the broadest sense, the documentary is almost always, therefore, an instrument of propaganda."

[4]I am examining communication variables often approached by rhetorical critics—content, form, and the audience's psychological processes. Examination of such variables from a cultural perspective, however, probably is not a traditional approach, although it is gaining popularity. My fundamental impetus comes from the writings of Harold Adams Innis and his notion of communication determinism. For a brief explanation, see his *Empire and Communications*, rev. Mary Q. Innis (rpt. 1950; Toronoto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), esp. 9-11.

[5]Kenneth Burke, *Counter-Statement* (Los Altos, Ca.: Hermes Pub., 1954), p. 124. An interesting attempt to discuss "arrangement patterns" as forms in this Burkeian sense can be found in Carroll C. Arnold, *Criticism*

of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1974), Chap. V. "Structure and Form."

[6]The notion that linguistic and social rules make direct claims upon us has been developing simultaneously in two disciplines—linguistic philosophy and sociology. For representatives of each movement, see John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1969) and Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959).

[7]The notion of "differentiation" as I am using it is developed in Solomon Asch, "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige, and Limitation in Social Psychology," *Psychological Review* 55 (1948): pp. 250-276. I have used it before in Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Rhetorical Invention in the Regency Crisis Pamphlets," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58 (Dec. 1972): esp. 419.

[8]The notion of "transference" as it is articulated here can be found more fully developed in Donovan J. Ochs and Ronald J. Burritt, "Perceptual Theory: Narrative Suasion of Lysias," in *Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism*, ed. G. P. Mohrmann *et al.* (University Park: Penn. State University Press, 1973), esp. 53-56.

[9]For a discussion of the traditional organizing principles, see Don Fredericksen, " 'Book Reviews': Erik Barnouw's *Documentary: . . .* and Richard Meran Barsam's *Nonfiction Film: . . .*," *Cinema Journal* 15 (Fall 1975): 58-60.

[10]See n. 12. A more interesting (i.e. more rhetorical) approach to classification is suggested by Barnouw, who discussed documentarists as prophets, explorers, reporters, painters, advocates, buglers, prosecutors, poets, chroniclers, promoters, observers, catalysts, and guerrillas. Such a scheme would suit, especially, a critic working from an *auteur* ("speaker") perspective; as I am working here from the viewpoint of the vehicle, I have not adopted it. It does, however, have considerable potential for rhetorical critics.

[11]One must remember, of course, that a cinéma vérité approach is not the only kind of "report" we could be concerned with. A report certainly can use classical narrative, historical treatments, and the like; there are, in other words, potentially many different *forms*, only one which we will explore. Any complete enumeration of genres of documentary would have to attempt a listing of such forms to make the cube complete. (I should also add that I am not concerned with vérité forms which purposely destroy filmic conventions—e.g. those currently which seek to comment upon the filmic medium per se. While films which make as their subject-matter the graininess of the certain stocks, the zooming of the lens, etc., certainly can be considered "documentary" in one sense, they probably are more properly seen as aesthetic rather than rhetorical products, and hence do not fall within my purview.)

[12]William Jersey, "Some Observations on Cinéma Vérité," *Motive 27;* No. 2 (Nov. 1966): 12.

[13]On only two occasions did I notice obvious continuity—once a phrase was repeated by someone else at the beginning of a new scene, and once a head shot of a person carried us from one scene to another.

[14]"High School: Frederick Wiseman, Producer-Director," in *The New Documentary in Action: A Casebook in Film Making*, ed. Alan Rosenthal (Berkeley: University of California, Press, 1971), 73.

[15]INTEXT's Protest series includes films meant to generate classroom discussion about the purposes and means of public agitation; various films treating the 1968 Columbia University agitation, Vietnam protest, black power, the 1968 Chicago convention riots, two marches on Washington (the 1932 Bonus March and Resurrection City in 1968), prohibition, strikes, assassinations, a comparison of King and Ghandi, Eugene McCarthy's 1968 campaign, and "quiet" protests (Quakers, boycotts, Ralph Nader, etc.) are available, with a teacher's guide to leading discussions. Neutrality, supposedly, is achieved.

[16]Gronbeck (n. 7, p. 419) calls such works "quasi-poetic," in that the formal conventions are those of fictive literature, but the subject-matter is reality-based. Indeed, all genres along the bottom half of the matrix are quasi-poetic in this sense.

[17]Flaherty is known for his anthropological studies, including *Nanook of the North* (1922) and *Moana* (1926); Grierson, for the films on governmental services we noted earlier; Riefenstahl, for her romantic interpretations of Nazi Germany, including *Triumph of the Will* (1936) and *Olympia* (1938); and Lorentz, for the 1930's governmental projects discussed at length in MacCann's *The People's Films* (see n. 2). Notions of documentary and romance are discussed in Grierson's "First Principles of Documentary" (see n. 1) and in Paul Rotha's *Documentary Film* (New York: Hasting House, 1952).

[18]Reprinted in Lewis Jacobs (Ed.) *The Documentary Tradition; From Nanook to Woodstock* (N.Y.: Hopkinson and Blake, 1971), 174.

[19]These films are described in some detail in Barsam, 168-276.

[20]These and other criticisms are leveled with force by John Simon in "A Variety of Hells," in Jacobs, 466-468.

[21]For a general critique of all literary approaches to generic analysis, see Paul Hernadi, *Beyond Genre* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972).

[22]John G. Cawelti, *The Six-Gun Mystique* (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1970.)

[23]Horace Newcomb, *TV, The Most Popular Art* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974), 244, 245.

[24]These generalizations have been articulated most recently by Barsam.

[25]Barnouw, 288.

AFTERWORD

The final section is an essay that comments on the critical essays in section II and speculates about the role of genre and form in criticism, the concern of the essays in section I. It is, in the true sense, an afterword, a set of statements made after discussion of broad concepts, minute analysis of the criticisms, and ruminations about the relationship of all this to rhetoric, communication, and criticism generally. Bormann offers his comments on the conference and the essays, and he indicates directions for future discussions and criticism.

RHETORICAL CRITICISM AND SIGNIFICANT FORM: A HUMANISTIC APPROACH

ERNEST G. BORMANN

A strong impulse towards studying enduring features of rhetorical discourse as exemplified in recurring significant forms is revealed in the growing number of studies of rhetorical myth, metaphor, genre, and fantasy which are being published and in the appearance of essays dealing with the nature of rhetorical criticism which compare and contrast it with literary criticism.[1] The impulse expressed itself in the Kansas Conference on Significant Form in Rhetorical Criticism which was called to consider "recurring patterns in discourse or action including among others, the repeated use of images, metaphors, arguments, structural arrangements, configurations of language."[2] The impulse is, as yet, relatively unformed and unstructured. It raises a number of significant issues for scholars drawn to its practice. Many of the important issues emerged from the discussions of the papers which form this volume and of the concept of *genre* which served as a focal term for the deliberations. The prospects of enduring criticism are alluring; the pitfalls of such attempts are becoming more apparent. This chapter is addressed to the major issues; to the alluring prospects; and to the pitfalls.

Types of Rhetorical Criticism

In Section I, I discussed rhetorical styles and how they consist of a complex system of interrelationships among communication practice, criticism, and theory. The concept of rhetorical style relates to the practice of scholarly rhetorical criticism in several important ways.

Scholarship and style-specific criticism. One important kind of communication criticism is the expert evaluation of the specialists in a style who continually relate theory to practice. All teachers of communication, whether in an academic setting or not, practice criticism vital to a rhetorical community. Teachers of public speaking criticize student efforts as do instructors in interpersonal communication. Facilitators of encounter

and sensitivity groups criticize the communication of participants as do organizers of consciousness-raising sessions.

The critic as teacher, coach, and connoisseur of a given communication style produces criticism which is style-specific and ephemeral, to use Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's term.[3] To say that such criticism is ephemeral is not to deny its importance but simply to note its scope, nature, and function. Communication styles go in and out of fashion. When the established circuit rider critiqued the communication of his apprenticed exhorter as they made their rounds, he was involved in an activity which was indispensable to the ungenteel style just as much as was the criticism of a professor of rhetoric evaluating a student oration in a 19th century literary society according to the Websterian standards essential to the sentimental style.

On occasion, scholarly critics will use the criteria of a theory unique to a rhetorical community and apply it to a body of discourse with considerably more care and thoroughness than they would use in criticizing a student effort according to the same standards.[4] If a scholar, for example, uses the criteria of a rhetorical community engaged in intercollegiate debate in the 1970's to do scholarly criticism of the teach-ins of the 1960's the result will be an ephemeral one because the standards of communication of intercollegiate debate will change over the years. In addition, of course, the study will be a travesty because the standards of one communication style are not appropriate to another. A person might as well judge the communication of a negotiation session between labor and management by the standards of the interpersonal communication style. But even when the critic uses the communication theory of the style which produced the discourse, the results will be ephemeral. We read the critiques of Webster written by 19th century participants in the sentimental style no matter how scholarly they might be with the same interest we examine artifacts in a museum.[5]

Scholarship and criticism as advocacy. Another form of ephemeral criticism has been to take part in controversies. A scholar may advocate a public position by evaluating the communication in support of the preferred position favorably and attacking the shoddy quality of the communication of the opposition. The critic who scrutinizes contemporary argument and evidence for its truthfulness or validity helps clarify public debates on important issues and submits the communication of pressure groups to careful, systematic, and professional scrutiny. The rhetorical critic can play the role of consumer advocate and watchdog, warning the public about shoddy communication. A considerable body of professional rhetorical criticism is essentially the use of scholarly methods to enter contemporary debates.[6]

Advocates have also used rhetorical criticism in a less specific fashion to examine how communication contributes to undesirable conditions in society in general. Where in the first instance the critic as advocate attacks the president for his foreign policy, for example, by attacking the

presidential speeches relating to that policy, in the second instance the critic as advocate may examine how racism is embedded in the use of terms relating to light and darkness or black and white or how sexism is embedded in terms like *chairman* or the use of the inclusive masculine pronoun.[7]

Criticism as a corrective for society's ills is important, and certainly communication is such a vital part of any culture that criticism of a society's communication by scholars especially trained for the task is necessary. Important as it is, however, rhetorical criticism that deals with transitory problems is as ephemeral as the criticism which trains neophytes to appreciate and practice a given style.

Scholarship and Meta-Criticism. Although much rhetorical criticism is ephemeral in the sense that it is context-specific and tied to the conventions of communication style or to the issues of the moment, there is another perspective which offers the possibility of providing insight of a more enduring nature into human communication.

The perspective I have in mind is not that of a participant in a communication style judging rhetorical matters according to the theory unique to that style, nor yet that of an advocate in partisan debate or a critic of contemporary culture. Rather, the more enduring perspective is one in which the critic stands outside the assumptions of a rhetorical community and style and also outside the contemporary controversy or culture which is the concern of the more ephemeral perspective. By standing outside rhetorical communities the critic employing the perspective can view the similarities and differences among a number of different rhetorical styles. Similarities that characterize a large number of styles will indicate significant recurring forms related to human communication. In addition, the critic can examine the practice, theory, and criticism of a given rhetorical style and discuss its functions, influence, and impact upon the culture. Black's study of the sentimental style is essentially such a critical essay. The critic may decide to discover the inception, growth, maturity, and decline of one or more communication styles—may, indeed, trace families of communication styles as they evolve through time or chart the major communication styles operating in a given public at a given time.

I define the more permanent perspective as meta-criticism in the sense that the meta-critic stands above or beyond the first level of communication. I use the term by analogy with the relationship between object-language and meta-language in the philosophy of language.[8]

The meta-critic evaluates a rhetorical style or common rhetorical forms which appear in a number of rhetorical styles on some grounds other than the norms of criticism (the theory) which characterizes the style or styles under study. That is, a study of the Puritan preaching style will need to describe the norms of that style's criticism in order to document the existence of a coherent style and to describe and explain its nature. The meta-critic might well use Cotton Mather's rhetorical theory as presented in the *Manductio ad Ministerium* for that purpose but the critic would not

use those critical standards as the basis for an evaluation of the Puritan style nor for a recurring form which appeared in the Puritan style and a number of other styles as well.[9]

Research Methods for Meta-Criticism

The scientist would study recurring rhetorical patterns as Simons indicated by striving for inter-observer reliability and replicability of results. In addition, the scientific approach would involve careful operational definitions of key concepts, wide sampling of discourse, and comparison and contrast and control techniques to assure that distinctions were significant and relevant. How would a humanistic critic proceed?

Although the rhetorical critic differs from a historian of public address in some important ways, the critic and historian both share some significant humanistic scholarly norms. I shall begin by sketching the essential method of the humanistic scholar.

The scholar's viewpoint. The scientist shares with a community of like-minded scholars a common perspective about the nature of a good theory and about the proper paradigm for the practice of normal science. The shared paradigm of practice will include such things as the way to go about setting up hypotheses, designing research projects, collecting and interpreting data. The historian and critic, on the other hand, have a more personal and often more idiosyncratic viewpoint about their studies. Of course, like-minded scholars often form schools of interpretation in history and criticism but even within such schools there is room for differences of opinion as to the emphasis of various features of the perspective.

The viewpoint which a humanistic scholar brings to a specific research project will include general assumptions of a philosophical nature as well as specific preferences for research procedures of a technical nature. For example, critics will have as part of their perspectives some assumptions about free will and choice. The scholar who assumes the events under study are entirely or partially determined will also have some assumptions about the determining factors. The scholar may assume that economic factors are important, or social norms or mores, or institutional structures, or historical traditions, or religious influences, or sexual practices. (One psychiatrist of my acquaintance expressed amazement that a colleague of ours in the history department could write a large volume of biography on an important king of France without mentioning the king's sex life which the psychiatrist felt had a large influence on the history of the period.) Of course, most scholars are not as single-minded in their devotion to a determinism based upon a single cause as was the legendary scholar with a biological bent who accounted for the military history of the Thirty-Years-War on the basis of the migration patterns of rats. His argument was that the rats carried the plague which decimated armies and civilian populations alike and had more to do with the outcome of the wars than the battles themselves.

The scholar's viewpoint with its broad general assumptions as to what is important and unimportant in the activity under study will play a decisive role in determining what topics the critic will select to study, what evidence the critic will seek out to support conclusions, and what interpretations will occur to the critic. The scholar who feels that economic forces are important and who decides to study agnostic speakers of the 19th century such as Robert G. Ingersoll will likely search out records indicating the economic conditions of the time, the rise of industrialism, Ingersoll's role as a corporation lawyer and Republican Party spokesman, the fees earned by lecturers, and so forth.

Historians of the nineteenth century sought for an objectivity in history which was similar to the objectivity of the natural scientist. Many attempted to write "scientific" history but subsequent generations of historians analyzed the work of the "scientific" school and discovered that it was filled with assumptions and that the scholars were often captives of their biography and their culture.[10] Carpenter's essay on Mahan, Turner, and Mackinder illustrates the ways in which historians fail in being objective in a "scientific" sense. The "scientific" and "objective" viewpoint aimed to write history as it actually happened. The alternative position, which developed early in the twentieth century, recognizes that different scholars have different viewpoints and acknowledges the usefulness of a pluralistic approach to humanistic scholarship. The alternative approach, however, provides that both scholar and audience should be as aware as possible of the main features of the viewpoint which a scholar brings to a given essay.[11]

In addition to the general assumptions which undergird a scholar's perspective, the critic will also have a much more specialized set of assumptions which form an important part of the research viewpoint he or she brings to a study. These specialized assumptions will relate to such questions as whether or not a critic should have a clearly structured set of concepts to guide the opening of a study such as Kenneth Burke's pentad, whether some general notions will do, or whether a critic should, as Rosenfield suggests, "release himself, letting the phenomena 'speak to him' through their luminosity."[12]

The fact that some rhetorical critics prefer to start a study with a structure such as Burke's while others find their method as they find their interpretation does not mean that the scholarly community of rhetorical critics does not share norms relating to thoroughness of investigation, rigor in testing source materials, and care in documenting information.

The scholar's method. The basic mechanics of scholarship involve searching for information relevant to a particular inquiry, carefully examining the information to determine its accuracy and weight, and footnoting the sources so other scholars may check the evidence directly. Every professional meta-critic has the basic craft of scholarship as a minimum requirement. Thus Carpenter quotes a number of letters from the Frederick Jackson Turner collection at the Huntington Library includ-

ing one from Theodore Roosevelt to Turner on February 10, 1894. This letter is available to other scholars who may go to the Huntington Library and examine the original. By so doing they can check on the accuracy of Carpenter's evidence and on the fairness with which he used it. No matter what the viewpoint of the critic he or she will share with all others in the scholarly community norms of evidence and logical rigor of proof which provide a continual check upon the scholarly work. The rhetorical critic or historian is not writing historical romance and must continually tie back inferences and conclusions to documentation by means of footnotes which make the evidence part of the scholarly community.

The scientist in the laboaratory may keep careful manuals documenting the course of a series of experiments and some scholarly journals may require the filing of such documentation in support of an article submitted for publication, but the more likely check is to have another scientist in another laboratory replicate the experiment in order to see if the outcome corroborates the first findings. The same function is provided for the humanist by the study of records which can be checked by other scholars because of the care with which the scholar indicates the sources of the evidence through footnoting.

The scholar's interpretation of events. The scholarly critic with an avowed viewpoint towards rhetoric and towards the general human condition approaches a body of discourse and proceeds to study the authentic record. Somewhere in the process, which is partially a creative one, the scholar discovers (or invents) a structure which provides an explanation of the phenomenon under study. By structure I do not mean to imply the same thing as organization. Structure usually leads to organizing an essay in a clear and logical way but it is possible to organize material without having much structure in the sense in which I use the term. That is, a good newspaper reporter or executive secretary might search archives and record note cards and organize the results according to a chronological order or around some topics without providing insight and explanation which leads to greater understanding. Thus, a good journalist ought not be able to write a work of scholarship unless she or he is, indeed, an inspired amateur scholar, and that is why a critical evaluation of a scholarly essay to the effect that it is journalistic is a damaging one.

Structure implies an organic form of interrelationships among the salient features which provides so apt a fit of the observable record or the sources that the reader of the criticism is both persuaded and pleased by the scholar's new way of looking at the material. The structure leads to an understanding of the subject under study.

Humanistic scholarship consists of the application of a viewpoint to carefully and rigorously tested evidence in order to discover an explanatory structure. Essentially—a powerful explanatory structure is what makes a work of scholarship live on through time. Such structures are imaginative works of the magnitude of Newton's Theory in the natural sciences and can be considered the product of genius. The structure which

Karl Marx discovered to explain economic phenomenon is an example of the classical sort of scholarship. The structure which Adam Smith discovered to explain economic phenomena some years earlier than Marx is a similar powerful work of scholarship. But one need not look only to the grand landmarks to discover talented scholars producing apt and satisfying accounts of the subjects of their studies. Carpenter's paper alludes to Alfred Thayer Mahan's work on *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. Mahan certainly saw the world from a somewhat unique viewpoint and discovered a structure to account for the unfolding of history which provided an explanation for the rise of empires that marks it as an important scholarly work. So, too, Frederick Jackson Turner discovered an important structure to account for the unique nature of the American experience.

A good many of the essays in this book exhibit structure in the sense in which I use the term. Carpenter's paper provides a structure to account for historical writing from a rhetorical viewpoint. Carpenter comes to the study of historiography from a viewpoint which assumes that there is an important rhetorical dimension to history which influences contemporary society. He says, in a sense, the aphorism of George Orwell that who controls the present controls the past and who controls the past controls the future is an important assumption which helps account for historical development. Carpenter also has as part of his viewpoint the assumption that historians adapt language rhetorically to achieve suasory impact. With that viewpoint guiding him he selects three writers who seem promising scholars to examine from a rhetorical perspective. To study their rhetorical impact he uses the concept of jeremiad and further defines that concept into five basic features. He examines each writer in turn in terms of the five basic features and discovers that more or less explicitly each historian exhibits the five defining criteria. He further discovers that the most salient responses to the writings are those which reveal a sense of dire urgency and a motive to change and do the recommended action. The discourse thus has a formal structure which is complemented by the appropriate response in the significant audience as revealed by the letters.

When the conference considered Carpenter's paper he was challenged on the issue of plausibility of the structure. The fact that there was so much variation exhibited by the discourses on a number of the five formal characteristics of the historical jeremiad caused some critics to assert that Carpenter's case for placing them together in one genre was not adequately demonstrated by the historical record.

Carpenter was further challenged on the grounds that he had not adequately documented audience response by searching primarily in the letters written to the historians. All of these challenges indicate how closely tied an explanatory structure must be to the historical sources which support it.

Although the structure did provide an explanation for well documented popularity, fame, and perhaps, influence of the three writers in terms of

their use of an old tried and true persuasive form, and although the structure was apt and pleasing as most structures which discover a new and fresh analogy tend to be, the structure was vague in places and lacked detail. Thus, the critical sessions devoted to Carpenter's paper included a good deal of creative modification of the structure. Indeed, one of the strengths of the structure is that it does stimulate such thinking, and good scholarship ought to set off the reader in new directions and adaptations. One suggested modification was to provide a structure which emphasized not the five formal features in the discourse but which tried to document a latent jeremiadic response waiting in a large public for some suitable symbolic event to focus its energy and give it prominence. Some of the difficulties of explaining the response to Turner's paper which exhibited some key features of the jeremiad in very sketchy detail or not at all might thus fit more plausibly into a structure which discovered that sentences of tangential interest to the main theme of the paper were nonetheless picked up and made the most important feature of the response and that these sentences turned out to be those which allowed for the dramatization of a second persona which enforced established values, particularly the values of America as the new Eden, free from the corruption of the old world.

Halloran studies the televised debate held in the House Judiciary Committee from July 24 through 30, 1974, on the proposed impeachment of Richard Nixon from a perspective which emphasizes the whole series of televised reports as one "drama," as a way for society both to solve a problem and hold a mirror up to the community itself and by the playing out in dramatistic fashion main currents within society the televised debate can serve to support or undermine the forces which cause the society to cohere.

The structure which Halloran discovers is that the two functions of a public proceeding (discussing and deciding important community questions and performing a ritual of communion) are in conflict during the television debates on impeachment. The conflict results in the heavy allocation of time to the first of the five articles under consideration and in the essential termination of the proceedings after the vote on Article I. In addition, the ritualistic features account for the linguistic style and the "rhythm and solemnity" of the use of congressional forms of address. Finally, the emphasis on the ritualistic and communal aspect of the television debates accounts for the effect of the opponents of the majority view. Here Halloran's explanatory structure which portrays the hearings as primarily community ritual and only secondarily as task-oriented groups comes clear in the role of minority spokesmen such as Sandman of New Jersey and Wiggins of California. Wiggins' role is central and crucial in the structure. Because Wiggins supported the basic legitimacy of the entire proceedings and because he spoke as the loyal opposition he enabled the television debate to function in a way which supported and reinforced the community's customs, laws, and established values for doing public business.

Halloran's structure is plausible and accounts for the record. The committee did spend most of its time debating the first article. The proceedings did seem anti-climactic after the first ballot. Wiggins was applauded for being a good representative of the loyal opposition. Sandman paid the price for attacking the legitimacy of the proceedings. If the overriding purpose of the television sessions (tacit although it may have been) was to perform a ritual of community cohesion, then much of what another critic might judge to be ineffectual or poor communication in terms of another structure which emphasized the quality of the decision-making process becomes understandable. Indeed, Halloran rather implies that judged according to the needs of community cohesion the communication event of the impeachment proceedings on television was of a high order of excellence.

Halloran's structure to explain and provide the reader with an understanding of the television proceedings exhibits another characteristic of a good piece of scholarship in that others will see new applications for the very same structure. Another critic wishing to examine another set of communication transactions might decide they are analogous to the televised debates on impeachment and take Halloran's structure and apply it to the new material.

Significant Issues Relating to Meta-Criticism

Genre as viewpoint or genre as structure. Significant forms as related to rhetoric may be seen as part of the scholar's viewpoint or part of the structure of a work of criticism, or both. The question of whether significant form in terms of recurring patterns in discourse or action is phenomenological or not is important to the general analysis of the concept of *genre* and needs to be carefully explicated. One of the major issues of the conference discussions related to such questions as: Is it useful to think of genre as a construct of the critic which guides investigations? Is it useful to think of genre as in the minds of the audience? Or, is it useful to think of genre as a feature of the rhetorical discourse? The easy answer, of course, is to say that it is all three. However, to dismiss the issue quickly by saying that genre resides in the mind of the critic, and in the discourse, and in the audience is to miss some significant issues worth exploring. A critic developing an explicit viewpoint to bring to a study ought to explore the implications of a decision in regard to these questions. For example, the critic who takes as a perspective the view that genres are in audiences might interpret the record which Carpenter studied in a way which revealed that many people had a jeremiadic response characteristic which had been developed or conditioned over years of hearing religious messages cast in that form. Frederick Jackson Turner had unintentionally tapped a large reservior of guilt and feeling of loss of the basic American *ethos* with his message about the end of the frontier for those Americans so conditioned. The critic who begins with the viewpoint that genres are in

messages might create an interpretive structure which sees the sentimental style as a historical phenomenon which waxes and wanes depending upon the needs of the times and that the style waxed particularly strong in the United States in the 19th century. Thus Black not only asserts such a genre existed but that it was a rhetoric which left "no scintilla of reaction" for the audience's own response, that for the listener, "Every nuance of his response is suggested by the speech." Further, Black states that "it may have been Webster's particular contribution to the comfort of his contemporaries that he devised themes and a style which combined to lull the stirring conscience of his country." The end result was that "a form of consciousness emerged" which was able to subordinate moral considerations to aesthetic ones.

Finally, one ought not drop the issue of genre as viewpoint or genre as structure without noting Rosenfield's critique of an essay by Wander and Jenkins in which he argues that the critic who distinguishes Being and Appearance has difficulty in practicing criticism as appreciation. According to Rosenfield:

> The point to bear in mind in all this is that by retaining implicitly the distinction between Being (values) and Appearance (observables, objects, perceptions, facts) Wander and Jenkins shut the critic off from the very involvement that they see as necessary for at least a good deal of worthwhile criticism, an involvement that necessarily dissolves the dichotomy.[13]

My position is that genre or significant form may be a part of the critic's viewpoint. A critic may, in addition to the other assumptions about the nature of reality and of the human experience, have specialized critical assumptions and predilections that certain recurrent patterns are significant and have a limited set of distinguishing features. Gronbeck's cube might thus serve as a set of *topoi* for another scholar approaching documentary films of the 1970's. The scholar would look for evidence that a given film was "real" or "poetic" on the basis of such cues as "slice-of-life" as opposed to "bigger-than-life". Further, the critic would look for the proper placement of a film which was "bigger-than-life" in terms of whether it was populated with easy-to-recognize heroes and villains, and so forth. The scholar beginning with the viewpoint which included Gronbeck's cube, or Burke's pentad, or some other notion as to significant recurring form, might discover that the discourse fails to fit neatly into the patterns or that modification of the pattern will serve better to explain the discourse and may, indeed, serve better to explain the original material upon which the first formulation of the pattern was based. The end result of such an investigation would be an essay or study which produced a ***structure*** to interpret and explain the discourse which was also a genre or a

recurring pattern. The significant form then may be part of a scholar's viewpoint or it may be the structure the scholar invents to account for the discourse under study.

Clearly the significant form of discourse, say the jeremiadic form as Carpenter understood it as he began his study of Mahan and Mackinder, was in the viewpoint of the scholar. The structure which Carpenter discovered to account for the influence of the trio of writers, however, was a result of the interaction of the scholar with the authenticated historical record. Carpenter could not provide quotations to show how Turner's essay stated a solution to the problem in order to complete the jeremiadic form which ends with the warning that unless "a certain course of action is followed, dire consequences will ensue." Since Turner's paper was designed to alter the emphasis of historical scholarship it did not contain a solution to the problem of the closing of the frontier. The structure of Carpenter's paper reflects his own viewpoint and scholarly interpretive skill so that another critic beginning with a different viewpoint and with a different talent would probably find a different structure. Both critics, however, would have to deal with Turner's paper as it is and though they might choose to select different features of it to emphasize, they would, nonetheless, have to be rigorous and accurate in their use of that source.

Deriving structural viewpoints from previous scholarship. One of the major issues facing the critic who is in the process of avowing a perspective or viewpoint for scholarly work and examining potential alternatives in regard to method relates to the extent to which the borrowing of a structure such as Halloran's or Carpenter's (or Noble's) or Lévi-Strauss', or Kenneth Burke's, and then applying that structure to new material in a different context is a useful and facilitating procedure. Derivative structures pose difficult problems for a scholar as Gronbeck argues in his section entitled *"4. This determination of genres likewise has avoided the tendency to impose externalized frames from other studies."* Rosenfield makes a strong attack on the use of borrowed structures for the study of rhetorical events in his essay "The Experience of Criticism" when he argues that:

> A critic who comes upon a critical object in a state of mind such that he has a "set of values" handy (or, indeed, any other system of categories) does not engage in a critical encounter so much as he processes perceptual data. His "mentality" is that of the mail room clerk sorting parcels into pre-established, discrete, empty bins. But he would be wrong to equate such hollow data processing with thinking, let alone experiencing anything.[14]

Although much has been said against the "cookie-cutter" approach of taking a structure borrowed from another work and applying it to new contexts, Gronbeck does develop a more general structure than the other critics in this volume. He suggests a series of dimensions which should serve as the defining or criterial attributes of documentary films and sug-

gests that other scholars employing the basic structure will find it a useful way to categorize films in terms of the form-content tension and of cultural rules for interpretation. Such programmatic scholarly investigation, Gronbeck implies, might produce theoretically important comparative studies through time within the same culture and cross-culturally.

The lure of comparative work is particularly strong in rhetorical criticism and accounts for much of the preoccupation of the conference with the concept of *genre*. If comparative work is advisable then programmatic scholarly investigations make a good deal of sense. For programmatic studies some common perspective, at any rate, is essential. Perhaps, skillfully used, some common structure such as Gronbeck's cube would facilitate a community of like-minded scholars in their studies and their discussion with one another.

For inept scholars even a borrowed structure may be better than trying to discover a unique interpretation of an event which too often results in a confused series of assertions and factual information which provides little understanding. On the other hand, the slavish devotion to a borrowed structure resulted in the trivial studies that Black characterized as neo-Aristotelian and demolished in definitive fashion in *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*.

Genre, generalization, and lawfulness. Simons was not the only scholar at the conference searching for lawfulness. Nor is the paradigm of the attitude change study and the Newtonian theory the only kind discussed in the papers of the conference. The concept of genre raises the possibility of a taxonomy of genres with explanatory and, perhaps, predictive powers.

Impressive theoretical developments by naturalists in the 19th century also influenced subsequent students of communication. Thomas Huxley on the voyage of the *Rattlesnake* studying specimens of invertebrate sea life, Charles Darwin on the voyage of the *Beagle* studying a variety of geological and zoological phenomena were part of another important research program. The naturalists developed a theoretical structure which classified living organisms into categories according to such differences as whether or not they had back-bones, suckled their young, were warm blooded, could mate and produce offspring, and so forth. The end result was an elaborate taxonomy of genera and species which arranged living organisms into classes according to level of abstraction and scope into an orderly chain of being. Simons calls for an approach that "Rather than haggling over the level at which some thing becomes a genre as opposed to a family or species, we might better recognize the genres 'exist' at various levels of abstraction, from the very broad to the very specific." When Simons suggests a taxonomy of genres arranged in a "hierarchical" scheme he reflects the tradition in the natural sciences which searches for theoretical structures composed of categories based upon crucial distinguishing characteristics.

If the rhetorical critic is to develop a taxonomy of genera and species analogous to the theories of biology, botony, and zoology then a broad-

based sampling of discourse along the lines called for by Simons is appropriate.

The classification theories of the natural sciences represent lawful clusters of qualities in the form of a concept. When the chemist describes the properties of oxygen or any of the elements on the periodic table, the purpose of the classification is to assure that if a given sample of gas exhibits some of the properties of oxygen the other properties will be invariably present. Unless the theory based upon a scheme of classification is composed of concept laws of the sort represented by the periodic table in chemistry it cannot serve for prediction and control. If the theory is based upon concept laws then it will enable both prediction and control.

The genera of literary and dramatic criticism are not concept laws like oxygen and iron or snails or crabs but definitional constructs which describe pigeon-holes into which given literary works may or may not fit or into which they may only partially fit.

Gronbeck's taxonomy of "Celluloid Rhetoric" illustrates the method of clarification by classification as it applies to humanistic scholarship. Gronbeck divides documentary film into two genera, poetic and real, and further divides each genera into three species. The poetic genera consist of romance, melodrama, and morality play. Each species exhibits sufficient distinguishing criteria relating to content and treatment to distinguish it from the others. Each species has exemplar films which serve to illustrate the category: *The River* is the touchstone for the romance; *Let My People Go* illustrates the melodrama; *V. D. Blues*, is the exemplar of the morality play. If the taxonomy were a scientific one then each of the categories would be a concept law and the qualities associated with the concept would be invariably related in a given instance of a film. Thus when a film which was poetic developed a problem and solution organization with "bigger-than-life" treatment then heroic narrative would always accompany the pictures. However, Gronbeck's taxonomy is not scientific. He notes that after categorizing *The River*, *The Plow That Broke the Plains*, *Night Mail*, and *Man of Aran* as romances with some apparent confidence he thinks that the *Making of the President* series fits "perhaps". *Romance* as a concept is not the same as *iron*, the concept which forms part of the table of elements in chemistry.

If classifications of messages into genres do not result in describing a lawfulness in the practice of communication, to what purpose is the search for recurring patterns and genre? The question of recurring form in rhetorical criticism is part of the broader question of generalization in history. Historians have divided on the question much as have participants in the conference on significant form. Some historians argue that generalization in history is unjustified, the factors are too complex, each historical situation too idiosyncratic for comparison with another. They focus upon illuminating the specific historical event, period, or movement. Other historians search for some broad theory of history with lawfulness reminiscent if not of Newton, at least of Darwin.[15]

Some critics would argue that the duty of criticism is to illuminate the specific and unique and others would search for such overarching and recurring patterns that they could be called mythic. One important part of a critic's viewpoint, therefore, relates to the question of the extent to which rhetorical patterns tend to recur. For those who take the position that there are a limited number of mythic recurring patterns such as the pattern Burke discovered in terms of hierarchy, fall from perfection, guilt, and purgation of guilt, the search for the mythic pattern is an important function of rhetorical criticism and an important way to illuminate human symbol using. Others take the position that recurring patterns are widespread and important but tend to be culture-bound. Again for critics who find widespread and important patterns, their discovery and illumination is an important function of criticism. For those who see their function as critics to engage the immediate rhetorical experience and to compare and contrast a few, perhaps, at most two rhetorical events, an important function is to appreciate and understand the richness and complexity of human communication and to appreciate its uniqueness.[16]

The rhetorical critic may take as a perspective a static view of communication much like the abstracted empiricists who try to study communication scientifically. This critic may see the recurrent patterns of discourse pinned into time like butterflies in a collection. With communication patterns frozen in time and space, the critic searches them out and describes them, in static terms. This critic may isolate a given rhetorical pattern and describe its markings as though painting a still life. Such criticism has some virtue in that it may serve to describe an ideal type *(Idealtypus)* along the lines developed by Max Weber.[17] Ideal types are useful to aid in discussing artistic artifacts if scholars go on to examine particular individuals in terms of how closely they resemble the ideal type. But like the abstracted empiricists, the critic of recurrent significant forms who simply describes the form runs the risk of triviality and abstraction from experience.

The critic who has the search for significant forms as part of his or her viewpoint may also incorporate a dynamic developmental perspective in regard to rhetorical styles. For example, the critic who views significant forms as static and complete might develop the ideal type of the Puritan sermon (or the jeremiad which Perry Miller discovered at the turn of the 18th century and whose rules he argues were as rigid as those for the ode).[18] The critic working from a developmental viewpoint might do something similar but would go on to examine the significant form of the jeremiad at those breaking points, crises, and transitions from one form to another. The critic might ask, what happened at that point when the Puritan sermon changed its form into that of the jeremiad and what happened at that point when the jeremiad came to a transition or breaking point? The critic who traces the rise of a significant rhetorical form, charts its progress and describes its nature at the height of its power, and then traces its break up and demise discovers a structure which has worked

productively to trace historical periods in economic, social, military, political, and intellectual matters.

Tracing the rise and fall of significant patterns of discourse is essentially a job of historical scholarship. The scholars studying communication and rhetoric very much need to have the history of persuasion in the United States charted in detail and surveyed in a way which provides a structured account of our historical symbolic experience. The history of significant rhetorical forms would be a major contribution to the field. To this point most of the history of public persuasion has been of a topical nature and consists of documenting important speeches and speakers.

The critic, however, has not completed the task with the writing of the history of a significant rhetorical form, as important as that is in its own right. The scholar who wishes to write history is to be encouraged and ought not be viewed as performing a less important task than the critic simply because the critical viewpoint requires additional interpretation once the essential historical structure is discovered. What the critic seeks to do in addition to the historical function is to evaluate the significant rhetorical form according to some criteria of a rhetorical nature.[19] The critic often evaluates the form in terms of how it works to achieve rhetorical effects. Thus, Halloran, on the one hand, examines the televised hearings over impeachment in terms of dealing with the task of making a public decision, debating the issues, apportioning time adequately to deal with all five articles, and, on the other hand, in terms of how they express the ethos of society and serve to reaffirm the basic norms and values of the culture. Black evaluates the sentimental style in terms of how it works to cover over the guilt and tensions associated with slavery and economic and technological dislocations. The consciousness associated with the sentimental style deals with here-and-now problems in an essentially sick and decadent way; the style emphasizes aesthetics rather than morality.

Genre or the notion of significant recurring form is important to metacriticism and a useful concept for many purposes of humanistic study. For example, if a scholar wishes to write a survey or history of rhetorical practices over a considerable period of time for a relatively large cultural tradition, one good way is to discover important similarities which thread through practices over time. When a number of similar strands weave together to form a school or tradition, then the classification of such similar practices into a genre is useful scholarly discovery. The scholar can then characterize the main features of the rhetorical tradition and discuss its rise, growth, mature features, and decline. The scholar can isolate representative works for more detailed analysis in order to illuminate the entire genre or the scholar may select works which represent the highest achievement in the practice of the art of rhetoric within the conventions of the tradition.

I take it that Black's essay on the sentimental style is illustrative of the method which characterizes the main features of a rhetorical tradition and then illuminates the entire genre with a work which is an "acutely

sonorous representative of the type," namely a passage from Webster. Black argues, however, that "such examples of the sentimental style could, of course, be multiplied from discourses of the time," The sentimental style then forms a school or tradition of rhetorical practice which flourished in the nineteenth century and which provides the critic with an opportunity to discover crucial features of the way the rhetoric worked to meet or evade the needs of the times. Black assumes Webster's popularity and then attempts to discover its source. He finds Webster's success to be a symptom "of disquiet and unease, of a subtly gnawing conscience and a tacit agreement to repress." The nineteenth century had good reason to feel disquiet and unease, first of all because of the presence of slavery but also because the process of industrialization and technological development created "social disruption and human suffering." The end result of the momentum of change was that "The accumulating detritus of the process—the ugliness, the exploitation, the social insecurities—all had to be accepted as an inevitable means to a higher good." In the end "A form of consciousness emerged which was adapted to such demands, a form that was characterized by the subordination of moral to aesthetic considerations—by the achievement of psychic comfort and subcutaneous harmony through the refusal to apprehend the jarring, the unwholesome, the corrupt."

Side by side with the sentimental style in the nineteenth century I found what I called the ungenteel style.[20] The ungenteel style shunned the aesthetic, the language was aimed at "taking the hide off" the audiences and revealing their corrupt and sinful natures. The leading practitioners of the ungenteel style were the uneducated lay ministers of the Methodist and Baptist denominations but the style also found its way into the revival practice of Charles Grandison Finney and into the abolition agents who were under his influence. Thus, to paraphrase Black, simultaneously in the period prior to the Civil War, "A form of consciousness emerged that was characterized by the subordination of aesthetic to moral considerations—by the achievement of psychic pain and consciousness of guilt through the searching and forcing of the perception of the jarring, the unwholesome, the corrupt."

Once rhetorical critics chart the various styles which characterized the nineteenth century in the United States scholars will be able to fit the discourse of the present into the patterns of the past for the better understanding of the future.

Not only that, but the reader of such critical analysis gains a new appreciation of the life of the popular mind in the nineteenth century and the unfolding of such events as abolition reform, the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, the reconstruction of the South and the rapid industrialization of the North following the war.

The relationship between situation and rhetoric. One of the most salient and important issues discussed at the conference in relation to meta-

criticism was raised directly by Simons who expressed one position forcefully as follows: *"Rhetorical genres will emerge most clearly when rhetorical practices are most constrained by purpose and situation."* Simons essentially attributes the position to Black, Rosenfield, Bitzer, Hart, Jamieson, and others.[21] In Simons' view "rhetorical practices do not cluster together into identifiable genres by accident; rhetoric as a pragmatic, adaptive art, is highly constrained by purpose and situation—and these constraints are often quite similar for different rhetors facing different audiences at different times."

The critic whose viewpoint includes the notion that, as Simons puts it, "in statistical terms purpose and situation account for the greatest common variance among rhetorical practices" will proceed as Measell does to search out first the historical context to discover the constraints of situation. Having documented the historical analogue Measell next searches for the commonalities that both Lincoln and Pitt share and assumes that when similar situational constraints exist then a similar body of discourse of a repressive nature will be associated. Such a critic will, of necessity, write a good bit of historical background for any study and as Measell illustrates, the historical situation will generally come first in the structure which comes to account for the rhetoric. A second position on the issue of the relationship between situation and rhetoric is that expressed by Simons in his footnote when he suggests that a cyclical or dialectical relationship between historical events and rhetorical discourse is a better viewpoint and more likely to be fruitful for critical investigation. The notion that situation affects rhetoric which then affects the subsequent course of events is a venerable one in rhetorical criticism. Essentially the effects criterion of the first edition of *Speech Criticism* emphasized such a pattern.[22] Thonssen and Baird argued that the critic could not understand a piece of rhetorical discourse until the audience, historical background, specific occasion, speaker's previous biography, and specific purpose were documented. Once the speech was accounted for in terms of the context from which it arose then the critic's task was to complete the analysis by discovering the speech's effect, immediate and long range, on the unfolding of history. Halloran's essay illustrates the way the viewpoint works. He begins by discussing the exigencies which bring a public proceeding into being. In the case of the televised impeachment hearings those exigencies were the unfolding of Watergate, prior hearings, and so forth. He then analyzes the rhetorical transactions that took place during the hearings and concludes that they did have a positive influence: "Whatever his personal motives, Wiggin's manner of arguing the case for Nixon helped make the impeachment debate a model of public life, that the American people could and evidently did take as a valid representation of themselves."

My own position on the question of whether or not historical analogues drawn from diverse cultures which flourished in remote as well as in more recent times are likely to exhibit similar rhetorical forms is that they are

not. Since I would stress the importance of the social reality which is created by rhetoric, my perspective on this question illustrates yet a third viewpoint.

My position is that the critical viewpoint that divorces rhetoric from what "really counts" too often sends the critic searching for the "real" moving forces of history. Such critics search for social, economic, or other forces to account for what is "really happening" and tend to see rhetoric as thrown up by these forces as rationalization or a way to keep the public misled in order to cut down unrest. The Marxist position, indeed all economic deterministic viewpoints, have been very influential in supporting the notion that "ideology", which is in their terms usually synonomous with rhetoric, is a smoke screen or an aura which surrounds the material forces which determine the march of history.

Critical viewpoints which divorce rhetoric from what really counts are, in some respects, sophisticated versions of the folk wisdom that "if you want to know what a politician is up to, watch his feet, not his mouth." Marvin Meyers, a trained historian but an inspired amateur in rhetorical criticism, remarks of the position that "politics is reduced to a hoof-or-mouth question; and only school children and the gulls of Buncombe County attend to political talk. Journalists, historians, all astute men of affairs will watch the shifting feet." Interestingly enough some rhetorical critics, perhaps because they aspire to be astute men of affairs, also prefer to watch the shifting feet even though one would think they would be the first to emphasize the importance of what is said. Meyers, in the preface to his book *The Jacksonian Persuasion*, argues against the emphasis on the "shifting feet." He notes that political behavior is "vastly more complicated than the 'realists,' folk or academic, imagine." He maintains that:

> Persuasion is not one thing—mere talk—and conduct another—'reality.' The paradox of Jacksonian Democracy is not to be resolved by simple separation and elimination. This book is an attempt to define the relationship, placing persuasion in the foreground and conduct in the background. Another writer might reverse the view. In the end the two accounts must meet.[23]

The critic with the viewpoint that the feet are more important than the mouth uses the important stuff whether sociological analysis or historical interpretation or economic principles or political theory to account for rhetoric. The critic validates the rhetorical analysis with criteria from investigations which reveal such "real" historical forces as class structure and conflict and economic interests. Measell establishes the analogy between Pitt and Lincoln first on historical grounds and then searches for rhetorical similarities as though rhetoric were the dependent variable and historical forces the cause of discourse. The notion that "the situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity" is a popular one. The concept of *situation* needs careful explication, however. Simons is right that too often the critical terms central to a critic's work have been "woefully

inadequate." Particularly I would agree with his charge that "when pressed to indicate what one means by 'rhetorical situation' " the response too often has been "to use such equally ambiguous terms as 'climate,' 'atmosphere,' 'occasion,' or 'set of exigences.' " Rhetoric can be viewed as situational in two distinct ways. In one sense of the term *situational*, a speaker always faces some idiosyncratic aspects of audience, occasion, topic, and so forth. The speaker giving a funeral eulogy in North America in the 1970's discusses a unique individual and in somewhat constrained by that person's biography. Audiences will differ. The setting for the eulogy will have unique aspects. The speaker may have a somewhat unusual purpose for delivering the eulogy. The immediate occasion will contain novel features. To say that rhetoric is situational in the sense that each specific occasion is to some extent unique is commonplace and does little for the critic searching for significant recurring rhetorical forms. Indeed, the idiosyncratic nature of the situation makes the discovery of analogues more difficult and mitigates against the discovery of genres.

In another sense of the term *situational*, a speaker at any time and in any culture faces a context analogous to other situations in other cultures at other times. That is, all funeral orations in all times and all cultures share a common set of distinguishing characteristics so they can be called a genre. If funeral orations do not do so then some rhetorical situations in some times and some cultures, such as mass media apologies or repressive political disourses, will evoke rhetorical responses which can be classified into genera and species.

I find a tension if not a contradiction between the situational emphasis of the method and the search for significant form as a recurring pattern. Just as situational ethics tends to restrict the application of ethical insights such as "Thou shalt not kill," so, too, emphasis on the exigencies of the rhetorical situation mitigates against the discovery of general recurring patterns related to situations. Yet it is the second sense of situational as archetypal historical contexts which results, if not invariably, often, in analogous rhetorical forms which are the bases for generic criticism as a way to lawful knowledge. Such a position is implied by Simons' call for explanatory theorems to help explain why the rhetorical situation is constraining. The second sense of situational is basic also to Measell's essay.

On occasion, critics following the general assumption that rhetoric springs from situation will accept a historical or sociological definition of a movement or campaign and then turn to the discourse associated with that group and try to find common rhetorical characteristics. Thus we get the rhetoric of black power, of isolationism, of the New Left, of feminism, and so forth. Movements defined on historical, sociological, or political grounds are seldom rhetorically homogeneous. My study of the reform speakers of the three decades prior to the American Civil War revealed two distinct rhetorical movements working for abolition, the rhetoric of agitation and the rhetoric of conversion. On other grounds, historians have

often lumped the people involved in the two rhetorical movements together as 'the abolition movement'.[24]

I would argue for a critical approach which puts the emphasis on the symbolic side of the equation. Some critics should begin with the assumption that the rhetoric is a crucial factor in the way a community generates and sustains its social reality and that their social action follows or mirrors their symbolic action.[25] The historical situation, the here-and-now problems facing a group of rhetors, does have an influence on discourse in that the rhetoric must often account for it or have a plausible mechanism for ignoring it. Nonetheless, most of the time, the symbolic interpretations of similar events vary a great deal. Indeed, some rhetorical visions are so bizarre that outsiders evaluate them as "crazy" or out of touch with reality. In the 1950's, for example, the rhetorical vision of a group on the far right characterized Dwight Eisenhower as a communist and discounted evidence to the contrary as the result of communists changing appearances through their control of the media.

Even rhetorical visions which seem plausible to an outside critic may vary a good deal in the way similar here-and-now situations are defined into social reality. Those who responded to the presence of human slavery in the United States in the 1830's dramatized that institution in a number of different ways. Even those who argued to free the slaves differed. One group saw slavery as an evil which the founders had placed on the way to gradual extinction and dreamed of a solution which would relocate the freed slaves back in Africa. Another group saw the institution as an evil recognized as such by an anti-slavery compact called the Constitution. The way to free the slaves as they saw it was to work within the confines of the Constitution and abolish the evil laws such as the Fugitive Slave Law and push the moral argument that slavery was a sin and not condoned by the Bible. In still another group's social reality the Constitution was a rotten pro-slavery compact from the start. Their way to deal with slavery was to destroy the Constitution and the corrupt government associated with it and free the slaves immediately on the soil where they were found.

My point is that some critics might well search first for rhetorical similarities among messages and define a movement, campaign, or genre on rhetorical grounds. Such a critic could then go on to search for historical effects. For example, the Garrisonians who dramatized the Constitution as a pro-slavery compact resisted the laws, burned the constitution, and advocated revolution. The followers of Weld who dramatized the constitution as an anti-slavery compact worked within the framework of the established government and sought to change the political structure by eventually forming the Liberty and Free Soil Parties.

Without the presence of slavery in the society neither rhetorical vision would have developed for both were responses to slavery. Yet the critic who discovers what particular fantasies are shared by a rhetorical movement can account for the behavior of the participants since the fantasies

provide the motivation, the dreams, purposes, and plans which shape or contain the attitudes and behaviors of the participants.

Conclusion

The prospect of meta-criticism which seeks to provide explanations of human symbol-using which transcends particular times and places and styles of communication is an attractive one. To the function and purpose of such criticism the humanistic perspective on scholarship is most appropriate and the illumination of the human condition which can follow from perceptive and talented critics applying such a perspective to human discourse is well worth the time and effort.

The humanist always faces the perplexing problem of generalization. Recurring and significant forms of discourse lure on the hope for generalization. However, lawfulness in the sense of the typical scientific theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is not an appropriate goal for rhetorical criticism. The discovery and critical analysis of significant forms or genres can, nonetheless, lead to structures which provide important sorts of understanding which scientific laws cannot. The two modes of scholarly inquiry can proceed side-by-side providing different but equally important kinds of explanations of communication.

NOTES

[1]The references in earlier chapters in this book indicate the trend. Simons cites a number of studies which illustrate a generic tendency. Measell notes a number of such studies. Among the commonly cited are B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the General Criticism of Apologia," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59 (Oct. 1973), 273-283; Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," *Speech Monographs*, 35 (Nov. 1968), 435-450; references to literary critics are numerous and illustrated by such sources as Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); typical of the methodological studies are Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (Winter 1968) 1-14; Kathleen M. Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 6 (Summer 1973), 162-169.

[2]*Spectra*, 11 (Aug. 1975), 6.

[3]"Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," *Speech Teacher*, 23 (1974), 9-14.

[4]For a discussion of the critic's act in general and within the theory of communication styles in the classroom see Walter R. Fisher, "Rhetorical Criticism as Criticism," *Western Speech*, 38 (Spring 1974), 75-80.

[5]For some museum-piece criticism of 19th century oratory see Edward G. Parker, *The Golden Age of American Oratory*, (Boston: Whittemore, Niles, and Hall, 1857).

[8]See, for example, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric*, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1972); the issue is raised in extreme form in Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (Apr. 1970), 168-178 and discussed in the *Forum* for December 1970. Richard H. Kendall attacks the Newman article for being a polemic unsuitable for a scholarly journal in "A Reply to Newman" 432-435 and Newman answers. The issue is raised in more subtle fashion by Forbes I. Hill, "Conventional Wisdom—Traditional Form: The President's Message of November 3, 1969", *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (Dec. 1972), 373-386 and discussed in the *Forum* of the same number by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "'Conventional Wisdom—Traditional Form': A Rejoinder," 451-454. Interestingly enough the same speech was studied by Hermann Stelzner from the perspective of significant recurring form as an example of the mythic quest drama in "The Quest Story and Nixon's November 3, 1969 Address," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 57 (Apr. 1971), 163-172. For an essay outlining the rationale for criticism as polemic see Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins, "Rhetoric, Society and the Critical Response," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (Dec. 1972), 441-450. For an interesting commentary on Wander and Jenkins see Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "The Experience of Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 60 (Dec. 1974), 489-496. The question of criticism as polemic has clearly come under heavy dispute and self-conscious evaluation in the early 1970's. Such dispute often signals a shifting perspective among scholars. Thus, the impulse for a more enduring criticism raises questions about the use of criticism as polemic.

[9]See, for example, Haig Bosmajian, "The Language of White Racism," in Haig Bosmajian, ed., *Readings in Speech*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 205-215.

[10]See, for example, Gustav Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*, 2nd ed., (Madison, Wisconsin: Univ. of Wisc. Press, 1967).

[11]*Manductio ad Ministerium: Directions for a Candidate of the Ministry*, (1726; rpt. New York, 1938). See also Eugene E. White, "Cotton Mather's *Manductio ad Ministerium*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 49 (Oct. 1963), 308-319. Mather's book deals with many aspects of preparing for the ministry but in extensive sections discussing the study and practice of preaching he outlines the Puritan rhetorical theory which sustained the Puritan rhetorical style in the late 17th and early 18th Centuries.

[12]See, for example, W. Stull Holt, "Historical Scholarship," in Merle Curti ed., *American Scholarship in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 95-96.

[13]John Herman Randall, Jr. and George Haines, IV, "Controlling Assumptions in the Practice of American Historians," in *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography*, (Social Science Research Council Bulletin 54, New York, 1946), 19-24.

[12]Rosenfield, "The Experience of Criticism," 494.

[13]Rosenfield, 490-491.

[14]Rosenfield, 491.

[15]Louis Gottschalk, ed., *Generalization in the Writing of History*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

[16]Scott and Brock delineate a viewpoint which they call *experiential* and characterize in part as seeing "each day and its experiences as unique, requiring critical insight to understand the skein of passing phenomena." *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 125. Rosenfield's "The Experience of Criticism," illustrates the viewpoint.

[17]For an excellent treatment of the explanation of human action from Weber's viewpoint see L. M. Lachmann, *The Legacy of Max Weber*, (Berkeley: University of Cal. Press, 1971).

[18]*The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*, (Boston: Beacon, 1961), 29.

[19]For discussions of history and criticism of communication see Barnet Baskerville, "Must We All Be Rhetorical Critics?" *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 63 (April 1977), 107-116, and Bruce Gronbeck "Rhetorical History and Rhetorical Criticism: A Distinction"; *Speech Teacher*, 24 (Nov. 1975), 309-320.

[20]Ernest G. Bormann, "The Rhetorical Theory of William Henry Milburn," *Speech Monographs*, 36 (March 1969), 28-37.

[21]See particularly Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 1 (Winter 1968), 1-14 and Kathleen M. Jamieson, "Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 6 (Summer 1973), 162-170.

[22]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism*, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948).

[23]Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), v, vi, viii.

[24]Ernest G. Bormann ed., *Forerunners of Black Power: The Rhetoric Of Abolition*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971).

[25]Cathcart makes a strong case for the rhetorical definition of movements rather than for the critic relying on definitions based on historical, sociological, or political grounds. See Robert Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," *Western Speech*, 36 (Spring 1972), 82-88; see, also, Charles A. Wilkinson, "A Rhetorical Definition of Movements," *Central States Speech Journal*, 27 (Summer 1976), 88-94.

THE AUTHORS

EDWIN BLACK is a professor of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* received the Speech Communication Association's Golden Anniversary Prize Fund Award. Professor Black edited the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* from 1975-1978.

ERNEST G. BORMANN is a professor of Speech Communication at the University of Minnesota. His published works include *Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts*, *Forerunners of Black Power: The Rhetoric of Abolition*, and *Discussion and Group Methods*. Professor Bormann is a past president of the Central States Speech Association.

KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL is a professor of Speech Communication at the University of Kansas. Professor Campbell authored *Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric*. The conference on " 'Significant Form' in Rhetorical Criticism" was conceived and executed by Professor Campbell in her role as chairperson of the Speech Communication Association's Research Board.

RONALD CARPENTER is an associate professor of English and Assistant Director at The Institute for Advanced Study of Communication Processes at the University of Florida. In 1974, he received the Fellow of the Huntington Library Award.

BRUCE GRONBECK is an associate professor of Speech and Dramatic Art at the University of Iowa. Professor Gronbeck's work has appeared in a number of major books and journals including the *Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals*, *Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition*, *Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism*, and *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: Selections and Readings*.

STEPHEN MICHAEL HALLORAN is an assistant professor of Communication at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He has published in *The Personalist*, *Journal of Technical Writing and Communication*, *The Centennial Review*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *College English* and *Intersections*.

KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON is an associate professor of Speech Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park. Her analysis of the conflict over *Humanae Vitae* received the Speech Communication Association's Outstanding Dissertation Award. Professor Jamieson has edited the book review section of *Quarterly Journal of Speech*.

JAMES SCOTT MEASELL is an associate professor of Speech Communication, Theatre, and Journalism at Wayne State University. His published work has appeared in *Studies in Honor of the Illinois Tradition*, *Theorhet*, *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, the *Central States Speech Journal*, and *Free Speech Yearbook*.

HERBERT SIMONS is a professor of Speech at Temple University. Professor Simon's monographs have received four "best article" awards from the Speech Communication Association and the American Forensic Association. He is the author of *Persuasion; Understanding, Practice and Analysis* and co-edited *Perspectives on Communication in Social Conflict* with Gerald Miller.